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Preface 
"A Ia recherche du temps perdu." The French writer Marcel Proust well understood the significance 
of having time, and in doing so he rewarded us with one of the invaluable masterpieces of 20th 
century literature. 
The present study deals with reducing time in order to have more time. This paradox is unfol-
ded in detail in the chapters that follow. From its genesis, the analysis needed a considerable 
amount of time and travelled through various time zones. A single place of origin is difficult to 
identify for it; the formative experiences occurred some time ago in different locations. A car 
factory in southern Germany, known for its star on the bonnet, greatly influenced the author's 
perception of time, in particular the relation between working and leisure time. The Department of 
Sociology at the University of Bielefeld later provided the unexpected stepping stone for unravelling 
the various dimensions of time in a comparative perspective. Without Claus Offe's invitation to 
collaborate in a research project, the time spent on working time policies in Belgium, France and 
Britain would have been much shorter and less thought provoking. 
Equipped with a detailed research report and awarded a two-year Ph.D. grant from the 
Deutscher ~ademiscbe Austauschdienst, the author set out in the autumn of 1989 to confront the 
complexity that is Italy. Working at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence provided an 
invaluable international environment which profoundly shaped the scope and content of the author's 
dissertation project. During the course of this work at the EUI's Department of Social and Political 
Sciences, the author entered into a dialogue with Gesta Esping -Andersen and Hans -Peter Bloss-
feld who both pointed to the need to riprendere tempo. In numerous seminars and discussions their 
suggestions helped me clarify what repeatedly came to be termed "the dependent variable." Courage 
was thus necessary to change and scrutinize various parts which had cost the author a considerable 
amount of time. The test in endurance to which both supervisors invited me finally produced a 
study which bears only limited resemblance to the project in its earliest stages. 
Finally, the comments of many, at times with measured passion, have greatly influenced the 
evaluation of the present analysis. Those listed will undoubtedly find paragraphs and even sentences 
where their suggestions, criticism and encouragements have made their way into the work. In 
particular, I am indebted to M. Eggert, U. Vogt, D. Gregory, J.M. Beguin, B. Ebbinghaus, J. De 
Deken, J.Y. Boulin, D. Purdy, L. Messeri, Y. Sintomer, M. Held and H.U. Brose. 
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Introduction 
The present study is concerned with one of the most controversial issues of contemporary labour 
market policies: the use of work sharing to confront the social and economic problems caused by 
mass unemployment. In the course of the prolonged economic stagnation since the mid- seventies, 
the advocacy of work sharing was linked to the reduction in working hours. This approach implied 
a large scale reduction of the contractual working week under the heading of the '35-hour week'. 
The underlying argument in favour of work sharing is that distributive equity (a more equal distri-
bution of employment) and social welfare (improved quality of life) are advanced through the 
reduction of working hours. 
The recognition of working time policies as serving to create new jobs gained currency and 
decisively influenced the arena of social and labour market policies in a specific set of Western 
European countries. Such countries can be characterized by a combination of the following three 
features: (i) an absence of institutionalised commitment to full- employment, (ii) a dearth of a 
flexible wage policy, and (iii) an intermediate degree of centralisation in the institutions of collective 
action (for instance national bargaining). Belgium, France and Great Britain' are three such coun-
tries. Their employment performance during the past 15 years has seldom been characterised as 
success stories and their labour markets could be said to suffer from 'institutional sclerosis'. 2 
Throughout the past two decades the relationship between labour market institutions and em-
ployment performance across countries has intrigued economists and political sociologists alike. In 
part, this debate was motivated by the observation that since the onset of a low- growth, high-
unemployment phase of capitalist development in the mid- 1970s certain OECD countries have 
fared better than others. On that account the evolution and configuration of unemployment provo-
ked greatest divergence in explanation and policy response. 
1) Hereafter referred to as Britain. 
2) The term institutional sclerosis highlights frustated reforms and lack of adaptation. Institu-
tions are considered as widely unaffected by environmental change and/or reform efforts (cf. 
Kaufman 1976). 
--------------------------
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Some authors attribute success in sustaining low unemployment rates to the institutional feature 
of corporatist intermediation. Seen as a device for successful crisis management, corporatism is 
generally understood as a combined pattern of interest intermediation and as a system of concerted 
public policy-making (cf. Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982). Austria and the Nordic countries are 
most often cited as the model cases of corporatist income and active labour market policies (cf. 
Crouch 1985, Bruno and Sachs 1985). 
From a very different perspective, it is argued by Klau and Mittelstadt (1986) as well as Free-
man and Weitzman (1986) that the favourable outcomes are rooted in decentralized and flexible 
labour markets which afforded competitive forces sufficient leeway for adjustments and revisions, in 
particular with regard to incomes policies. This market forces approach selects the United States and 
Switzerland as the positive examples. 
Finally, the 'view from the top' holds that the successful employment performance was shaped 
by the degree of inter-union and interemployer cooperation in wage bargaining. Calmfors and 
Driffill (1988) and Oswald (1979) argue that the capacity of labour confederations and employer 
associations to internalize externalities, such as macro-economic parametres like the level of 
inflation, the development of unemployment and total demand, essentially rests on independent 
variables like organisational centralisation (the degree of hierarchical control) and concentration (the 
degree of inclusiveness). Both features converge in the idea of encompassing interest organisations 
in the labour market which are capable of producing a "national perspective on political issues" (cf. 
Olson 198:!: 50).3 Again, but from a different point of departure compared with the first approach, 
Austria and the Scandinavian countries are cited as the economies with the most favourable outco-
mes. 
Such studies not only generated predictions about the interaction of labour market institutions 
and employment performance but were matched by a search for alternative options outside traditio-
nal Keynesian policy making: (i) accelerating rates of inflation, (ii) exogenous shocks, such as the 
huge oil price increases, to which the OECD countries were subject during the seventies in coexis-
tence with (ill) balance of payments difficulties, (iv) persistent growth in labour supply and (v) the 
dramatic emergence of unemployment confronted policy makers with a fundamental problem. Fiscal 
3) However, as Olson (1986) has pointed out, the stability conditions for encompassing organi-
sations are demanding and their dynamics problematic. Given the degree of uncertainty in times of 
sustained economic crisis, sub- groups in encompassing organisations may very well dominate the 
configuration of certain issues on the agenda of labour market policies, thus limiting the internaliza-
tion of cost effects and the moderation of demands. 
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and monetary policy alone were no longer sufficiently powerful instruments to simultaneously 
guarantee full employment and secure price stability (cf. Schmidt 1987: 5). In consequence, the 
sustained economic crisis .forced acknowledgement that the development avenue of the 1960s, 
heretofore accepted as uncontested, might no longer be open (see for examples, Casey and Bruche 
1985; Scbarpf(1987); Schmidt (1987)). 
It is at this critical conjuncture that the present study begins. The research constitutes a dynamic 
analysis of a particular policy process studied accross countries and over time. Its focus of interest 
is the change of specific policy responses to the employment crisis of the 1970s and 1980s. The 
period under consideration spans the rapid growth of unemployment during the mid -seventies to 
the eve of establishing the Single European Market in 1992. Three national policy settings -
Belgium, France and Britain - are compared and contrasted in order to investigate the political 
behaviour of collective actors in the labour market. 
Kohn (1987: 713) has argued that "cross-national research is most useful when it can resolve a 
disputed question of interpretation." His underlying requirement is therefore that the countries 
selected for case-oriented comparisons be moderately dissimilar. Obviously Belgium, France and 
Britain are each democratically constituted countries with an advanced capitalist economy and 
established welfare state. Aside from these general similarities a number of internal particularities set 
them apart, including, among others, the institutional framework of the labour market and the 
politico-economic situation. 
The Choice of Countries 
The selection of the three countries under consideration needs to be placed in a broader internatio-
nal context. Work sharing, its redistributive potential to the fore, became a common feature of trade 
union labour market policies in many Western European societies. Belgium, France and Britain 
were among the countries witnessing shorter hours policies being placed on the agenda of collective 
bargaining during the late seventies and ·early· eighties. But they were not alone. Alongside them 
were the Netherlands, Spain, Austria, Denmark and in particular (West) Germany. Hence, the 
existence of the policy does not account for our choice of countries. 
A clearer picture emerges when considering basic structural differences. The three countries 
display different patterns of industrial relations. To illustrate: the voluntary, fragmented and decen-
tralized nature of the British industrial relations system frustrates the achievement of redistributional 
5 
objectives above the individual plant level. Lash and Urry (1987: 12) have argued that the "instru-
mental collectivism and 'democratic anarchy' of the British shop stewards' movement" renders it 
most difficult to achieve work sharing objectives above the individual firm level. 
The French tradition further diversifies the trajectories. Irrespective of its political colouring, 
protracted governmental intervention highlights both the regulatory competence of the government in 
labour relations and the repeated subordination of unionism to politics. Moreover, in spite of 
traditionally low union density figures, and in the absence of neo -corporatist arrangements, the 
French labour confederations have possessed and proved substantial mobilisation capacities (cf. 
Rosa.nvallon 1988). 
Completing the contrast, Belgium enjoys a state- induced concertation system which seeks to 
provide political predictability and incremental adjustment to structural constraints beyond the 
control of Small European States. However, one has to bear in mind that the Belgian case does not 
readily lend itself to the generalisations that govern the mainstream of international comparative 
studies of unemployment and labour market policy. Capturing the distinctive politico-economic 
structures and practices in Belgium requires recognition of a specific regional dynamic in combina-
tion with linguistic cleavages which severely constrain any policy confronting unemployment on a 
national scale (cf. Bastian 1992: 36). 
Focusing on the three aforementioned countries also allows comparison of the incumbency of 
different political governments, and to what extent variation of this calibre affected the formulation 
\ 
of labour market policies. Regarding the political environment, the British electorate mandated 
Margaret Thatcher on 3 May 1979 to lead a Conservative Government that subsequently repudiated 
the Keynesian economic and social consensus that had prevailed for the previous three decades. On 
8 November 1981 the Belgians elected Wilfried Martens to head a coalition government of Chris-
tian- Democratic and Liberal parties which quickly introduced a major politico-economic rupture 
within the country's institutional system. 
By contrast, on 10 May 1981 the French elected Fran~ois Mitterrand as the first Socialist Presi-
dent under the Fifth Republic. Contrary to voting patterns in Sweden in 1976, Britain in 1979, the 
U.S.A in 1980, and Belgium in 1981, the so-called Rightward drift of Western electorates witnes-
sed a marked challenge. Rather, France in 1981 demonstrated that there was no general trend 'to 
the Right', but "towards the rejection of governments which failed to cope with the contemporary 
economic crisis, whether the methods used were Keynesian/Social Democratic or 'neoconservative"' 
(cf. Lange et al. 1982: 78). 
In the realm of economic and labour market policies, France provides a decided exception to the 
other two countries: the Mitterrand Government of 1981/82 constituted the single Western European 
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country where a redistributional policy of working time reduction (partage du travail) coincided with 
the decision to pursue an isolated reflation programme built on Keynesian budgetary policies. In that 
respect, the centre of gravity of distributive conflicts was explicitly moved by the Socialist Govern-
ment from the labour market into the political arena. This shift provides a marked contrast to 
Belgium and Britain, and offers fruitful elaboration on the possibilities for the French labour move-
ment to influence distributive processes by political means. For our purposes, the French case shall 
be treated with regard to the consequences this shift implied for the choice of conflict strategies and 
distributive policies. 
The Focus on the Policy Process 
Across these diverse national settings we analyze the policy process in relation to a particular 
redistributive labour market strategy: work sharing. The policy process is conceptualized as a 
multi-dimensional process consisting of three stages: (i) adoption (agenda-setting and compromise 
formation), followed by (ii) implementation (action phase) and completed by (iii) evaluation (rein-
forcement, goal displacement or termination) of the policy. In the context of this conceptualisation, 
three key actors are examined: the government, employers associations and labour organisations. 
Our focus on the dynamics of policy-making in three Western European states serves the 
purpose of understanding how particular institutional contexts in the labour market affect the 
operation of industrial relations organisations. The strategy of work sharing provides the empirical 
suport to this end. This strategy (re -)emerged in the course of the structural break with the 
post- war economic and social settlement. Spiralling unemployment as a pressing problem and work 
sharing as a means of countering the labour market crisis arose simultaneously on the political 
agenda during the late 1970s (cf. Bastian et al. 1989: 323). 
The majority of studies published in the past decade on the issue of working time reduction 
privileged the examination of labour market efficacy, and, in theoretical terms, the instrumental 
rationality of the respective ·policy. Econometric simulations and plant-based case studies were the 
characteristic methods applied to a research agenda which was traditionally concerned with the 
evaluation of goal achievement (cf. Tuchszirer and Greffe (1986) for the Belgian case, Marchand et 
al. (1983) for the French example and White and Ghobadian (1984) for the British case). 
Operationalizing policy evaluation exclusively in terms of outcomes implied comparing results 
with goals. Hence, the focus centred around the effects of working time reduction, in particular the 
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policy's performance record with regard to curtailing unemployment. The yardsticks chosen for such 
a form of policy evaluation were the respective success or failure of shorter hours in creating new 
jobs. Yet, very little emerged from the aforementioned references on working time policies about 
the importance of institutional variables structuring the interactions of industrial relations actors. The 
operation of labour market policies depends on whether the resources needed for implementation are 
available and can be legitimately used. Institutional arrangements in the industrial relations system 
provide collective actors with resources and regulate their use Disregarding institutional dynamics 
can lead to the neglect of one of the fundamental paradox of contemporary labour market policies. 
It is likely that such policies are sought in situations when the constraints of the circumstances in 
which they are to be applied are such that their chances of proving effective are highly uncertain 
(cf. Olsen 1992: 253). 
The outlines and implications of our policy process analysis will be elaborated in more detail in 
the course of the chapters that follow. Still, some comments about the general relevance of institu-
tional factors shaping policy processes in the labour market are apposite here. 
In analysing the logics of politics in Belgium, France and Britain, I attempt to show how 
different policy processes produce similar programme proflles at the level of labour market policies. 
Empirically, this is applied to the adoption and implementation of work sharing strategies via 
working time reduction and its subsequent transformation into issues focusing on the introduction or 
enlargement of temporal flexibility in the labour market. Identifying the variation in the routes 
~ 
adopted and exemplifying such diversity in terms of the institutional characteristics of the policy 
processes in the three countries form the centrepoint of the analysis. 
This view of the policy process implies that advancing redistributive strategies forces labour 
market actors into subjective assessments of environmental stability or change, trade-off constella-
tions as well as interpretations about the respective performance of policies. Performance is under-
stood as informing labour market actors about the relative efficacies of strategies. The conclusions 
which the different organisations then arrive at are reflected in the subsequent flexibility of organisa-
tional behaviour. This assumption has some ramifications for our analysis. Exploring the signifi-
cance and effects of experience implies investigating possible strategy changes and policy transfor-
mations resulting from what March and Olsen (1988: ·335) have termed "organisational learning 
under ambiguity." 
Policy adaptation concerns how organisations adapt to changing, uncertain environments. To 
study collective actors in such a way is to identify the degree to which their policies have to be 
modified in order to address new conditions. However, learning from experience has to take two 
central features of the environment into consideration: (i) the frequency of changes, of which many 
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cannot be anticipated in times of sustained labour market problems, (ii) and the degree of uncertain-
ty deriving therefrom which impairs strategies from being stable over time (cf. Kurke 1988: 203). 
Strategies may thus change as a result of reflection based on experience, necessity or contextual 
ambiguity. The comparison is therefore particularly concerned with how organisations assemble 
responses to outcomes. 
Learning from experience may not only be difficult to adopt, but if it so happens, there is no 
guarantee that the politics of learning live up to original objectives or a changed set of policies. In 
response to policy performance, environmental change or institutional constraints labour market 
actors display patterns of "selective perception" (cf. March and Simon 1958: 127). These percep-
tions shape their horizon of attention, filter available information and determine the repertoire of 
possible responses. 
Policy modification is treated in the context of labour market actors learning, that is developing 
experience, forming evaluations and basing subsequent responses on these two. Policy adaptation is 
thus an outcome of policy performance and changes in the socio-economic environment of indus-
trial relations actors. For our purposes it will serve as an analytical lens on the chances and limits 
of policy -learning. In the Belgian and British cases the focus is on policy adaptation after funda-
mental changes in the law and standard operating practices of industrial relations became politically 
feasible because the respective governments had converted to monetarism and no longer depended 
so much on union cooperation. The French example considers the incapacity of unions and employ-
ers' associations to alter premises of decision -making on various policies and Mitterrand 's expe-
rience of being 'out of step', both of which fostered the government's resolution to entirely alter the 
Socialisme a la lranfaise reform project. 
This study of redistributive strategies can extend our knowledge of labour market policies in 
three ways. First, the analysis explores work sharing strategies along the axes of (i) policy adoption, 
(ii) compromise formation and subsequent implementation, (iii) as well as policy evaluation. In that 
respect, the political dynamic inherent in the strategy of work sharing has a broad reach: It extends 
from the evaluation of (working) time preferences of the workforce to the intervention into fields as 
controversial as income sharing, the establishment of inter-organisational compliance with redistri-
butive objectives and the selection of implementation procedures that correspond to the standard 
operating practices of individual sectors and fums. 
Second, the comparative nature of the study is a major advantage. Such a comparative enterprise 
can bring a wider range of options to view. By enlarging the focus of analysis to an institutional ap-
proach of state -capital-labour relations across countries we can divine structural properties that 
shape distinctive national patterns of policy. Such properties can be regarded as resources for the 
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achievement of outcomes. Still, comparative research is sometimes criticised on the grounds that 
evidence generated for one country hardly applies to another because the multivaried contexts of 
countries have to receive appropriate affirmation. Our comparative focus directs attention to how 
these are shaped by an institutional design and what dispositions the government, employers associa-
tions and labour organisations manifest towards redistributive strategies. 
Finally, the critical role played by labour market institutions in the articulation and adoption of 
working time policies is of pivotal importance for an understanding of policy processes in Belgium, 
France and Britain.4 Examining the interaction between interests, institutions and strategies in the 
industrial relations systems contributes to a broader theoretical understanding of labour markets as 
systems of economic and social interaction. 
The Empirical Basis of the Research 
The analysis utilizes different sources of information, none of which assumes priority. Documentary 
sources include statistical data, research material produced by institutions that service governments, 
employers' associations and trade unions. Furthermore, the study rests on partly unpublished 
documents that became available through direct contacts with government representatives and 
\ 
officials of the individual industrial relations organisations. 
In preparing this study, the author benefited greatly from a series of interviews conducted in 
Belgium, France and Britain between 1988 and 1990. The interviewees consisted of representatives 
of interest groups, officials of trade unions, employers' associations, political parties, government 
executives and academics in each country. The list of interviewees for the respective countries is 
presented in the Appendix. 
The importance of the interviews has to be seen in context. Their originality did not derive from 
the fact that they yielded information which was not available from the growing body of literature 
on labour market policies. Their significance rather originated from experiencing the different 
industrial relations actors in their environment, receiving an insight into the opportunities, con-
straints and situational perceptions which shape decision making about labour market policies amidst 
4) For an analysis of suboptimal choices in politics based on a rational choice approach to 
institutions which covers the same three countries as our study see Tsebelis 1990. 
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an unprecedented level of contextual uncertainty. Thus, the interpretation of objective data from 
other sources was greatly enhanced through meeting labour market actors in their respective sur-
din s roun gs. 
Finally, parts of the empirical case studies are based on an extensive research project at the 
University of Bielefeld, Department of Sociology in which the author took part. The research 
focused on comparing developments in working time policy in seven OECD countries during the 
period 1975-1990. The countries under consideration were Austria, Belgium, Britain, France, the 
(former) Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and Norway. The project was funded by a 
two year research grant of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), and was directed by Prof. 
Dr. Claus Offe and Dr. Karl Hinrichs (University of Bremen, Center for Social Policy). The 
analysis was carried out between August 1987 and February 1990. For a detailed overview see the 
final research report submitted to the DFG (cf. Bastian et al. 1990). In toto, the diversity of infor-
mation sources will thus permit us to reconstruct the making and transformation of a core issue on 
the agenda of labour market policies during the past decade. 
The Order of the Analysis 
The chapters that follow are designed to achieve various purposes. Organised around a comparison 
of working time policies in Belgium, France and Britain, the analysis seeks to illuminate the dyna-
mic interplay between actors, policy processes and the industrial relations context. The study's 
fundamental contention is that institutional arrangements shaped the formulation, compromise forma-
tion and implementation of redistributive labour market policies. Thus, institutions structure the 
interaction of labour market actors and influence the actors' definition of interests, one's own as 
much as the anticipated complementary behaviour of other collective actors. 
5) Adding to the interest and the substance of the study were revealing incidents and surprising 
options that often accompany personal interviewing. Of those contacted for interviewing, only one 
- although fumly agreed - was unexpectedly prevented due to his "Wimbledon holiday". On 
another occasion, interviewing the President of a University in Belgium who· was a former State 
Secretary to the Employment Minister ultimately resulted in receiving the invitation to interview the 
Employment Minister himself. 
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The chapters I and ll provide the theoretical terrain. First, by conceptualizing work sharing as a 
redistributive labour market strategy. The advocacy of work sharing through reduced working time 
concentrated on redistributing employment in favour of those seeking (re -)entrance into the labour 
market. Accordingly, the emergence of work sharing on the agenda of labour market policies is 
analysed with reference to a policy process with multiple features: the mosaic of policy adoption, 
implementation and evaluation. 
The dynamic of the policy process is taken up in chapter n. The Chapter attempts to identify 
how strategies are translated into policies and takes account of the constraints involved in the 
process. In essence, decisions concerning labour market policies are made under contextual uncer-
tainty and with limited means of forecasting their performance, let alone unanticipated contingen-
cies. 
The empirical chapters contain an account of working time policy in Belgium, France and 
Britain during the past 15 years, which can be read for its own sake. The main objective of these 
chapters, however, is to unfold the direction that working time policies took in the three countries. 
By doing so, I shall direct the searchlight to institutional dimensions of policy making in the labour 
market. 
The Belgian case is underpinned by the recognition of a specific regional dynamic which placed 
any attempt to confront the labour market crisis on a national scale under taxing constraints. By 
contrast, in the French example I highlight the interaction between the state and the collective 
bargaining brganisations in the field of work sharing, and illustrate how the lack of support from 
the latter influenced the decision of the former to terminate the objective of the 35-hour week. 
Finally, the British chapter draws attention to the capacity of unions and employers associations to 
perform as positive contributors for active labour market policies. Given the fragmentation and 
decentralisation of British labour relations the implementation of work sharing policies was bound to 
be conflictual and subject to repeated legitimacy problems. 
The comparative perspectives in chapter VI outline the institutional dynamic of labour market 
policies in Belgium, France and Britain more completely. In this context, Germany is briefly added 
to the analysis as a counterfactual. It serves the purpose to achieve more comparative leverage over 
the issues at hand. The comparison further includes a number of questions still searching for 
answers which are addressed in the closing parts of the chapter. They deal with, inter-alia, the 
increased prominence of non-standard forms of work and the challenge of improving the flexibility 
of industrial relations in Belgium, France and Britain. 
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CHAPTER I 
Conceptual Focus and Background of the Study 
1. Work Sharing as a Redistributive Strategy 
There are two broad types of policies focusing directly on jobs: employment policies and labour 
market policies. The distinction is not entirely felicitous. Because both types of policies are overlap-
ping categories it is acknowledged that the terminology rests on thin ice. In practice the differen-
tiation between the two is equally ambiguous. There are a number of reasons for this. First, various 
employment policies affect one or a combination of labour market parameters (for instance labour 
supply, vocational training, job creation through subsidies to relocating frrms). Furthermore, the 
distinction between employment and labour market policies is generally one of degree rather than of 
kind. Finally, at a conceptual level little agreement exists on how each should be defined with 
regard to their differences. 
Uncertainty over their defmitional boundaries derives from the problem of distinctively concep-
tualizing the scope and depth of interventions into labour markets which serve the purpose of 
reducing unemployment for persons who are ready to work (cf. Janoski 1990: 7). The lowest 
common denominator would be that labour market policies can be regarded as a subset of employ-
ment policies. The latter are characterized as serving the unemployed and directed towards explicite 
job creation, while the former are designed to improve the employability of (specific) groups of the 
workforce inside and outside the labour market. Besides, labour market policies seek to influence 
the composition of employment demand during rapid structural change. In addition, employment 
policies may require the direct involvement of government, for instance when implementing public 
sector job creation schemes. In sum, it is necessary to emphasise that the differentiation between the 
two is an analytical, not a substantive one (cf. OBCD 1983: 8). 
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As a labour market policy work sharing is characterized by its redistributional objectives. It 
seeks to influence the supply side by altering two parameters in the operation of the labour market: 
the duration and configuration of standardized annual or weekly working time. The advocacy of 
work sharing, in French partage du travail, through shorter hours envisaged a large-scale redistri-
bution of paid work in the mainstream economy between those in full- time employment and those 
seeking (re- )entrance into the labour market. It therefore differs considerably from an approach to 
work sharing that is well established at the level of the individual firm: short-time working. The 
underlying assumption of short-time working is that weekly working time and wages are (tempora-
rily) reduced in order to avoid redundancies resulting from a downturn in business (cf. White 1987: 
27). 
For our analysis the distinction between work sharing as a distributive strategy and working time 
reduction as the policy outcome is central. This differentiation highlights the dynamic approach to 
policy making that is adopted here. In relation to work sharing we ask. and provide empirical 
evidence for, the question: how do strategies converge into policies? The use of the term strategy 
and its analytical prominence are deliberate. The term strategy has rational choice implications 
which - inter alia - refer to comprehensiveness, coherence, consciousness, long-term perspecti-
ves and patterns of interaction between agents (cf. Elster 1989b). Furthermore, a feature of strate-
gies as distinct from policies is that they develope a dynamic of their own after their adoption. 
Strategies can become a public property - a common point of reference which fascinate and 
intrigue botJ1 supporters and opponents alike. This in itself usually guarantees that once it has 
become established as public property, a strategy will take on a life of its own. 
Strategies are thus developed in dynamic situations. Hence they are subject to constraints, 
contextual uncertainty and possible change. With such dimensions strategy makes reference to the 
activities of a (collective) actor, and cannot be examined apart from the acting self. It is necessary 
to reinforce this apparent tautology because in a substantial part of the sociological literature the 
nature of strategy is discussed primarily in relation to a contrast with tactics and practices. How-
ever, the characteristics of the interplay between strategy and agency remain unexplored or implicit 
(cf. Crow 1989). 
The term 'strategy' as I apply it here involves the dynamic interplay between actor(s), objectives 
and the industrial relations context in which the strategy is being employed (cf. Kochan et al. 
1984). This interrelation raises questions of strategy formation with regard to (i) the attention being 
paid to the actors involved (originators of a strategy), (ii) the strategy of others (institutionalised 
relations between social actors) and (iii) that elements of an original strategy may change over time 
in the process of compromise formation and policy evaluation (structural constraints on strategic 
choice). 
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Throughout, the emphasis is on the relational character of strategies in the industrial relation1 
systems; that is to say, on the adjustment and re-adjustment of strategies through the interactiom 
of collective actors. TJ:¥8 dynamic component implies choices, resources and discretion over decisior 
procedures. In a word, the dynamic places the question of autonomy and dependence in social 
interaction on the research agenda. Both properties involve excercising power. The notion of power 
is understood in a relational sense, and concerns the accomplishment of definite outcomes in strate-
gic conduct. The realisation of these objectives is contingent on the agency of other actors. This 
aspect of structural constraints on strategic choice has received considerable attention in the analysis 
of collective actors in industrial relations systems. 
"a choice of strategy is not just a choice between goals, but a choice between goals set in the 
context of the means needed to secure them. It may often happen that a union pursues a less 
desired goal because the means available to secure it are less hazardous than those needed for a 
more desired goal. The result is often peculiar: unions and workers are seen to pursue a strategy 
which no one really wants. But the alternative may have been securing no goal at all (cf. Crouch 
1982: 139, emphasis in original), 
Situated in such an understanding the strategy of work sharing opens capital-labour bargaining, 
focused on income levels, to the provision of additional jobs through working time reduction. The 
increased salience of work sharing demands in the public discourse about labour market problems 
thus reflects changing frontiers of distributional conflicts between the industrial relations actors ( cf. 
Korpi 1980: 300). However, we have to bear in mind that such distributional conflicts are not 
simply issues of shifting frontiers. The interpretations and meanings that labour market actors attach 
to legal, political and social institutions significantly augment our understanding of work sharing 
demands. The general predispositions of industrial relations actors towards the (i) employment crisis, 
(ii) changing nature of the labour market, (iii) modes and scope of state intervention and (iv) 
welfare state provisions are essential for comprehending distributive conflicts emerging since the 
mid-seventies (cf. Sbalev 1983: 315). 
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2. The Historical Background 
The genesis of work sharing on public platforms and bargaining agendas was essentially pragmatic. 
Some governments as well as many trade unions in the main OECD countries valued the strategy of 
work sharing as a response to the evident end of the halcyon days of vigorous economic growth 
and near full-employment. According to governmental and union blueprints advocating the positive 
effects of work sharing, the alleviation of widespread problems of employment rested on two 
interdependent parameters: (i) the greater the proportion of working time reduction and (ii) the 
speedier this reduction was arrived at. Rather then deriving from new investments and enlarged 
profitability margins, job creation was considered to be the outcome of redistributing the volume of 
work offered. Thus, in theory, ftrms are forced to look for a combination of improving producti-
vity and reverting to the external labour market. 
Therefore, the salience of work sharing must be seen in the light of an institutional challenge: 
recourse to other strategies capable of mastering the labour market crisis were either blocked in 
various OECD countries, or established routines of policy making increasingly became subject to 
legitimation problems. With the drop or even cessation of economic growth and the rapidly expan-
ding une~ployment rates, collective bargaining actors were forced to confront the readjustment of 
two traditionally crucial elements of their repertoire of industrial governance: determining trade-off 
constellations in the distribution of income and the allocation of employment opportunities (cf. 
Bastian et al. 1989: 323). 
It should become clear through these remarks that I am concentrating on work sharing as a 
means to an end: reductions in standard weekly hours were identified by unions and governments as 
a regulatory measure capable of advancing redistributive objectives in the labour market. In that 
respect, I am not concerned with (working) time as a sociological concept. The calculation of 
working time extends over various periods of calendar time: daily, weekly, monthly, annually and 
life labour time (cf. Zoll 1988). For our purposes it is unnecessary to investigate these periods. I 
shall rather be particularly concerned- with the impact of weekly working time reductions on enhan-
cing work sharing. Furthermore, the focus is on active phases of shorter hour policies, therefore 
some temporal imbalance in the coverage of time periods in the three countries is self-evident. 
Formerly, the demand for a reduction of normal working hours focused on a re- adaptation of 
working time organisation to differentiated needs of society and changing leisure preferences of the 
individual employees. In other words, the reorganisation of working time schedules and the desea-
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ling of rigid time regimes were regarded as measures supporting economic modernisation and 
extending social welfare gains. In addition to such viewpoints which dominated the shorter hours 
debate during the period ,1960-1979, a variety of social norms was invoked in working time 
policies. Such normative considerations included equality of treatment and fairer divisions. In 
particular, the industrial unions would call for a reduction in working hours, and receive instant 
support from their rank- and - ftle because they viewed existing disparities with white -collar staff 
as an undue and unjustified practice. Engineering unions therefore concentrated on curtailing, and 
eventually overcoming, differentials between occupational ranks. 
However, this normative approach harboured serious difficulties, several of which stemmed from 
a failure to address existing working time differentials in recognition of the gendered dimension in 
the division of labour (cf. Daly and Scheiwe 1991). The distribution of working time inside and 
outside the labour market between men and women did not become an issue of a redistributional 
strategy intended to curtail unemployment (cf. Pwdy 1988: 145ff.). The logic of the work sharing 
debate · surfacing first in the traditional Fordist industries saw the prime age male worker as the 
primary bread winner. Furthermore, he constituted the core of union militancy in manufacturing 
industries and felt entitled to make the strongest claims over a shrinking supply of jobs in the 
secondary sector. 
In its formative stages the work sharing debate can thus be regarded as accommodating a Fordist 
policy logic. However, the timing and goal formation of the strategy exhibited a profound paradox: 
the work sharing alternative was adopted by blue-collar unions when the Fordist reality was 
increasingly crumbling. Only when the policy transformation from work sharing objectives towards 
enlarged options for temporal flexibility set in did the gender division in the patterns of work 
organisation and non- market work in the household economy gradually make their way on the 
collective bargaining agenda (cf. Kurz-Scherf 1988: 544). 
3. Towards an Institutional Understanding of Labour Market Policies 
The present research tries to make a number of theoretical contributions. First, our enterprise lends 
a dynamic understanding to institutional theories1 of the labour market. In studying labour market 
institutions we must distinguish between (i) institutions as providing a regularity in collective 
behaviour, a focus that is often applied in game theoretical analysis of institutions (cf. Hechter 
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1990; Sened 1991), and (ii) seeing them as constituting an organisational or legal structure which 
enforces, determines and alters policies and the polity (cf. Freeman 1988; Shepsle 1989). This 
categorisation does not imply that the two approaches are mutually exclusive. 
In practice, however' the discussion of the former approach is mainly concerned with the emer-
gence of institutions and links their genesis either to the spontaneous and voluntary actions of 
self- interested atomized individuals (invisible hand approach) or to individual demands for jointly 
produced private goods (solidaristic logic). By contrast, the latter scholars conceptualize institutions 
as part of the environment which present labour market actors with a matrix of incentives.2 Given 
our focus on the policy process in the labour market we must sidestep a further analysis of institu-
tional genesis, although it is acknowledged that deliberation along such lines is fruitful. 
Furthermore, placing the key focus on the ways in which a particular institutional context affects 
the operations of labour market organisations emphasizes the procedural properties of institutions. 
Having noted the organisational and legal structures of institutions, our approach stresses how 
routinized compliance processes and standard operating practices shape not only the stability and 
persistence of institutional arrangements but simultaneously determine the formulation, adoption and 
implementation of policies (Shepsle 1989: 137). Finally, our understanding of institutions as struc-
turing the interactions of labour market actors holds that organisational positions within institutional 
arrangements influence the actors' perception and definition of interests, one's own as much as the 
anticipated complementary behaviour of other strategic actors (for instance competing unions, em-
ployers or bhsiness associations, the state, international institutions). 
This relational character of institutions (cf. Hal11986: 19) leads us to the final implication: the 
power relations within institutions and the control over institutional procedure. Studying the policy 
process involves acknowledging that the labour market is "embedded" in and formed by (i) net-
works of social relations, (ii) social institutions like the welfare state, (iii) demographic factors and 
(iv) the critical importance of (asymmetrical) resources available to the industrial relations actors. 
Hence, we conceive labour market institutions as arenas of "democratic class struggle" over agenda 
power and policy outcomes (cf. Korpi 1983: 21). 
1) Institutional theory has a long tradition in social sciences. As Durkheim ([1895] 1938: 1 vi) 
already noted "sociology can ... be defined as the science of institutions, of their genesis and of their 
functioning." 
2) Understanding institutions in their dual aspect of agency and structure helps in overcoming 
the trap of structural determinism, namely through the predominance of economic structures, so 
common in mainstream marxist social sciences of the sixties (cf. Giddens 1979: 49-95). 
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Our understanding of institutional arrangements as being affected by a system of social relations 
and political forces runs counter to structural- functional explanations that view institutions as the 
efficient solution to economic problems (cf. Williamson 1981). Currently resurfacing under the 
' 
heading of "new institutional economics", Williamson assumes that institutions are a functional 
substitute for the incapacity of atomized individuals to create trust between each other. By contrast, 
our endeavour provides evidence in support of the view that the contextual properties of institutions 
are essential influencer& of the operation of (collective) actors. For this reason, we are concerned 
with the ways in which interests and preferences develop within the context of institutional action. 
4. The Policy Backdrop: Reacting to a Critical Conjuncture 
The labour market crisis unfolding midway through the seventies is taken as a critical starting point. 
Why and how it came about is a matter of substantial controversy ever since its emergence after the 
first oil price shock of 1973174. Out of the pool of competing crisis analyses three approaches merit 
brief presentation. They mirror the range of theoretical positions elaborated to describe the critical 
conjuncture midway through the 1970s. However, no attempt is made to rank them on their 
capacity to explain the crisis phenomena in the labour markets of Belgium, France and Britain. 
Rather, they are utilized to provide stepping stones for our central argument in this section: that 
routines of Keynesian demand management were profoundly thrown into question and generated a 
new set of policy responses. 
The British economic historian Maddison (1991) posits the post-war prosperity as the excep-
tion, rather than the normal course of events, in OECD countries. For him, the formidable success 
story between 1945 and the early 1970s was the result of a unique development of capitalism in 
Western European societies. According to Maddison, the erosion of the particularly favourable 
circumstances of the "golden age" involved facing (i) double-digit inflation, (ii) floating exchange 
rates as a result of the collapse of the Bretton Woods international monetary systems in 1971, (iii) 
balance of payments and terms of trade shocks as well as the (iv) disintegration of the full-
employment objective. Dealing with these shocks implied new risks for policy- making, and 
transition problems in devising new instruments. "It was felt that accommodation of inflation beyond 
a certain point would lead to hyperinflation, and that hyperinflation would threaten the whole 
socio-political order" (cf. Maddison 1991: 188). 
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The French economist Boyer (1988, 1989) elaborates a completely different interpretation. His 
scholarship has introduced the paradigm of the Regulation School. For Boyer the "big crisis" in 
1974, like the world wide recession of 1929/30, represents central fractures and crossroads for the 
transformation of advanced capitalist societies. Overcoming such a major crisis by making the 
correct turn occurs through the protracted use of new structural parameters. Such societal mecha-
nisms of regulation range from the international division of labour, new monetary and fiscal policies 
as well as readjusting the trade -off patterns in capital-labour bargaining. But the existing policy 
toolbox, primarily consisting of a combination of economic growth and (near) full-employment, 
overtaxed the labour market organisations when the crisis began to reveal its dramatic dimensions. 
Acknowledging that the unfolding crisis required new responses betokened a hard- felt farewell to 
established routines of crisis management. 
Finally, the American economist Piore and sociologist Sabel herald the end of the Fordist age of 
mass production. Its demise coincides with the loss of influence of Keynesian demand management 
policies directed at macro-economic objectives, in particular full-employment and welfare state 
expansion. A further shift in the international economy during the 1970s concerned the increasing 
interdependence among nations in the global economy. As Piore and Sabel (1985) argue, with the 
expansion of manufacturing in newly industrializing countries like Taiwan, Singapore and South 
Korea, Western European ftnns faced growingly stiff foreign competition and as a result therefrom, 
the loss Jr manufacturing jobs in textiles, steel and shipbuilding. With the spread of micro-electro-
nics, the regionalization and flexible specialization of production patterns, the authors identify a 
changing industrial logic. The contours of such new industrial arrangements bear the possibilities of 
prosperity, and therefore the chance for a reintegration of the economy into society. 
Notwithstanding the merits and flaws of the three approaches they all share, albeit from different 
points of departure, the observation that since the beginning of the seventies central features of 
advanced capitalist economies have undergone sustained transitions. This assertion forces US to 
enquire what precisely changed, and simultaneously to consider how governments and collective 
bargaining organisations in the industrial relations systems reacted to this major rupture. 
The starting point is best characterized as the experience of a multi -dimensional break with 
tradition for Western European countries. The contextual conditions for the successful expan~ion of 
capitalist economies prevailing until the mid -seventies had promoted a comfortable accommodation: 
the economic arrangements and institutional routines in Western Europe neither challenged the 
relevant labour market actors to verify their prerogatives of economic and social policy making, nor 
forced a revision of the interpretations on which they were grounded. 
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In the Keynesian diagnosis, re -emerging unemployment was identified as a manageable short-
coming within the demand side of the labour market, almost a hiccup in fact. The Me Cracken 
Report (1977: 14) understoQd both the inflationary outburst of 1974 and the rise in unemployment 
that followed the oil price shock as the outcome of "an unusual bunching of unfortunate disturban-
ces unlikely to be repeated" (author's italics). Thus, this OECD expert committee recommended that 
"better use [be made] of existing instruments of economic policy" (ibid.).3 
But as the crisis aggravated and lengthened, the expectations among governments and industrial 
relations actors of a speedy return to the status quo ante underwent a profound empirical setback. It 
was precisely the established routines and measures of economic policy making which were increa-
singly being thrown into question by the duration and magnitude of the recession. Henceforth, the 
agenda of economic policy making in general and labour market policies in particular was to be 
dominated by the capacity of governments and collective bargaining organisations to come up with 
proposals that either fell within a Keynesian perspective or sought a return to full- employment 
beyond Keynesianism. 
In the absence of policy instruments that could be effectively employed for controlling demand 
and supply, economic policy makers were faced with a choice between containing inflationary 
pressure and weathering unemployment. In that respect, the flfSt central revision of the Keynesian 
post-war compromise occurred in the shape of stagflation policies. Within this approach, curtailing 
inflation was singled out as the pertinent objective of macro-economic policy making. "The policy 
response given was to contain the inflationary impulse and to prevent the price shock becoming 
built into the domestic wage/price spiral" (cf. Llewellyn 1983: 204). Strikingly enough this response 
was initiated by policy makers who could not be suspected of being stirrup holders for neo -liberal 
economic doctrines. For instance, the former British Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan 
justified his spectacular alteration of policy priorities at the Party Conference in 1976 in the follow-
ing terms: 
"We used to think you could just spend your way out of a recession and increase employment by 
cutting taxes and boosting government spending. I tell you, in all candour, that the option no longer 
3) To what extent this view was matched by similar recommendations in the field of anti-
inflation policies is reflected in the following fmding. Concerning incomes policies at the outset of 
the 1970s the OECD (1970: 35, § 80) could diagnose that "the fundamental problem is how to get 
people to exercise the moderation that they would do if they believed that a major recession was 
possible, without actually having to administer the lesson" (my italics). 
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exists, and that insofar as it did exist, it only worked by injecting bigger doses of inflation into the 
economy followed by higher levels of unemployment at the next step. The [Labour] Manifesto was 
right when it said that the fU'St priority of the Labour Government must be a determined attack on 
inflation" (cf. Labour Party 1976: 189). 
This lengthy quotation serves well to illustrate that the gradual turning away from economic and 
political principles of Keynesianism by its initial protagonists had a profound impact on their most 
important political ally: the trade unions. For the abandonment implied to abstain from bail-out 
guarantees that labour organisations had enjoyed in the domains of labour market policy and expan-
ding welfare state provisions. With the policy shift towards controlling inflation and the inertia 
displayed by governments to urgently prioritize growing unemployment, trade unions were left to 
mobilize their own organisational resources to challenge the unfolding labour market crisis. 
However, the labour confederations faced a dilemma with a number of dimensions. First, a 
primarily growth induced fall of unemployment was deemed unlikely, even if still hoped for, and 
became increasingly identified with unintended side effects, especially in the field of environmental 
problems. Additionally, the unfolding phenomenon of jobless economic growth was fundamentally 
altering the definition of how a return to full- employment could be achieved in the short- term 
(cf. Esping-Andersen (1990: 148). Finally, spelling out the components of active labour market 
policies forced a marked recognition of how far the composition of the labour force had changed in 
post- war c~pitalism. Such changes had been under way for decades, but it was only in the face of 
the employment crisis that they forced their way to the forefront of attention. 
The mainstream definition of full- employment had privileged able- bodied men as the bread 
winners (see for instance the Beveridge-model for Britain). But as a glance at labour force partici-
pation rates from the 1960s onwards illustrated, the broadening of what constitutes full-employ-
ment was a result of the female half of the nation repeatedly knocking on the doors of and entering 
into the labour market. Hence, any active labour market policies introduced by a government and/or 
collective bargaining organisations during the employment crisis had to confront the dramatic 
increases of new, especially female, labour force entrants. 
These different transformations forced a much wider menu of policies onto the agenda. The 
features of the employment crisis and the challenges resulting therefrom exhibited various problem 
fields for which the relevant labour market actors would have to open their window(s). Yet, the 
field was not without its fences: certain alternatives lacked credibility, displayed a limited degree of 
efficacy and were subject to. considerable legitimacy problems. For example, the selective curtail-
ment of the active labour force on the basis of ascriptive features like reducing the number of 
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foreign workers or lowering female labour force participation in the three countries were either 
considered economically ineffective (for the former) or politically and socially illegitimate (for the 
latter). 
In a similar vein, an exclusive focus on early retirement schemes, while temporarily compensa-
ting for redundancies, was marred by self -evident limits regarding direct job creation. Adopted for 
ad -hoc responses to the evolving labour market problems, such schemes provided a (non -inten-
ded) parametric shift of norms and expectations, in particular among older employees. A transfor-
mation insofar as the standard working lifetime was permanently changed. Still, even if such sche-
mes include a replacement clause, the programme does not influence the level of employment by 
creating additional, new jobs. Focusing on labour force participation rates of the elderly may thus 
quickly amount to no more than a palliative. Such an approach entails macro-economic disutilities 
on budgetary resources as well as the under- utilization of manpower capacity. The more workers 
take advantage of existing schemes worked out by the government and/or collective bargaining 
organisations, the more fmancial capacities are affected, thereby running social security budgets and 
ftrms' pension programmes into unintended, but astronomical, deficits. 
Given considerations such as these, Scbarprs (1991a: 272) claim that "achieving full-employ-
ment is a distributive problem [whose] main burden must be borne by the workers", is of pivotal 
importance for the present study. Much of the discussion which follows is therefore focused on the 
taxonomy of commitment to redistributive labour market policies. I shall be particularly concerned 
in the following sections with the question of to what extent the state, capital and labour hold 
shared or conflicting conceptions of their interests in the fteld of defming employment problems and 
providing the means of confronting them through work sharing. In what form past scholarship in 
this policy fteld has addressed these questions or ignored their importance shall be reviewed in the 
following section. 
5. Shortcomings in Existing Research on Working Time Policy 
Prime examples of existing scholarship on the labour market effects resulting from working time 
reduction include the analysis by White and Ghobadian (1984) of the implementation of the 
39-hour week in Britain. Regarding France, Marchand et al. (1983) focused on the state-induced 
working time policies during the Socialist experiment of President Mitterrand in 1981-83. Finally, 
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the Belgian case was examined by Tuchszirer and Greffe (1986) who centred their inquiry on the 
combination of statutory income moderation and shorter hours policies during the 1982 - 1986 
period. 
All these studies share the central aim of furnishing objective evidence for the following 
research question: does a policy of working time reduction constitute a rational strategy for curtai-
ling sustained labour market problems? The positive line of the argument implies that since work 
sharing is considered instrumentally rational with regard to its expected performance, namely 
furnishing new jobs, it will be adopted by one or a combination of labour market actors. Inversely, 
the acknowledgement of unintended side-effects and dilemmas which could hamper the presumed 
favourable outcome will guide the concert of actors to refrain from advancing the demand, thus 
suggesting a hands-off approach. On a more theoretical level, the studies' emphasis has been 
placed upon regarding work sharing as an active accomplishment of purposive, knowledgeable 
collective actors. The actors of state politics and capital-labour organisations are regarded as 
rational agents who are constituted in such a way that they are receptive to arguments grounded on 
strategic rationality. 
Simply arguing that a strategy is considered rational and therefore translated into action by the 
state and/or collective bargaining actors is a sociologically precarious description of the motivation 
to adopt a certain measure. This is all the more important against the background of a permafrost of 
structural unemployment. Accordingly, it is misleading to ask which strategies are instrumentally 
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rational for the achievement of a specific objective, for instance labour market efficacy. The basic 
flaw of such an argument is that it involves putting the cart before the horse. A brief disgression 
into "states that are essentially by-products" (cf. Elster 1983: 43ff.) may provide added illustra-
tion. 
What the three studies mistakenly tend to erect into goals for political action effects - namely 
job creation - can only come about as the by-product of activities undertaken for other ends. 
Elster argues in his paramount analysis that some individual and societal states cannot be brought 
about directly but arise spontaneously by abstaining from seeking to execute them deliberately. The 
intentionality to achieve a certain state only results in a widely self -defeating experience. This 
drawback inheres as much in the ·actor constellations as it derives from the state to be realized by 
one or more agents. In short, the advocacy of redistributive equity in the labour market may 
generate reactions from the employers and/or the state which hinder the realisation of the objective 
(see chapter n, section 2 for a more detailed account of this argument). 
In contrast to the aforementioned studies, the present enterprise refrains from entering into the 
fray of methodological controversy about the ·measurement of employment effects of working time 
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reductions or the validity of diverging results of those evaluations. The truth is that defmitions are 
so flexible, reliable data so limited, the possibilities of statistical misinterpretation so great, and 
standards of scholarships so, elastic that almost any argument in this debated field can call on 
empirical support (cf. Aberg 1987; Hart 1984; van Ginneken 1984). In addition, when relying 
exclusively on result indicators the problem arises when to determine the appropriate timing for 
policy evaluation and who should be blamed for ineffectiveness. 
How to deal with the performance of a policy which is explicitely focused on the objective of 
job creation therefore resembles so-called wedge issues: a way for each side in the debate on 
policy evaluation to prove the unreasonableness and fallacy,.-of the other side. We can expect that 
"organisations prefer to take credit for conditions enhancing outcomes but insist that conditions 
having a negative effect be taken into account if outcomes are evaluated" (cf. Scott 1992: 354). 
Hence, the enterprise of comparing ex-ante prognosis with actual labour market performance is a 
matter of consistent controversy and confusion. 
Lack of sound data and methodological constraints linked to identifying an invariant relation 
between a single input factor and its various outcomes are at the core of such evaluation shortcom-
ings. In fact, however, the issue at stake cannot meaningfully be reduced to any single, purely 
quantitative yardstick of evaluation. The presence of many concomitant causes of both success and 
failure render it necessary to recognize the multiplicity of legitimate evaluation criteria. Moreover, 
inherent limits in appraising policies by quantifying the performance of specific measures make it 
difficult to present a yardstick that will fully capture the many different aspects of labour market 
policies. For this reason, the practice of policy evaluation includes taking the larger policy context 
into consideration, which again entails the use of a variety of evaluative criteria (cf. White 1987: 
16-21). 
For our purposes we will narrow the issue of policy evaluation to the following set of questions: 
bow do industrial relations organisations interpret the performance and possible (unintended) side-
effects of the implementation process? Can these interpretations affect the behaviour of actors by 
altering their subsequent choice of strategies? More generally, how do perceptions and conclusions 
arrived at by the state and capital-labour bargaining inspire or limit further action in the policy 
field under consideration? On that -account, instead of looking at the success/failure variables we 
focus on the resources of collective actors in the labour market to adopt, and later either alter or 
reinforce a certain strategy. Our approach acknowledges that strategies, once initiated and later 
transformed into policies, can take on a life of their own. For this reason a policy cannot be seen in 
isolation. It interacts with other policies and is embodied in institutions, social norms and standard 
operating procedures. Furthermore, while focused on a particular objective, policies may produ-
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ce unanticipated consequences which themselves have repercussions for the initial goals set out by 
labour market actors. 
A further shortcoming in the empirical studies is that they tend to fit the country (countries) into 
theoretical constructions that are heavily event-oriented (cf. Teune 1990: 56). Instead, what needs 
to be specified are the (i) organisational conditions, (ii) the character and resources of the concert of 
actors as well as (iii) the recognition of dilemmas arising in situations in which manifest conflicts of 
interest prevail. In other words, we need to shed light on the interaction, the taxonomy of commit-
ment and the standard operating practices which enforce, determine or alter the relations between 
collective actors in various segments of the labour market. 
The work of Bienefeld (1972) adressed this research agenda in a promising way. He analyzed 
the specific conditions, constraints and opportunity structures that surface when engineering a policy 
of working time reduction. Prompting his undertaking was the acknowledgement of this interaction 
process. However, his research as executed had clear shortcomings: his historical study was confi-
ned to economic variables; Bienefeld considered only one country, Britain; and the period under 
investigation extended from post World War II until the mid-sixties. Like the aforementioned 
studies, Bienefeld underestimated the field of action which precedes an investigation of presupposed 
favourable effects of work sharing through working time reduction: the rationality problems, the 
formal rules and compliance procedures which govern the precarious process of consensus forma-
tion within and between the relevant labour market actors. 
The pr&ent study directs scholarship in the field of work sharing to the following research 
agenda: strategic action is constrained by the duration and multi -dimensionality of structural labour 
market problems unravelling under the impact of worsening economic performance during the 
1970s. The texture of possible responses to the crisis is defmed by the decision over yardsticks to 
be applied: economically risk prone, socially desirable and politically disputed. Thus, the adoption 
of policies can be interpreted as the outcome of a number of factors: (i) rationality bounded by the 
combination of established decision rules and (ii) administrative capacities to meet the constraints in 
the labour market in a serial fashion. Furthermore, (iii) the availability of information 4 and (iv) 
institutional resources at the disposal of the state, employers' associations and labour organisations 
to guide the implementation shape the process of policy adoption (cf. Simon 1983). 
4) However, the availability of information does not qualify the information itself. As Nisbett 
et al. (1982: 101) have convincingly shown, information must not necessarily be informative. 
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CHAPTER IT 
. 
The Dynamics of the Policy Process in the Labour Market 
1. The Policy Process as a Mosaic of Adoption, Implementation and 
Evaluation 
Our enterprise follows the lines of a case- oriented approach. In that respect, the explanatory 
mechanism treats the three cases as distinct entities (cf. Ragin 1989: 66). Aiming to identify 
intrinsic features of cases has a twofold objective: contributing to an understanding of concrete 
problems faced (in the present case those of the labour market) and solutions implemented in each 
country, and elaborating theoretical insights yielded by the comparison. In this regard we are 
making connections between observations within a country/countries and linking these to an expla-
natory framework (cf. Teune 1990: 48). Generating such a dialogue between theory (ideas) and a 
number of cases (evidence) entails a comprehensive examination of historically shaped phenomena 
and relating specific outcomes to characteristics common to the cases (cf. Tilly 1984: 82). 
In doing so, the case-oriented analysis is not interested in Belgium, France and Britain for 
their own sakes. Rather, this cross- country research on working time policies is motivated by a 
desire to elucidate why governments and/or industrial relations organisations adopted certain posi-
tions, the shape of the respective policy processes and what consequences derived therefrom? Thus, 
the countries were selected and will be compared in order to identify conditions under which labour 
market policies operate, and the factors influencing the policy adopted. Relevant variations between 
the three national settings are presented in figure I. 
.111gure I: Belgium, France and Britain in relation to the master variables 
Belgium France Britain \ 
- Tradition of developed welfare state - Limited degree of welfare state provisions - Backlash on welfare state provisons during 1 
- Christian Democrat-Liberal coalition - Socialist Government for most part of 1980s 1980s 
government during 1980s - Tradition of state intervention mixed with - Conservative Government throughout the 
Polity - Unprecedented level of statutory intervention in corpoljltism in 1970/80 1980s 
collective bargaining during 1980s - Dominance of non-solidaristic ideology - Major rupture of social and economic post-war 
- Compromise arrangements impaired by consensus 
regi~nalisation and linguistic division - Unprecedented degree of industrial relations 
legislation during 1980s 
- Mass unemployment in 1970/80 - Mass-unemployment in 1970/80 - Mass-unemployment in 1970/80 
- Moderately strong inflationary pressure - Moderately strong inflationary pressure - Strong inflationary pressure 
- High external dependence of national economy - High external dependence of national economy - Moderately high external dependence of 
- Moderately strong political reactions to - Strong political reactions to mass- national economy 
Socio- unemployment in 1980s unemployment in 1981-83 - Weak political reaction to mass-unemployment 
economic - Early retirement schemes followed by working - Early retirement and working time reduction in 1980s 
time reduction in 1970/80 parallel in 1981-83 - Early retirement provisions and working time 
- Gradual expansion of part-time jobs in 1980s - Gradual expansion of part-time jobs in 1980s reduction are incomensurable in 1980s 
- Statutory incomes policies in 1980s - Statutory incomes policies in 1980s - Strong expansion of part-time jobs in 1970/80 
- Unrestricted wage bargaining in 1980s 
- Rapid expansion of public sector jobs in 1970s - Medium expansion of public sector jobs in - Low expansion of public sector jobs in 1980s 
- Voluntary wage restraint low 1980s - Voluntary wage restraint during Social I 
- Mass-unemployment softened by welfare state - Voluntary wage restraint abscent Contract i 
Labour Market provisions - Mass-unemployment moderately compensated - Low welfare spending on mass-unemployment 
institutions - Corporatist mode of class conflict regulation by welfare state provisons - Unstructured confrontation and decentralised 
along regional cleavages - Confrontational and interventionist modes of modes of class conflict regulation I 
- High levels of union density class conflict regulation - Medium levels of union density 
- Low levels of union density 
' 
- Active role of government in industrial relations - Active role of government in industrial - Active role of government in industrial I 
in 1980s relations in 1980s relations in 1980s 
Industrial - Consociatio?al institutions of compromise - History of plural and fragmented unionism - Sustained dualism between shopfloor unionism 
relations formation - Ideological cast of trade unions and centralised levels of aggregation 
systems - Union fragmentation along regional-linguistic - Tendency of strikes to be politicized - Multi-employer bargaining 
cleavages - Multi-employer bargaining 
- Multi-employer bargaining 
- -· -·- ------~ --
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The configuration of the policy process in the labour market over time forms the dependent varia-
ble. In this dynamic perspective the policy process is conceptualized as a selection mechanism based 
on the order of ideas and the qrder of events (cf. Majone 1991: 302). The former incorporates the 
process of conceptual innovation, debate and persuasion whereas the latter rests on resource aggre-
gation, interest mediation and policy implementation. Our view of the policy process is thus two-
fold: it translates strategies, legislation and sanctions1 into social practices. Besides, the standard 
operating procedures and distribution of resources in the policy process determine the capability of 
actors to secure outcomes. 
On that account, I conceptualize the dynamics of policy making as being shaped by the institu-
tional design, in this case of the labour market. We therefore ask how and to what degree the 
policy process in the labour market is influenced and mediated by structures and choices on the part 
of collective actors. In that respect it has to be stressed that structural factors amplify or, converse-
ly, mitigate labour market problems. They present constraints and opportunities to the labour market 
actors but they do not determine a particular solution. In the famous dictum of Giddens (1979: 69), 
"structure is both enabling and constraining ... structure thus is not. .. a barrier to action, but is 
essentially involved in its production." 
Such a view of the policy process captures a threefold dynamic: (i) the mosaic of adoption 
(agenda-setting and decision making), (ii) implementation (action phase) and (iii) evaluation 
(performance and appraisal) of a policy. Embedded within this multi- dimensionality of politics is 
the theatre of volatile conflicts and consensus formation (cf. Windhoff-Heritier 1987; Scharpf 
1973). The third component in this dynamic draws theoretical attention to the ways in which organi-
sations confront outcomes, and thus refme their initial strategies. This focus deliberates on the way 
organisations, after having adopted and implemented a particular policy, establish sensitivity to, or 
instead ignore, its respective performance (cf. March and Olsen 1988: 333). For this reason, our 
enterprise directs the searchlight of organisational analysis in industrial relations on the possibility of 
policy adaptation of labour market actors in response to (i) environmental change, (ii) the limits of 
national economic strategies (iii) and the reallocation of their resources. 
Under considerations such as these, I understand the cornerstones of the policy process as 
continuity and change, yet asserting that incrementalism may be a pervasive feature of both. In this 
context, organisational learning as a result of policy evaluation requires interpretation of events 
whose causality is nevertheless difficult to unravel. The obstacles that stand in the way of learning 
1) Such sanctions can be of a utilitarian, moral or negotiated nature. 
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from experience have been elaborated by Elster (1986) on grounds of a rational choice model, 
while Levitt and March (1988: 319) draw more on behavioral studies of organisations. 
Rational choice models position organisational learning as the result of cost- benefit calculations 
deriving from the interaction of rationally self- interested agents. It is thus in the interest of 
individuals and/ or collective actors to adapt to interpretations formed in the event of classifying 
outcomes and therefore establish new institutional arrangements. However, collective organisations 
do not automatically nor immediatly modify their strategies in the light of new opportunities and 
evident constraints. Next to adjustment costs and internal consensus problems, "it may be rational to 
postpone adjustment until one knows for certain that the change is a durable one (cf. Elster 1986: 
24). 
This modus operandi is most prominent in cases where the renegotiation of policy imposes costs 
and fuels dissent along three interacting dimensions: (i) decision- making, (ii) enforcing new 
procedures, (iii) and the adaptation needed for the collective actors to turn a blueprint into a new 
strategy. The flTSt dimension is generally concerned with the distribution and formation of interests, 
while the second draws attention to the available resources and the respective power positions within 
a given institutional framework. Finally, compliance with revised rules of the game entail a learning 
process that is iterate, open-ended and shaped by a high degree of contextual ambiguity. The third 
dimension relates to how organisations adapt their behaviour in terms of policy performance and 
perceptions build around the outcomes (cf. Levitt and March 1988). 
The perdeptions which the relevant labour market actors develope towards the policies are thus 
treated as an endogenous variable in our analysis. This means that perceptions and interpretations 
form core elements of collective action in the labour market. Such actions, and the perceptions they 
yield, are situationally determined, and filtered by an institutional network. Thus, any argument 
adressing the learning capacities of organisations does not entail that learning from experience 
includes a built- in guarantee that future decisions will be less particularistic. What is to be learned 
is a matter shaped in the course of learning itself and subject to possible drawbacks through the 
parallel adapting behaviour of other organisations. In short, organisational learning is defmed as a 
process rather than as an outcome (cf. Hedberg 1981: 7). 
For reasons of feasibility and given the nature of the comparative method employed, we are 
restricting our case-oriented analysis to specific types of causal factors. Rejecting as unachievable 
an examination of all possible germane causes, we undertake to explain the policy process with a 
set of related contextual variables. We identify four independent variables that are seen to be 
fundamental in determining the policy process in the labour market over time. The ftrst variable 
concerns actor constellations in the industrial relations systems. This variable conftgures the inter-
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and intra -organisational arrangement of labour relations as well as their links to political parties 
and/or the government. A second cluster of factors focuses on the institutional design of national 
labour markets. Indicators of Jabour market institutions include the degree of unionization, labour 
market flexibility, centralisation and concentration of collective bargaining arrangements, social and 
participation rights in industrial governance. 
Existing structures of the polity constitute the third independent variable and encompass, inter 
alia, state regulation of industrial relations, either in statutory, interventionist or voluntaristic terms. 
The role of government in labour market performance and the existence of and recourse to social 
norms in organized political units also fall within this third contextual variable. Finally, socio-eco-
nomic conditions are exemplified by the levels of unemployment, demographic changes in the 
labour market, the configuration of the welfare state influencing employment outcomes and to what 
extent countries are controllers of change or managers of exchange given the exposure of their 
national economies to the international context. These clusters of factors are considered in the form 
of an interactive model. Therefore none of the variables is in itself the most important, but is so 
only through its interactive effects. Our explanatory framework can be seen in figure II, page 31. 
Following one of the foremost learning trajectories in the social sciences, these independent 
variables can be conceived as a dichotomy of structure and agency (cf. Giddens 1979: 49-95). 
Structure is defined as providing social rules and (asymmetrical) resources that contribute to beha-
vioral interdependence between individuals and/or collective actors. The role of structure is thus not 
conceived as essentially negative in the sence that it is understood as a constraint on agency. 
Rather, structures shape interaction in the labour market in two ways: they enable and constrain 
collective action. Instead of simply reflecting social forces structures are .understood to modify 
behaviour and order resources at the disposal of industrial relations actors. 
My conceptualisation of agency emphasises factors that make industrial relations organisations 
unlikely to act on their own interests alone, for instance because social norms are invoked in 
organisational behavior (cf. Elster 1989a). Collective actors may prefer certain institutions not only 
because of the welfare gains they are expected to provide but also because such institutions embody 
social norms of solidarity, collective identity and distributional fairness. Understanding institutions as 
organisational and administrative structures plumbs March and Olsen's (1984: 738) dictum "of a 
more autonomous role for political institutions .. .institutions can be treated as decision makers." 
Thus, while agent preferences and optimising behaviour remain central elements explaining social 
outcomes, the new institutionalism seeks to enlarge the explication by directing the searchlight at 
institutional features like transaction costs, enforcement mechanisms and commitment capacities. 
RESEARCH DESIGN: NATURE OP RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TilE VARIABLES 
AOTOR CONSTELLATIONS IN 
TilE LABOUR MARKET 
- inter-lintra-orgenisa'tional configur-
ions of labour relations 
-link.a.2'es 'tD 'DOlitical parties/ 
gove:mment 
- sect>ral, political cleavages 
STRUCTIJRE OF TilE POLITY 
- modes of state regulation of the 
labour market 
- role of government in labour 
market peifonnance 
- moral currency of the polity 
/" 
POUCY PROCESSING IN 
TilE LABOUR MARKET 
-process of policy adoption, 
implementation and evaluation 
-volatile conflicts and consens-w 
fonnation in politics 
LABOUR MARKET INSTI1UTIONS 
-degree of uniorusation 
- labour market flexibility 
- central13a't10nlconcentrat10n or 
collective bargain:ing arrangements 
- social and participation rights 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
- domestic levels of unemployment 
- demographic change in the 
labour market 
- configuration of the velfare state 
- international context 
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Adding to such an understanding of interests in institutional theory are "circwnstances that cause 
actors who do recognize and try to act on their interests to be unable to do so effectively" (cf. 
DiMaggio 1988: 5). The sources of these limitations are manifold and may derive from one alone 
or a combination of the following factors: (i) coordination problems between and within collective 
organisations, (ii) the lack of resources such as mobilisation capacity and legal rights, (iii) con-
straints set by environmental instability and (iv) what Cohen and March (1974) have called "organi-
zed anarchies" in which ambiguous goals, unclear technologies as well as unstable participation 
render uncertain organisations' activities. In light of these limitations the appraisal and definition of 
labour market problems faces a high threshold. Making unemployment an objective of policy 
initiatives undertaken by the relevant labour market actors thus reflects political decisions about 
socio-economic priorities. 
Consensus about the type of unemployment that employers (associations), trade unions and the 
state are prepared to deal with neither emerges instantly, nor is automatically achieved on grounds 
of a tri-partite understanding. There are a number of stages involved. The issue-building process 
depends in part but not exclusively on the visibility of the problem. Given this, policy problems 
need to do more then send out regular signals like monthly labour market statistics. In order to get 
special attention the respective problem space also has to pass "some threshold of tolerance" (cf. 
Majone 1991: 303). 
However, this does not necessarily lead to a collective consensus to deal with the problem. Even 
if this sorpasso in tolerance has taken place unemployment, just as much as inflation, is then often 
attributed to institutional calamities and organisational irresponsibilities. This retort has two outco-
mes: the albeit premature and debated acknowledgement that unemployment is man-made, thus 
subject to intervention. Additionally, such disputes contribute to the assignment of individual respon-
sibilities to secure a recovery. For all of this, the means subsequently called upon to confront the 
labour market crisis can elucidate opposing and possibly incommensurable interests among the 
labour market actors. 
To what degree an employment crisis can be confronted depends, inter alia, upon the institutio-
nal repertoire that a given industrial relations system has at its disposal. Since the development and 
configuration of contemporary labour markets are decisively influenced by the actions of state 
agencies and collective bargaining organisations, the objective of overcoming sustained employment 
problems will depend less - or at least not exclusively - upon the 'invisible hand' of market 
forces. Contrary to standard neo-classical economists, I do not treat the labour market as a closed 
system in which its market character and the rational action of industrial relations arrangements 
guarantee that equilibrium will prevail in an autonomous clearing process. 
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Rather, two institutions, a political and a social one, significantly determine labour market 
performance. As a political institution the state has become directly inserted into labour markets. 
However, controversies persist over to what extent active labour market policies shape employment 
outcomes or impair economic performance (cf. Therborn 1986, Scharpf 1987). The social institution 
relates to how advanced welfare states have decisively influenced countries' capacities to either 
maintain full-employment or have contributed to confronting the unfolding labour market crisis. 
The former is most true for Scandinavian countries which have utilised active labour market policies 
for public employment in health, education and welfare. The second scenario includes countries like 
France and Belgium which oversaw a mass-exit from working life into early retirement (cf. 
Esping-Andersen 1990). 
Given all of this, central questions remain: (i) under what circumstances will work sharing 
strategies be adopted? (ii) what constraints of compromise formation and implementation have to be 
recognized? A useful approach to these questions is to incorporate institutional features into rational 
choice approaches. Taking the latter body of theory as a privileged but not exclusive analytical tool 
helps to link structure and agency in producing social outcomes (cf. Shepsle 1989: 137). Thinking 
of institutions as part of that which embeds organisations and individuals in social situations can 
contribute to an understanding of work sharing as a redistributional strategy. It is to this issue that 
we shall turn in the next section. 
2. How Leaky is the Bucket of Work Sharing? 
Critical to the understanding of redistributional labour market schemes are rank-and- file solidarity 
and commitment of the membership to the collective bargaining organisations' policy priorities . 
How both types of resources are activated when most required, for instance in cases of industrial 
conflict over work sharing, may differ considerably between countries given (i) the particular 
bargaining and mobilization routines, (ii) ideological formations (iii) as well as the perceptions of 
the relevant other as a strategic contingency. All three factors converge in the question, how leaky 
the bucket of work sharing is? I shall seek to answer this question by drawing attention te the 
challenges and constraints of redistributive strategies, fll'St with regard to the trade unions, then 
examining employers associations, and fmally the state. 
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Trade Unions vis-a-vis Work Sharing 
Accross most OECD countries the post- war introduction of the 40- hour week represents the 
classical pattern of a 'normal' shorter hours round. The prevailing economic conditions provided 
abundant distributional resources, not only to implement the hours norm but for considerable real 
income increases. Given a (near) full-employment situation, which was of pivotal importance for 
unions' bargaining position, the labour confederations could convincingly point to the productivity 
gains deriving from revised hours provisions (cf. Hinrichs 1988). In what follows, the discussion 
will focus on strategic implications of the unions' advocacy of work sharing. 
Historically, the claim for a shorter working week predominantly focused on adapting working 
hours to the differentiated societal patterns of allocating and distributing the resource of time as well 
as accommodating leisure time preferences voiced by the workforce. Within this context working 
time demands surfaced on the agenda of labour market policies as a means of accompanying 
modernisation strategies, unsealing rigid time regimes and providing individual welfare gains, for 
instance the call for a 'free Saturday'. Where agreement on shorter hours was realized any resulting 
labour market performance was regarded by the unions as a more or less welcome by-product (cf. 
Wiesentba11987). 
Under the impact of deteriorating economic performance during the seventies, the idea of 
shorter hours became linked to the objective of work sharing. This strategy rapidly became the main 
union response to the slump, noticeably influencing the arena of social and labour market policy 
during the past decade. 2 With insufficient jobs for all who sought them, the objective of work 
sharing implied spreading the volume of work over a larger number of the workforce through 
working time reduction. The same conceptual approach was pursued forty years earlier by L. Blum 
in France. As shall be shown in Chapter IV, the legacy of the working time policies introduced by 
the Common Front in 1936 profoundly shaped the Socialists' work sharing strategies in 1982. 
In theory and at union rallies such an approach has its obvious attractions. The adequacy of 
working time policies appealed to a trade union sense of solidarity; the belief that in times of 
adversity those with jobs should support those without. In addition to such arguments invoking 
individual and collective commitment, the persuasiveness of the work sharing slogan was enhanced 
2) Calling for the introduction of the 35-hour week, the ETUC espoused working time 
reduction at its Congress in 1976. 
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by arithmetic. Econometric modelling forecast that a phased move towards the 35-hour week 
accompanied by full wage compensation would considerably curtail unemployment (cf. Aberg 
1987). 
However, the results of such econometric simulations are extremely heterogeneous - even 
differing with regard to the direction (positive or negative) of employment changes (cf. Hart 1984; 
van Ginneken 1984). Here I refrain from challenging the various macro- economic modelling 
studies, and instead give emphasis to the following issue: such simulations can contribute to a better 
understanding of the multitude of economic relationships, but they do not "provide a basis for 
assessing the potential of hours reductions, (and) as a guide to policy decisions (they) offer a hope 
which is misleading (cf. White 1987: 21- 22). For our purposes it is sufficient to note that a policy 
of working time reduction does not offer a guarantee of solving the unemployment problem. This is 
a radical contention and the subsequent line of argumentation shall try to provide some evidence for 
it. 
The fact that real- world preference structures are heterogeneous serves as a point of departure. 
It is by no means certain that union members and non -unionized employees will agree on the 
precise nature of working time reductions. Especially for workers in relatively safe employment 
positions, other collective bargaining objectives (for instance training and workplace authority) can 
assume precedence over a reduction of their weekly working hours. Furthermore, even if employees 
support the claim for shorter hours this general preparedness may not automatically converge 
towards a s~gle form of reduced working hours. As the rule of thumb suggests, the perceived 
advantages of enlarged leisure time in the form of weeks per year or days per week will most likely 
outpace the third possibility: hours per day (cf. Engfer et al. 1984: 167). 
When we add gross -earnings levels to the equation, a second dilemma surfaces. This is genera-
ted by the wedge issue of advancing a cost neutral working time reduction, thus accepting partial 
wage compensation for shorter hours. If the across-the-board percentage reduction in gross 
earnings (corresponding with an average working time reduction) disregards differentials in pay 
levels then various low income groups will undoubtedly fall below the social minimum. Inversely, if 
highest gross earnings pay a greater share of the price tag attached to shorter hours, those with 
low/lowest incomes are protected. 
However, while maintaining the overall wage bill at a given level, the relative wage cost of 
semi- and unskilled jobs will increase significantly. Instead of being priced out of the labour 
market by the inefficiencies of undifferentiated across -the- board percentage reductions in gross 
earnings, a larger reduction in the highest gross earnings reinforces the pressure for the elimination 
of jobs through technological restructuring and manpower flexibility. As Van Parijs (1991: 5) has 
, I 
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argued "a dramatic and financially neutral reduction in working time is necessarily detrimental to 
the least qualified jobs - either because it kills the supply (they pay less than replacement incomes) 
or because it kills the demand .(they cost firms a lot more per hour than they used to)." This line of 
reasoning underscores the point that there may very well be conditions Iinder which individual 
sacrifices and costs are considered unacceptable, even if both are associated with progress towards 
resolving sustained labour market problems. Where to draw the starting line is precisely a matter of 
continuous disagreement and points to the consensus problems that collective actors have to 
overcome within and between each other. 
But constraints caused by inefficiencies and the heterogeneity of preferences are not the whole 
story of redistributive policies. The social differentiation of costs and benefits is biased in work 
sharing. Those foreseen to be predominantly favoured by work sharing are the unemployed, who, 
nevertheless, do not have to bear any costs in supporting the strategy. In stark contrast to this 
pay- off matrix, those actually called upon to stand up as 'brothers and sisters in arms' are left with 
a considerable degree of uncertainty regarding the performance of the policy. 
Such uncertainty derives from not knowing ex ante to what degree voluntary wage moderation 
or partial wage compensation will actually activate investment and deter free-riding. Even if the 
former were to be achieved, the positive scenario would still not guarantee that additional invest-
ments are channelled into subsequent job creation. Instead, employers can make use of their discre-
tionary power in various fields of investment policy. A combination of alternatives is at the disposal 
of management: ranging from (i) investment in the technological supply of firms, (ii) expanding 
their capital stock and (iii) restructuring the organisation of work. In that respect, the wage risks 
involved in bargaining over shorter hours and the inability to arrive at an assessment of the desired 
job creation objective places union negotiators in a situation of multiple uncertainty. 
A central problem of income sacrifices ponsists in the resulting collective goods problem. There 
are two elements to this: divisions between the insiders and outsiders as well as divisions among the 
insiders. If work sharing in combination with income moderation is focused on inclusive objectives, 
thus not defmed as a defensive strategy to predominantly safeguard existing jobs, then the current-
ly employed surrender parts of their attainable income increases to those outside employment. 
However, this sacrifice has to confront a fundamental assurance problem: in what form can the 
would-be cooperators be assured that they are not liable to be exploited by free-riders? While it 
remains unclear if and when the jobless and future labour market entrants will actually benefit from 
the sacrifice, those in employment nevertheless have to pick up the price tag attached to work 
sharing immediately (cf. Offe 1985: 89). Furthermore, they cannot later claim refunds if the 
objective of creating new jobs was not attained. 
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Likewise, when investing in a redistributive strategy, workers cannot know beforehand if they 
will later be among those negatively or positively affected. In addition, it not only remains unclear 
how many of the beneficiaries pay and who will opt to shirk, but all those who actually do contri-
bute may not be blessed for their sacrifice. This paradox arises for two reasons. First, it may be 
that many of those receiving rewards for their commitment do not consider the attained welfare as 
an advantageous outcome. Second, the rewards may fall to the non-payers, i.e. the positive effects 
are external, reaching the unemployed and future cohorts of labour market entrants. In the absence 
of third-party enforcement, for instance through the state, the union rank-and-flle may therefore 
be reluctant to invest in cooperative efforts, for they cannot be assured that their investment will 
yield a positive return. 
Let us explore the range of dilemmas involved in work sharing a step further. A game theoretic 
approach to work sharing strategies can teach us that it is probable that individuals acting as rational 
agents will prefer the greatest amount of a particular good at the least (private) cost. Following 
from this premise, and as the historical evidence mentioned above suggests, in phases of economic 
prosperity the compromise costs for shorter hours are comparatively lower or can be more easily 
borne than in times of sustained labour market crisis and downward pressure on wages. Thus, the 
collective bargaining organisations face the difficult task of aggregating individual preferences into a 
collective design. 
Unions' adeptness at tailoring solidaristic incomes policies to redistributive ends demands either 
non -utilitarik forms of collective action or an investive calculus on the part of the payers. While 
the former is in short supply when inflation is rising and unemployment expanding, the latter 
depends upon intertemporal considerations on the part of those in employment. The strategy of 
work sharing thus crucially rests on the unions' capacity to espouse and implement policies that 
build solidarity among and across occupational groups while simultaneously avoiding the exclusion 
of the 'outsiders'. In practical terms this challenge implies ensuring either the avoidance of internal 
discontent or the management of conflict "between those who pay and those who receive" (cf. 
Esping-Andersen 1985: 33). In addition, union strategies will have to focus on the elimination of 
incentives and reasons to seek particularistic solutions, for instance taking a 'free-ride' or seeking a 
'free lunch'. Both requirements combine in the difficult to achieve and maintain objective of esta-
blishing social solidarity and organisational commitment within collective organisations during an 
economic crisis. 
Besides, adherence to solidaristic wage policies faces the challenge of how fairness motives and 
distributional norms can be incorporated into one's range of self-interests. Expecting the 'insiders' 
to display an uncommon degree of commitment towards the 'outsiders' brings into focus what values 
38 
workers attach to the goal of work sharing, and what the potential costs of achieving this objective 
will be. As Elster (1989a) has shown, the relation between norms and self- interest is twofold. For 
one, adhering to social norms ,in wage bargaining implies that people are prepared - even if not 
convinced - to act against their self -interests. On the other hand, however, adherence to norms 
must not be incommensurable to serve one's self- interests. 
The texture of an investive calculus may regard voluntary wage moderation as an indirect 
strategy. "What seems like non -self interested subscription to a norm may turn out to be self-
interest in disguise" (cf. ibid.: 237). Even if the 'insiders' do not embrace redistributional norms, 
they may have good reason to act as if they had. In view of this, temporarily sacrificing parts of 
attainable wage increases can be a strategy aiming at a future improvement of the labour market 
situation. When such an improvement occurs the bargaining position of labour in general and of 
union leaders in particular vis-a-vis employers' associations can be reinforced in the long- term. 
But any choice for a certain set of measures cannot be taken in isolation from the respective 
counterpart(s), be they other unions in a fragmented and competitive industrial relations system, the 
texture of the employers' demands or the policy priorities of the state. In other words, each labour 
market actor will also have to take into account the other side(s) sitting at the bargaining table as a 
strategic contingency. In capital-labour bargaining both sides anticipate the strategic character of 
the others' behaviour. "Each class must take into account not only the other's actions but also its 
reactions, not only the other's current strategy but also the likely response to its own choice of 
strategy" (cf. Przeworski and Wallerstein 1982: 225). Anticipating strategic behaviour from other 
labour market actors not only affects the problem defmition, but concomitantly influences the extent 
to which particular policies figure among the organisation's priorities, how organisational memory is 
consulted, what strategy is adopted and to what extent coalitions between bargaining parties can be 
formed. 
Employers vis -a-vis Working Time Policies 
The material interests which employers attach to labour market policies are characterized by the 
difficulty of defming precisely collective strategies of employers. Given the variety of divergence (i) 
between large and small fU"DlS, (ii) fU"DlS concentrated on the domestic market and those focused on 
exporting goods, (ill) inter- fum competition on the demand side of labour and capital markets (iv) 
and on the supply side of goods markets, it is a central objective and core dilemma of capital 
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associations to marshall a non -contradictory reconciliation of internal heterogeneity ( cf. Offe and 
Wiesenthal 1985: 189). 
Since employers have the alternatives of informal cooperation or of acting as individual strategic 
agents assuming their entrepreneurial prerogatives, the prospects for collective action depend upon 
compulsion, the acknowledgement of common goals and the provision of means to satisfy these. 
Such goals cover (i) distributional norms in capital-labour bargaining, (ii) the leeway attainable for 
differentials in the organisation of the labour process (iii) and the question of how employers should 
confront their strategic counterpart, the union(s). 
Placing this line of argumentation in the context of working time policies leads, inter alia, to the 
following question: on what grounds will employers accept or reject shorter hours sought by the 
trade unions? With regard to distributional rules invoked in collective bargaining a fundamental 
asymmetry between capital and labour serves as a point of departure. At the firm level employers 
can pass on losses to workers, in the hardest case by effecting redundancies. By contrast, labour 
cannot insist that employers are obliged to share gains. As Przeworski and Wallerstein (1982: 217) 
have observed, 
"capitalists may themselves retain the entire additional output or they may share the gain exclusively 
with any of a number of potential political allies. Their market relation with workers ends as the 
cycle of production is completed and wages are paid, and there is nothing in the structure of the 
capitalist e~nomic system that would guarantee that workers would benefit because a part of the 
product (the profit) is currently withheld from them." 
Above the fum, the branch and industry levels focuse on establishing a common reading of costs 
and benefits, profits and losses that can be placed on the bargaining table as negotiable issues. The 
underlying logic of this procedure is to establish a reference level between future wages and current 
profits. Relevant decisions taken concern the part of the gains not transformed into wages, thus for-
saken by labour and appropriated by employers. In view of this procedure, a considerable degree of 
time is spent in capital-labour bargaining on the framework and specific content of collective bar-
gaining. 
This process of successive approximation in bargaining over the wage aspect in shorter working 
time arrangements becomes both more necessary and more feasible the larger and more strongly 
centralised are the national organisations representing business and labour. As various authors have 
emphasised, the structure of labour market institutions such as the degree of bargaining centralisa-
tion in wage formation influences (un)employment by affecting the levels of real wage growth (cf. 
Freeman 1988: 64). Centralisation is here understood as a simultaneous process between capital 
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associations and labour organisations which entails "the extent of inter-union and inter-employer 
cooperation in wage bargaining with the other side. The focus is thus on the extent to which 
coalitions are formed among lJ.Dlons and employers respectively" (cf. Calmfors and Drifflll 1988: 
17). 
On a different tack it is argued by labour economists and political sociologists that employers 
will consider the adequacy of certain labour market policies with respect to unemployment as an 
incentive device enforcing discipline in the labour force (cf. Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984, Lindbeck 
and Snower 1988). This body of literature on unemployment combines efficiency wage arguments 
with labour union theories that have a bearing on lay-offs and joblessness. The existence of (mass) 
unemployment and the threat credibility of firing a worker are both features conducive to risk 
aversion, therefore curtailing workers' particularism and re-inforcing managerial authority. 
Grounded on moral hazard assumptions, this approach perceives wage increases by employers as 
a device to ensure that workers have more to lose if they are caught shirking, and are subsequent-
ly fired. Hence, fums seek to influence their labour turnover rates and the bargaining priorities of 
their interest organisations by drawing attention to the deterrence effects resulting from a labour 
market situation that has been transformed from a sellers' into a buyers' market. The effect of this 
fundamental shift on social relations as well as collective preference formation can be described as 
follows: 
"To induce its workers not to shirk, the firm attempts to pay more than the "going wage"; then, if 
a worker is caught shirking and is frred, he will pay a penalty. If it pays one frrm to raise its 
wages, however, it will pay all fums to raise their wages. When they all raise their wages, the 
incentive not to shirk again disappears. But as all fums raise their wages, their demand for labor 
decreases, and unemployment results. With unemployment, even if all fums pay the same wages, a 
worker has an incentive not to shirk. For, if he is frred, an individual will not immediately obtain 
another job. The equilibrium unemployment rate must be sufficiently large that it pays workers to 
work rather than to take the risk of being caught shirking" (cf. Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984: 433). 
This lengthy quotation serves well to illustrate that it is a matter of strategic importance for employ-
ers and their associations to what extent the performance of labour market policies promotes or cur-
tails a situation favourable to capital. For if the existing supply surplus in the labour market would 
be reduced, the bargaining position of labour vis-a-vis management would be ameliorated over 
time. In that respect, shorter hours policies bring to the agenda of capital-labour bargaining the 
question of to what degree employment is a negotiable issue above the frrm level. Thus, in terms of 
workers' discipline and union bargaining strategies the price tag attached to work sharing strategies 
may consist in the invalidiation of the disciplinary function of the labour force surplus for industrial 
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relations. Consequently, the managerial resistance to working time reduction is also grounded in the 
underlying interest of barring the entry of employment levels to the negotiating chambers. 
In cases of an evolving conflict over standard working time reductions, employers can therefore 
either hold fast or aim at buying -off the union demand for shorter hours. The former scenario 
involves intransigence on the part of the employers and requires that no company breaks the rules 
of the game by taking a free ride on possible conflict costs. By contrast, the latter sequence of 
events opts for a more sophisticated regulation of the basic terms of exchange in collective bargai-
ning. 
By offering wage concessions whose individual benefits will exceed the benefits resulting from 
working time reduction, employers can make unions an offer which they cannot resist without 
encountering serious internal consensus problems. This buying -off logic is governed by the assum-
ption that, while the wage offer is direct and specific, the possible benefits of working time reduc-
tion remain unclear as regards the implementation process, the effects on work practices and 
non- intended outcomes (for instance triggering- off controversies over pay and working time 
differentials between different sectors and/or different groups of employees). Furthermore, agree-
ment on full-wage compensation for reduced hours commits employers to immediate costs, while 
simultaneous productivity concessions by the unions still have to be implemented, let alone fulfilled. 
Suppose, furthermore, that the employer is much more willing to offer higher wages in order to 
avert industrial action than to surrender control over such a central component of the labour process 
as the dura~n and organisation of working time. He could therefore reach agreement more quickly 
on wage claims than on a shorter hours demand which in the workers' estimation was equivalent in 
value and less costly as regards sacrifices. This difference in entrepreneurial response may reflect 
the employers' belief that concessions in working time pose a threat to managerial prerogatives and 
prestige, imperil the maintenance of established workplace practices, and eventually cost more than 
purely fmancial concessions. The scope of short-term costs (expected increase in labour costs and 
possible strike costs) is uncertain to predict and may not be limited to the balance between wages 
and attainable productivity increases. Beyond that, additional costs may arise in connection with 
labour turnover costs and expected adverse effects on utilisation of facilities, including loss of output 
or revenue (cf. White 1987: 30). 
Both the uncompromising and the buy -out approaches may illustrate the distance between the 
respective positions of employers and unions at the beginning of and during negotiations on shorter 
hours. In that respect, the process of compromise formation will essentially depend on how much 
movement towards a - strike free - consensus is still needed. A high degree of already existing 
interest affmity between the collective actors of capital and labour outside the specific issues on the 
bargaining agenda would conversely be favourable for reaching an agreement. 
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However, interest afflnity does not per se imply consensus. Rather, compromise formation appears 
as the result of strategic action, the availability of resources as well as the configuration of relations 
between the industrial relatio~ actors (cf. Therborn 1987: 275). In that respect, we can expect 
working time policies to be adopted if their desirability and usefulness are neither a matter of 
substantial controversy within employers' associations, nor an issue of prolonged conflict in 
capital -labour bargaining. 
The State vis -a-vis Labour Market Policies 
At the level of the state, political parties and the government are confronted with the dire conse-
quences of a sustained employment crisis in terms of the repercussions on fiscal revenues, allocation 
of budget priorities, individual voting behaviour as well as more general political values like the 
norms and standards of a society centred around waged labour. However, each of these effects, let 
alone their combination, do not per se determine that unemployment will eventually become a major 
concern of policy makers. 
Making unemployment an object of government initiatives reflects a political decision about its 
present and future priorities. In that respect, employment objectives compete with other policy goals 
like price stability, economic growth, and the balance of payments. Consequently, the translation of 
unemployment into an issue of pivotal importance on the agenda of governments is based on 
explicit political judgements. As Rose (1987: 287) has argued, it is a "political decision whether the 
principal goal of the government of the day is economic growth, low inflation, getting rid of a 
balance of payments deflcit or reducing unemployment." 
As a legislator the state can autonomously execute regulations in the flelds of industrial policy, 
labour law and a supra-market leverage on the labour market accompanied by a number of 
macro-economic policies. This involves statutory regulation, and in all likelihood will have a direct 
budgetary impact. In particular, the supra -market leverage may include (i) public works, (ii) public 
subsidies, (iii) public sector employment, (iv) public investment, (v) retraining, (vi) repatriation 
allowances paid to migrant workers, etc. 
Examining labour market policies in terms of public budgetary structure can be approached in 
two ways. The first follows the footsteps of Lipset's (1960) 'democratic class struggle' and Dawson 
and Robinson's (1963) party competition model. Both conclude that political parties are decisive for 
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the relative bias in favor of certain labour market policies. This school argues that the very existen-
ce of party competition contributes to the use of political rationality in the decision -making process 
(see for instance Casdes 1982). The other trajectory is predominantly inspired by Lindblom's (1959) 
bureaucratic- incrementalist model and emphasizes the degree to which budgets are immune to 
outside political intervention. The degree of effective budget re-allocations is limited by the 
reproduction of and prior commitments laid down in budgets (cf. Heclo 1974). 
Governments utilise or refrain from invoking certain labour market policies depending on the 
compatibility of the measure(s) with their set of socio-economic priorities. Unlike trade unions, the 
government is not exclusively confronted with the aspirations and expectations of the active work-
force and the organisations' members. Rather, in accordance with its criteria of success and failure 
at the ballot boxes, the government and the opposition parties are simultaneously seeking support 
from such groups of voters whose situation may not directly be affected by redistributive labour 
market policies: pensioners, those active in the educational system, workers in the home. 
Whereas collective bargaining organisations have to be able to manifest their success or short-
comings in the framework of collective bargaining agreements every one or two years, the election 
cycle of the parliamentary system allows political parties in office to purchase legitimacy on a 
different, extended t.ime scale. The mandate voters give to legislative bodies and governments 
extends over a period within which decisions on issues will be made, the nature and content of 
which are unknown at the moment of casting a ballot, and in which for this reason voters can play 
only a limi~ role. Moreover, governments can allow certain issues to pale into insignificance on 
account of re -adjusting the political agenda. 
The central question deriving from these statements concerns the conditions under which 
governments become involved in labour market policies in general, and in work sharing strategies in 
particular. Working t.ime policies can be depicted as part of a multi- staged decision making 
process made by the political system. This consideration bears on an issue that is central to the 
analysis of contemporary state action: the specific configuration of a policy is influenced by the 
conditional support that must be established, reinforced or drawn upon as an existing resource (cf. 
Schwpf1991b). Placing politics in such a context focuses attention on the decision about the degree 
of implementation cooperation sought for by· the government from unions and employers at the 
different levels of the industrial relations system. 
The theory of 'structural dependence of the state on capital' has radicalized the issue of imple-
mentation cooperation to the extent that structural constraints bind all governments, independent of 
their political allegiance. Daringly, the theory claims that "whether particular governments have 
interests and goals of their own or they act on. behalf of a coalition of groups or a class, the pursuit 
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of any objectives that require material resources places governments in the situation of structural 
dependence" (cf. Przeworsld and Wallerstein 1988: 12). 
This situation makes it advjsable for governments to encourage capital to perform in terms of 
investments decided upon by the individual fll'lil (cf. Offe and Wiesenthal 1985: 192). Accordingly, 
governments cannot reduce profits (in order to attain greater consumption for wage earners) and 
simultaneously increase investment. Concomitantly, the state faces a trade- off between income 
distribution and investment, or as Okun (1975) has emphasised between equality and efficiency 
amidst an asymmetrical relationship of control. 3 
Defming government regulatory competence will therefore depend to a large degree on the 
constitution of "appropriate institutions" in the labour market (cf. March and Olsen 1989: 117). In 
that respect, specifying the scope and content of state intervention is tied to the associative substruc-
ture prevailing in the industrial relations system. Instead of being predetermined, state regulation 
will rather be considered as the result of the interaction between conflictual socio-political proces-
ses of agenda-setting, the definition of fields, instruments and objectives of state-induced policies 
as well as the degree of implementation cooperation attainable, even enforceable, from the collective 
actors. 
But for the very same reasons of seeking cooperation and sanction adaptation capacities, a 
government cannot disregard the ensuing dilemma that the efficacy of its labour market policies can 
be impeded by allowing for extended flexibility options, granting new- style compromise arran-
gements and the use of various implementation exceptions. Finally, international commitments and 
external dependency may compel governments to favour free trade and a stable currency rather than 
placing top priority on measures directed to domestic labour market problems. Hence, a precarious 
and tentative decision making sequence will most likely characterize the implementation of labour 
market policies marshalled by statutory regulation. 
However, it has to be taken into consideration that any form of government- induced working 
time policy will face a serious set of challenges regarding depth, scope and timing. Any government 
intervention in the economy influences the allocation of investment and labour. Thus, the capacity 
to intervene affects the material welfare of privately-organized actors. Yet, as the public choice 
3) It is necessary to emphazise that such a classical economic view is only used as an analyti-
cal tool for our purposes. Given the complex interrelation between equality and efficiency the 
trade-off is not a zero-sum game. Furthermore, as many studies have shown, efficiency can 
advance equality and vice-versa (see for instance Willman 1982). 
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literature and political debates over de-regulation illustrate, the potential for inefficiencies, un-
acknowledged conditions of action and unintended side- effects resulting from sustained govern-
ment intervention is widespread. Furthermore, with increasing governmental competence the archi-
tects of politics may themselves become a prime target of influence and lobbying by those actors 
who are affected by regulation. 
Given these limitations and constraints, government-induced work sharing schemes may be 
considered as a second best scenario operating on an incremental basis. In the absence of a tripartite 
consensus between the state, the employers (association) and the trade unions on certain labour 
market policies, government regulation might intervene in favour of the unions (since union mem-
bers are a core voting group of the left parties in office), or in favour of the employers (because 
regaining industrial competitivity and encouraging 'business confidence' is an objective shared by 
both actors). 
In a tri-partite constellation the actors concerned implicitly agree on the dual desirability of one 
or various parametres, both economically and socially. This common understanding implies that the 
concertation of actors considers issues like the degree of wage dispersion across industries and 
commitment to wage flexibility as politically desirable and economically effective. 
A further issue concerns the variety of social norms (equality, equity, fair division and distribu-
tion) invoked in such a collective bargaining context. As Willman (1982: 1) has argued, the "moral 
currency" of industrial relations and the consistent need to appeal to the reality of distributional 
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norms may govern the mechanism of interaction and normative considerations of the actors at the 
central level. Such consensual arrangements and the institutional settings built around them have 
repeatedly been identified in Scandinavian countries (cf. Calmfors and Drimll 1988), corporatist 
strongholds like Austria (cf. Freeman 1988) as well as so-called "small states in an open econo-
my" (cf. Katzenstein 1985). 
As a result of this mosaic of constraints the architects of politics can focus their initiatives on 
influencing the governance capacity and the aggregation problems of the industrial relations actors. 
This avenue may involve support for a specific strategy advocated by either the trade unions and/or 
the employers as well as forwarding consensual approaches in areas essentially touching wedge 
issues, for instance voluntary income moderation and work sharing strategies. Thus, instead of 
responding to policy constraints deriving from capital-labour bargaining by either throwing money 
at the problems or reaching for the legislative 'stick behind the door', an alternative route to 
overcome wedge issues could be through web (connective) actions. 
In both cases, shorter hours strategies can be reconciled by governments of various political 
colourings. Governments may intervene in the consensus formation process of capital-labour 
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bargaining in different ways. For one, such intervention can include strategies that offer incentives 
for both bargaining parties, for instance hours legislation which transforms a national agreement into 
a new standard legal norm. A}ternatively, a government can promote compromise formation by 
influencing market determinants of industrial power relations. For instance, wage subsidies for 
working time reductions foster such· an approach which at least one of the parties concerned cannot 
refuse on rational grounds. 
When the state reconciles trade union working time strategies beyond rhetorical accommodation, 
it discharges labour confederations from the criticism voiced by employers and parliamentary 
opposition that they adopt particularistic approaches in collective bargaining. Instead, governmental 
endorsement can garner support for union work sharing demands by appealing to the notion of "in 
the (best) interest of all." Besides, governmental partisanship may prove conducive to enhancing 
workers' trust in the respective strategy and advancing an acceptance within the workforce that, 
given state support, the possible costs and sacrifices merit the effort. 
Furtherniore, the intervention can discharge the labour confederation(&) of accountability for 
voluntary wage moderation, thus reducing the union's need to popularize within its organisational 
constituencies the issue of partial wage compensation for shorter hours. In that respect, it can be a 
rational strategy for trade unions to call for state intervention or to seek assistance by transferring 
upwards the wedge issue of wage compensation. 
Such an approach gains particular significance if and when the government is in a position to 
and has a tradition of intervening in the realm of collective bargaining. Central constituents of such 
a procedure include (i) government authority in the field of incomes policy, (ii) a regulative compe-
tence in the collective bargaining system, (iii) paradigmatic norm-setting in the public services and 
(iv) the perception of unemployment as a pressing problem which therefore places it within the 
regulatory authority of the state. 
The social-democratic variant of government-induced working time policies promotes the 
(re- )distributive intentions of work sharing (the French example in 1981-1982). This support can 
be linked to the politics of decommodification.4 Such state action establishes conditions for the· 
reproduction of labour outside the labour market and includes non- market provisions like unem-
ployment insurance, health and housing provisions, (early) retirement schemes, public employment, 
progressive and corporate income taxation, etc. 
4) The politics of decommodification entail a non-market rationality in the prov1s1on of 
services. Welfare state intervention into the capitalist economy is the field where decommodification 
47 
The universalistic "social citizenship state" coined by EspiDg-Andersen (1985: 145-90) aims 
to reduce the dependence of workers on market exchange and supplant particularistic group identi-
ties with social solidarity. In that respect, decommodification of labour seeks to moderate competi-
tion between the employed and unemployed in the workforce. Furthermore, union support for 
decommodification can be explained by the aforementioned union dilemmas in bargaining over work 
sharing. Since non -market provisions decommodify the status of labour and encourage workers to 
refrain from breaking the ranks of solidarity, unions are allowed to overcome internal conflicts over 
partial or full wage compensation for shorter hours. 
By contrast, the conservative-liberal version may endorse the idea of redistributing work, but 
leave the outcome to the free play of the interaction between unions, employers and the workforce. 
In this case, working time reduction will be placed in the context of market-oriented solutions to 
the employment crisis and be considered as a vehicle for intervening in capital -labour bargaining 
on income policies, in particular the capacity of industrial relations politicians to arrive at, albeit, 
involuntary wage moderation (the Belgian example testifies to this). A third possibility consists in 
neither addressing the problem of unemployment, nor considering working time reduction as an 
adequate means of labour market policy and leaving the allocation of investment and labour to 
decentralized decision making processes (the British case will illustrate this potentiality). 
Let me summarize my arguments on the diversity of actor constellations through figure ill which 
illustrates the content and locations of strategic decision making over work sharing (page 48). The 
columns of the matrix represent the three key industrial relations actors who make and anticipate 
strategic decisions. The rows illustrate three levels at which such decisions are made. The effects of 
these decisions, however, may become apparent at levels other than those where the decisions were 
taken. In addition, the content of the cells are not mutually exclusive. 
Strategic decisions in the bottom row are those associated with the workplace. They include, 
inter alia, safeguarding managerial autonomy, individual working time preferences and at the level 
of the government providing wage subsidies. The nature of decision making options over work 
sharing in the middle tier may concern for employers barring the entry of employment levels onto 
the bargaining agenda. By contrast, unions' focus on redistributive labour market policies can aim at 
reinforcing their legitimacy in industrial governance. Finally, the government can appeal to the 
moral currency of industrial relations, thus supporting labour's approach. 
has received pronounced attention by authors such as Polanyi (1957), Offe (1984) and &ping-
Andersen (1985). 
Figure III: Work Sharing Strategy Matrix 
Nature of decision-making options 
Decision level Employers Unions Government 
- Distributional norms in capital-labour bargaining - Distributive equity - Political decision/non-decision about labour 
- Treatment of the strategic counterpart: unions - Quality of life market problems 
- Recognition of stable and predictable bargaining - Solidaristic incomes policies - Labour market and/or employment policies 
Macro-level institutions - Public policy objectives (e.g. adherence to - Trade-off between equality and efficiency, 
- Differentials in the organisation of the labour distributional norms, productivistic approach) income distribution, employment and 
process - Union organizing resources (e.g. improving investment 
bargaining positions, relations with political - Means of labour market intervention (e.g. legal 
parties, employers' associations) regulation, money, information) 
- Internalize externalities (e.g. inflation) - Decision of yardsticks (economical, social, 
political desirability) 
- Treatment of unintended side-effects 
- Politics of decommodification 
- Reconciliation of internal heterogeneity - Reinforcing legitimate industrial governance - Influencing the governance capacity of 
- Barring entrance of employment levels onto the - Harmonization of union bargaining positions industrial relations actors 
bargaining agenda - Collective bargaining strategies (e.g. job - Moral currency of industrial relations (e.g. 
- Buying-off logic of working time reduction creation vs income gains, productivity deals) appeal to distributional norms) 
Industrial - Establishing sophisticated exchange models (e.g. - Standardization of labour provisions - Degree of implementation cooperation needed 
Relations System voluntary wage moderation, productivity - Early retirement vs/and working time reduction - The 'stick behind the door' 
bargaining) - Standardization of collective bargaining I 
- Decentralisation of collective bargaining provisions 
mechanisms - Industrial policy, labour law, industrial 
relations regulation 
I 
- Supra-market leverage {e.g. public works, 
retraining) 
- Safeguarding managerial autonomy - Employee participation in flexible work - (De-)regulation of worker rights from status to 
- Concerns for and changes in economic systems contract, vice versa 
performance - Temporal flexibility and individual working - Provisions on co-determination (e.g. new 
Workplace - Maintaining established workplace relations time preferences forms of employee participation) 
- Introduction/expansion of temporal flexibility - Regulation of fringe benefits - Supporting new forms of work 
- Profit sharing - Overtime regulation - Wage subsidies 
- Union containment/avoidance strategies 
I 
~· 
-··-·-·-·--
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Decisions at the macro-level cover choices with a high degree of generality: how should employ-
ers confront their strategic counterpart, the unions? The latter have to decide on the feasibility of 
solidaristic incomes policies, and the government faces trade-off decisions between equality and 
efficiency, income distribution, employment and investment conditions. The matrix does not claim 
to be encompassing in terms of the totality of decision making options. It rather illustrates the 
variety, complexity and interdependence of possible choices involved in governmental, employers' 
and trade unions' decision making over work sharing. In this it confrrms the potential of work 
sharing to touch on issues at the very core of class and other forms of politics. 
3. Generating Hypotheses 
So far, we have analysed some general characteristics of trade unions, employers (associations) and 
the state with regard to work sharing strategies. Let us now summarise the differences between the 
considerations that influence how the state, business associations and labour confederations approach 
redistributive labour market policies. This leads us to delineate our key hypothesis, and contained 
therein a number of sub-hypotheses which chart the likely trajectory of work sharing strategies in 
the three countries. 
The casis are presented to investigate an overarching trend. We know that each of the countries 
started from a different situation, our purpose is to compare the processes that led to the outcomes. 
Specifically, the study investigates bow different points of departure in Belgium, France and Britain 
converge towards a similar outcome: the transformation of redistributional policies under the 
heading of work sharing into a strategy of temporal flexibility. Convergence does not imply unifor-
mity of results, nor is it used as a synonym for similarity. Instead it is conceived as a dynamic 
process over time which is comparable because outcomes correspond in substance or essentials ( cf. 
Bennet 1991: 219). 
The study can thus be regarded as a comparative exercise in which three country cases are 
brought together to identify common patterns and relationships in labour market policies. While they 
all faced similar problems, the industrial relations actors did not tend to solve them in similar ways. 
While the analysis provides evidence of convergence in labour market policies, the cases under 
review primarily show that the political processes by which outcomes were reached illustrated 
considerable differences. Hence, the temporal and comparative framework can display that different 
processes are at work, that the formulation, implementation and evaluation of labour market policies 
has to be seen in context. 
' i 
~ 
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That multiple paths lead to similar outcomes in Belgium, France and Britain does not imply that 
there is a singular logic built into redistributional policies under the heading of work sharing. 
Economic or political determipism is not my line of argument. Nor do I pretend that alternative 
outcomes would not have been possible under different institutional arrangements in the labour 
market. Some notes on Germany will provide a counterfactual to proving our argument in the final 
chapter. The sole ambition is to take the empirical evidence in the forthcoming chapters for the 
purpose of specifying why different conditions lead to similar outcomes in Belgium, France and 
Britain. 
Concentrating our endeavour on how different settings and processes can produce similar effects 
follows the methodological path of identifying "multiple conjunctural causation" in case-oriented 
comparative research (cf. Ragin 1987: 49). The comparative study of working time policies is 
therefore an analytical strategy to explore the dynamic of policy adoption, its implementation 
patterns and evaluation procedures. Within this framework the case-oriented approach contributes 
to explaining the outcomes by reference to internal particularities and tries to highlight the comple-
xity of causal factors involved in determining differences and similarities in context. 
I thus intend to illustrate how working time policies are embedded in the institutional arrange-
ment of the labour market in three nations. Belgium, France and Britain embarked on a strategy of 
work sharing. But in the process they had to drop the demand or push it out to the sidelines. In 
effect, redistributive labour market policies were replaced by measures enhancing temporal flexibili-
ty in employment and workplace organisation. The reasons for this policy adaptation are manifold. 
We shall concentrate our endeavour on a set of causal mechanisms shared by the three countries 
which explain similarity in outcome. 
First, responses to unemployment are shaped by the legacy of previously instituted policies. The 
legacy of policy is generally treated as an aspect of historical agency, for instance governmental for-
mation of welfare state provisions or the reshaping of industrial relations systems after 1945 in 
Western Europe. Legacies can work in several ways: (i) they establish institutional procedures for 
policies, (ii) they provide organisations with internal criteria of evaluation which shape their reper-
toire of possible responses, (iii) and they influence the corridor of action of collective actors. For 
our analysis, previously instituted policies form an additional set of pecularities that the three 
countries have in common. They will become active in the analysis for instance in the form of 
wage- price indexation in Belgium, the record of the Blum experiment in France and the history of 
the Social Contract in Britain. 
Furthermore, focusing on the legacies of policies implies to take on board considerations about 
what can be done and who can confront unemployment in a promising manner. Any confrontation 
of sustained labour market problems will have to acknowledge to what degree the organisational 
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resources at one's disposal are affected by the configuration of the employment crisis and the 
transition of domestic labour markets. This conundrum then boils down to the question if the 
duration of the crisis and its structural properties act to diminish the regulatory capacities and 
available resources for successful management? 
In addition, our conceptual baggage includes the lack or dissipation of resources on the part of 
the labour market actors. Regarding the institutional design of labour relations, it will be recalled 
that Belgium, France and Britain have conflict-prone industrial relations systems. However, each 
exhibits certain particularities. Throughout the 1970s Britain had a voluntary, fragmented and 
decentralised structure of labour relations. With the change of government in 1979 this structure 
was, and still is being, challenged by an unprecedented level of statutory regulation. The arrange-
ment of France's industrial relations system has rendered unionism a fragmented, competitive and 
ideological entity. State intervention, irrespective of its political colouring, repeatedly displaced 
collective bargaining organisations from the resolution of wedge issues, thereby diminishing the 
autonomy of industrial relations. Finally, the Belgian case is underpinned by a combination of 
regional and linguistic cleavages which severely affect the coherence of labour relations at the 
national level. 
The degree to which state intervention determines the field of action and shapes the bargaining 
agenda constitutes a fourth factor. Redistributional policies endorsed by the state require organisa-
tions of capital and labour that function as filters to implement and garner support for such policies. 
Industrial relations arrangements characterised by (i) longstanding organisational rivalries as in 
France, (ii) {egional cleavages as in Belgium and (iii) decentralised modes of class conflict regula-
tion as in Britain offer a stimulating insight into the study of the plurality of contending interests. 
Particular attention is therefore awarded to the character and resources of collective bargaining 
systems. 
Finally, the existence or absence of a viable exchange model is a core qualifier. The mosaic of 
compromise options will greatly hinge on the bargaining mechanisms that determine the sequence of 
policy proposals, compromise formation and policy implementation. These may include the costs of 
bargaining to each of the parties involved, the use of credible threats to push for a compromise, 
social norms invoked in negotiations and that agreement is facilitated when one outcome is especial-
ly salient. Work sharing demands can therefore be considered as a test of the trade-off potential 
between equality (socially adequate) and efficiency (economically viable). Where both objectives are 
bound to conflict, any sought- for compromise faces the question of how much can be added to 
equality or subtracted from efficiency and vice versa. 
Alongside our key hypothesis, similarity in outcome reflected in the shift from work sharing to 
temporal flexibility, the causal mechanisms will be elaborated in detail in the empirical chapters that 
follow. We start with Belgium, then look at the French case and in chapter N the British example 
is presented. 
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Chapter ill 
Belgium: The Demise of Consociational Policy- Making 
1. Introduction 
Compared to its European neighbours, Belgium was the fust country to initiate a process of 
working time reduction: in 1977 collective bargaining agreements in retailing introduced the 
39-hour week. A year later, manufacturing industries followed suit with the implementation of the 
38-hour week. Such pioneering performance may not be so surprising given that the labour market 
problems unfolding midway through the seventies were exceptional. Facing the prospects of a 
prolonged economic crisis, Belgium was the fl.rst country to register double-digit unemployment 
rates (1977/78)', -and by 1982 the 15 percent threshold had been surpassed. During the second half 
of the 1970s similar dramatic labour market problems were registered only in the Netherlands. For 
a comparison of the economic and labour market developments in both countries since 1945 see 
Lepszky and Woyke (1985), Rijckeghem (1982). 
As a country with early mass- unemployment the magnitude of the labour market problems 
fostered support for a specific set of responsive strategies at a point in time when neighbouring 
policy makers still had (some) reason to believe that the Belgian malaise was an isolated case. If we 
classify these labour market policies according to measures focusing on working time regulation, 
then we can single out the following distinctive types: 
1) On the basis of the domestic unemployment statistics (cf. Annuaire Statistique de Ia Belgi-
que 1986: 620). Alternatively, if we take the standardized OECD calculations the 10 percent mark 
was reached in 1981 (cf. OECD-Employment Outlook 1984: 15). Some commentators have argued 
that Belgian unemployment was artificially high in the 1970s because of the social security treatment 
of unemployed women (cf. Therborn 1986: 80). 
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..,_ Measures aiming at reducing labour force participation. This approach included numerous early 
retirement schemes embodied in governmental legislation and collective bargaining agreements 
between 1975 and 1982 . 
..,_ Starting in 1977/78 the strategy of work sharing through shorter hours gradually gained ground. 
However, a tripartite agreement on working time reduction lacked support within and between 
the relevant labour market actors . 
..,_ The transformation of working time policies from work sharing objectives in favour of temporal 
flexibility and employment deregulation became the new order of the day with the change of 
government coalitions in 1982. Under the heading of modernizing industry and restructuring the 
economy, both the Operation S-3-3 and the Hansenne working time experiments were com-
mitted to these specific policy goals. 
The classification indicates that certain labour market policies had a limited life- span. Later, their 
political desirability faltered, or they were dropped altogether in favour of other policy priorities. It 
is this change of prerogatives which especially interests us. Taking the tri-partite policy process as 
defmed in the preceding chapters - agenda setting, implementation and evaluation - the political 
dynamic in each is explored. Policy outcomes will partly be attributed to evaluations of success or 
failure on the part of labour market actors in the process of their policy reviews. In addition, we 
will not ignore the fact that the change of government in 1981 provoked a major political rupture 
within the Belgian institutional system. 
Not alone did the explanation for the rising tide of unemployment change following the forma-
tion of the Christian Democrat-Liberal coalition but unprecedented political intervention in matters 
of collective bargaining sought to alter the very arrangement of Belgian industrial relations itself. 
With these developments, state intervention either deprived completely (1982- 84) or partially 
(1985/86) the collective bargaining organisations of the right to independently settle wages and 
incomes. 
The dramatic unemployment problems taking shape in Belgium from 1975 onwards and the 
various measures they evoked from the relevant labour market actors form the core of this chapter. 
In the analysis that follows, I highlight the interplay between structure and process and demonstrate 
how working time policies were used as a pawn in a game about fundamental distributional issues, 
not least the power of the collective actors themselves. Structurally we emphasise two factors. First 
the recognition of a specific regional dynamic in Belgian policy making which placed any attempt to 
confront the evolving crisis on a national scale under taxing constraints. In addition, as Katzenstein 
(1985) has extensively shown, Belgium belongs to the European group of Small States in Wbrld 
Markets. The process analysis will demonstrate how the drama of the Belgian policy process in 
relation to the labour market crisis was shaped by decisions whether to alter certain institutional 
routines of regulation. 
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The chapter is organised into two parts. First. I set out the main structural features of the Belgian 
economy and society so as to provide the context within which the policy dynamic is translated. 
Unemployment - the precipitatipg problem - the unique features of Belgian economic and social 
structures, including the wide-ranging regional divides, the industrial relations system and some 
relevant sets of recent policies are all described in turn. Having thus explored the background, the 
second part of the chapter undertakes its central task: the detailed elaboration and analysis of 
working time policies between 1975 and 1990. 
2. Particularities of a Small State 
Labour Market Evolution 
The year 1974 marks a watershed in the development of the Belgian labour market. While total 
unemployment had remained under the threshold of 100.000 for more than a decade, it was in the 
Summer of 1974 that the "historical ascent" began (cf. Beguin 1985: 22). In the course of the frrst 
oil price shock, registered unemployment in Belgium sky-rocketed: it exceeded 100.000 in 1974, 
had more then doubled by 1976 (228.000), and reached over 10 percent for the first time in 
1977/78 (cf. Offlce National de l'Emploi 1977: 16). The dramatic scenario culminated in 1984 with 
a national unemployment rate of 18.6 percent. In short, within a decade Belgium went from a near 
full-employment country to a society "in (which) virtually all of its sectors manifested symptoms 
of immobility and crisis" (cf. Deweerdt and Smits 1982: 261). 2 
The rising tide of unemployment coincided with a comparatively low rate of labour force 
participation. In 1975 Belgian labour force participation reached 61.2 percent. This made it the third 
lowest rate in Western Europe, undercut only by Italy (55.5 percent) and the Netherlands (54.3 
2) In an address to the Chairmen of the Chamber and the Senate in 1981, the Belgian King 
Baudouin described the crisis by referring to a prevailing state of war whiCh demanded drastic 
action. Baudouin declared: "It is now high time to put differences aside, of whatever nature they 
might be, and to give priority to survival. This is what we would do if we were at war. Now, this 
is war, war for the preservation of our economy" (cf. Deweerdt and Smits 1982: 261, my italics). 
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percent, cf. OBCD-Employment Outlook 1984: 15). Two additional features of the evolving 
labour market situation deserve brief mention. For one, as a result of numerous early retirement 
schemes Belgium registered a steep decline of labour force participation among employees aged 
between 60 and 64 years. On the other hand, the portion of jobless women as regards total unem-
ployment was always higher than that of male employees. As the evolution of the employment crisis 
illustrated the massive influx of women into the labour market since the early 1960s turned out to 
be unsustainable. In fact, with unemployment particularly befalling women the gender segmentation 
of the Belgian labour market was reinforced (cf. OECD 1984: 32, M.B. T. 1987: 431). 
Until the beginning of the seventies Belgium belonged to the group of Western European 
-
countries with near full- employment. However, while full employment was recognized by the 
relevant labour market actors as a central parameter of macro-economic policy making, the aware-
ness did not lead to the institutionalization of the guideline as an explicit objective of labour market 
policies. The regular tripartite negotiations established between the government, the trade unions and 
the employers associations through Belgium's Social Solidarity Pact from 1944 repeatedly voiced 
their opinions of needed changes in the labour market. But the reality of unemployment and the 
means to confront such a challenge remained distinct non- issues. As Therborn ( 1986: 114) has 
argued, 
"a number of topics (were) dealt with - not only wages but also social and economic policy, 
broadly take~. - but the issue of employment never appeared in the records of these negotiations 
until 1973. Even then, the words "full employment" do not occur, even as a goal to be pursued." 
When the employment problems started to unfold in 1974, the magnitude of the problem demanding 
feasible reactions, the consequences of a missing institutionalization of full-employment policies 
quickly became apparent. In the absence of such a commitment the divergence in strategies of the 
relevant labour market actors was pronounced. The short supply of interest affinity between the 
collective actors on a variety of policy issues - wage indexation, working time reduction, regional 
disparities in the crisis - hindered the consensual implementation of strategies directed at confron-
ting the employment evolution. 
The rise of unemployment during the second half of the seventies did not affect all economic 
sectors and groups of employees to the same extent. Rather, the labour market situation displayed 
selectivity: for instance, the manufacturing industries lost more than 450.000 jobs between 1974 and 
1985. This corresponded to a drop of 32 percent! In particular the Walloon steel, coal and iron 
industries experienced the highest degree of job loss over the 10 year span. By 1980 employment in 
industry (excluding construction) accounted for 26 percent of total employment in Belgium (cf. 
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M.E. T. 1987: 426). Exacerbating the unfolding labour market crisis was a net increase of 30.000 
job seekers per year between 1973 and 1979. Young people reaching working age and steadily 
increasing numbers of women ~king employment fed this expansion. With the growth of the 
Belgian labour fox:ce (in absolute terms) from 3. 998.700 in 1975 to 4 .234. 700 in 1985 the structural 
problems of employment and unemployment quickly became evident: When it was urgent to genera-
te job growth, the Belgian economy, especially in manufacturing industries, was losing tens of 
thousands of jobs (cf. Spineu.x 1990: 47). 
In stark contrast the privat and public service sectors registered an increase in employment of 
15.2 percent ( + 270.000) over the period under consideration. Despite this favourable evolution, the 
massive de- industrialisation of the Belgian economy could not be compensated for by a sufficient 
number of new jobs. Nevertheless, governmental efforts were significant. But so also were the 
budgetary ill-effects. Public sector job creation represented the frrst state- induced response to 
confront the rising tide of unemployment with nearly 160.000 new jobs created between 1975 and 
1985, an increase of over 30 percent. As a result, employment in the public sector as a portion of 
total employment rose from 23 to 32 percent. However, the price tag attached to such a strategy 
raised expenditures of the public sector from 45.5 percent of GNP in 1975 to 52 percent in 1979. 
During this period "Belgium experienced the fastest increase of government expenditures of all EEC 
countries" (cf. Grauwe 1983: 110). 
Although manifest labour market problems, sustained processes of de-industrialisation and 
public sector job creation schemes became common features of many OECD countries in the 
aftermath of the frrst oil price crisis, the central difference between these countries and Belgium did 
not concern the timing, scope and depth of the crisis in the country. Rather, when the global 
economic crisis started to have a lasting impact on the domestic labour market, the interaction of 
structural constraints, institutional arrangements and specific policy decisions quickly contributed to 
put Belgium out of step with its European neighbours. It is to this mosaic of socio-economic 
structures and processes that we now turn. 
Managing External Dependence in an Open Economy 
In order to provide a comprehensive explanation of the Belgian miUaise the searchlight has to be 
directed towards particularities in the Belgian socio-economic situation. Otherwise, it would be 
difficult to explain, why for instance unemployment in Belgium, rather than in France or Britain, 
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rose so fast and reached double digits at such an early stage despite the latter two countries being 
simultaneously exposed to the oil price crisis. 
What sets Belgium apart from these two countries is the vulnerability of its economy. The 
Belgian case is underpinned by a matrix of politico-economic properties in which the exposure to 
developments beyond its control and the management of dependence are major elements. These 
various features converge in the concept that Katzenstein (1983, 1985) has elaborated, and which 
affirms that unlike France and England, Belgium belongs to a distinct group of OECD countries 
labelled "small European states in the international economy. "3 
A central characteristic of this concept is that Small European states lack the capacity to furnish 
economies of scale to various industries that are vital for domestic production. Hence, dependence 
on imports can repeatedly lead to large deficits in their balance of foreign trade. The pronounced 
extent to which the Belgian economy is open to foreign trade substantially constrains adjustment 
processes in its industrial juxtaposition. The export structure is largely based on semi- manufactur-
ing. At the outset of the global conjunctural crisis, Belgian products in international markets were 
"80 percent price-takers against 20 percent price-makers" (cf. Martou 1987: 197). 
The challenge posed by the accumulation of disequilibria and the problem of adjustment to 
economic change leads small European states to seek reactive and incremental policy instruments. 
Such an approach aims at bridging "the divergent requirements of international competitiveness and 
political preference ... (establishing) a calibrated balance of economic flexibility and political stability" 
(cf. KatzenStein 1985: 29). In politico-institutional terms, the peculiarities of the Belgian case are 
mirrored by a practice heralded as programmation sociale. The key to such an arrangement is the 
combination of consociational institutions with piecemeal economic and social policy making (cf. 
Dancet 1986: 109). 
3) Empirically, Katzenstein's classification of small European states includes seven countries: 
Belgium, Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. 
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The Pillarisatioo Effect 
While Belgium shares many politico-economic features of Small States, it is set apart from these 
by the process of pillarisation ("verzuiling ") the mainspring of which is a regional-linguistic 
cleavage. Belgium has three linguistic groups (French, Dutch and German) and its constitution 
recognizes two cultural communities (French and Flemish/. Still, the three geographic regions 
(Wallonia, Flanders and Brussels) neither fully coincide with the cultural communities, nor with the 
three pillars (Catholics, Socialists and Liberals) which exhibit a close-knit network of social, 
political, economic and cultural organisations and institutions. In particular, the Christian and 
Socialist pillars are distinct social systems shaped by denominational differences, diverging regional 
traditions, party and union links, employment trajectories in the public sector and linguistic features 
(cf. Post 1989). 
Note, however, that in Belgium pilllll'ization was more unbalanced than, for example, in the 
Netherlands, in that the only fully developed pillar is the two Catholic ones in Flanders and Wallo-
nia. Only these have an independent party, union, employer organisation, sickness funds and mutual 
benefit societies, cultural associations, youth organisations, school system (from Kindergarten to 
University) etc. The other pillars, the Socialist and the Liberal never managed to establish organisa-
tions on all those levels. In part, this may be attributed to ideological clashes (for instance it is 
difficult to imagine a 'Socialist' employers' association). In addition, these pillars were never able to 
monopolize representation of the corresponding segments of the population to the extent that Catho-
lics could, therefore they lacked the organisational equivalents of the parish and parochial schools 
(cf. Lorwin 1971: 156). 
Granted that the Catholic pillar is dominant in Flanders and the Socialist in the Walloon provin-
ces, we have to emphasize that a key reason why Belgium remains a federal political entity (up to 
now) lies in the cross-cutting nature of the aforementioned pillars. There exists a significant 
Socialist Party in Flanders (SP), and there is still a notable social basis for the Christian Democrats 
(PSC) in the Walloon provinces, in particular in the more rural districts. Concomitantly, the fact 
4) At present (1992), the Dutch-speaking community has approximately 5.8 million inhabi-
tants while Francophone Wallonia counts 3.3 million. In 1962 legal regulation recognized that 
Belgium is a bilingual country. A decade later the cultural autonomy of the linguistic communities 
was amended into the constitution. 
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that in the Flemish part of the country the Christian Peoples Party (CVP) is dominant, and in 
Wallonia the Socialist Party (PS) does not mean that institutionally the two parts are different. 
Instead, the two parties are each other's functional equivalent. In Flanders the CVP was most 
successful in colonizing the state and society; in the francophone provinces it was the PS. In short, 
CVP and PS could be likened to twin brothers, if and when their programmes and policies are the 
same! 
This point does not ignore the fact that because the two dominant parties in Belgian politics 
have different histories, ideologies and social roots, their dominance has prompted a differentiation 
between the two regions: an emphasis on subsidiarity and the maintenance of its autonomy in 
education and cultural affairs in Flanders; while the Walloon community is traditionally interested in 
the decentralization of both investment decisions and expenditures. 
Internal changes in the Catholic or Socialist pillars of Belgium during the period 1970-1980 
need not imply a disintegration of the respective pillar. As Dobbelaere and Billiet (1983) have 
shown, the progressive decline of religious practice in Flanders did not result in the disintegration of 
the catholic pillar. In contrast to developments in the Netherlands, such transformations reinforced 
the associative trajectory, i.e. the active participation in the respective schools, hospitals, social 
assistance, cultural services etc. In other words, the internal dynamic of pillarization may involve a 
shift of emphasis from religious imperatives to structural features and psychological implications (cf. 
Billiet 1984; Siegemund 1989). 
Finally, ~if regional separatism has not yet explicitly been put on the agenda of politics, then this 
non -inclusion derives from a distinct Belgian feature: the importance which the country's only 
metropole - Brussels - has assumed during the past 15 years. Apart from being a centre of 
domestic and European political decision -making as well as the financial centre of Belgium, the 
bilingual capital has provided a tacit bridging function between Flanders and Wallonia. Given its 
location within Dutch -speaking territory while being a primarily French- speaking city has 
contributed to political actors refraining from the regionalization of a vital national bond, i.e. the 
social security system. 
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Regional Economic Disparities in Belgium 
Exposure to an international economy beyond its control and structural problems in Belgian industry 
are reflected in diverging regional constraints which have been particularly devastating for the 
Walloon part of the country. The economic decline and the labour market problems affected 
Flanders and Wallonia in dissimilar ways, with the latter experiencing a crisis within a crisis. The 
process of de -industrialisation in the Walloon steel, coal and iron sectors amplified the existing 
economic cleavages between Wallonia and Flanders up to "the point of no return" (cf. Collinge and 
Quevit 1988: 259). The evolution of unemployment on a regional scale highlights disparities 
between both parts of the country. 
Tab. 1: Development of Unemployment in Flanders and Wallonia1 
Year Flanders Wallonia 
1960 6.8% 4.8% 
1965 2.7% 2.8% 
1970 2.8% 5.1% 
1975 6.4% 8.3% 
·1980 12.0% 14.1% 
1985 17.7% 23.6% 
1987 14.0% 22.0% 
1. Rate of unemployment in percent of the labour force. 
Source: M.E. T. (1987: 434), Ministere de la Region Wallonne (1988). 
As Tab. 1 shows, differences in regional unemployment rates widened consistently to the detriment 
of Wallonia since 1965. For the French- speaking region, the decline in employment during 
1973-1982 mainly affected industry and agriculture, while a slight increase was registered in the 
service sectors. In contrast to this, the Flemish provinces witnessed employment gains in industry, 
and all the more in services, whilst the regional joblessness rate was mainly fuelled by problems 
within the agricultural sector (cf. Collinge and .Quevit 1988: 260). 
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The key to the structural disequilibrium between the two regions is the concentration of the 
so- called "industrial furrow" in the Walloon provinces of Liege and Hainaut, whereas Anvers and 
Limbourg in Flanders mirror successful restructuring processes in the Dutch-speaking North. Until 
1965 the post- war development of the Belgian economy was predominantly focused towards the 
iron and steel industries as well as coal mining. Given the exclusive location of these industries in 
the "Walloon furrow", the Flemish provinces featured a diversified productive sector and increa-
singly established themselves - next to Brussels - as the service region of Belgium. 
With the restructuring process of the Belgian economy underway since 1965, the regional 
emphasis in industrial production, employment evolution and competitiveness considerably shifted. 
This extended adjustment of the regional economies was best illustrated in the petro-chemical 
industry established in Brugge and the expansion of Ghent's cotton industry as well as enlargement 
of the Antwerp harbour to become the second largest transshipment port in Europe (next to Rotter-
dam)5. Furthermore, the region's economic expansion was possible on the basis of a substantial 
labour force reserve accumulated during the 1960s. 
Finally, demographic factors in terms of domestic migration from Wallonia to Flanders and 
Brussels have to be taken into account. Overall, while Wallonia experiences a sustained socio-
economic 'peripheralization', Flanders has become the economic centre in Belgium and Brussels the 
financial and political capital. As Frognier et al. (1982: 255) conclude the "growth effects of the 
twentieth century have not served as homogenizing influences in a state characterized by regional 
imbalances.\ On the contrary, this growth has always occurred at the expense of one of the two 
halves of the country." 
The regional disparities in the fields of economic development, industrial adjustment and the 
evolution of employment were repeatedly influenced by militant ethnic and linguistic conflicts 
between Flanders and Wallonia during the period 1978-1986. Since the labour market actors in the 
two regions did not face the same magnitude of socio-economic problems, streamlining measures 
were regularly overtaken by particularistic recommendations and vested regional interests. 
In a situation which increasingly called for speedy policy responses, the non- solution of 
manifest economic and social problems created political deadlocks in the institutional system of 
governance (for illuminating examples of such political stalemates see Deweerdt and Smits 1982: 
265-267). Such deadlocks fostered the illusion of ungovernability, which was reinforced by the 
5) Currently, 75 percent of Belgian exports and 70 percent of its GDP originate in Flanders 
(cf. Klinkenberg 1992: 13). 
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fact that between 1978 and 1981 Belgium counted five Cabinets, with three different coalition types 
and two Prime Ministers. It was precisely the breakdown of social consensus in the face of the 
crisis which proliferated the Belgian malaise. To what degree the regional disparities were also 
reflected in and constrained by .organisational cleavages between the relevant Belgian labour market 
actors shall be elaborated in the next section. 
Organisational Cleavages Between Wallonia and Flanders 
Apart from the principal conflict deriving from the politico-religious fragmentation of the Christian 
ACV/CSC, the Socialist ABVV/FGTB and the Liberal ACLVB/CGSLB, the three labour confedera-
tions display inter-organisational cleavages which correspond to the linguistic communities. While 
the ACV/CSC was established in 1923, the ACLVB/CGSLB was founded in 1930 and the 
ABVV/FGTB in 1945. Given the pillarisation and bi-lingual nature of Belgian society it is "impor-
tant to recognise (that) the political-ideological backbone of Belgian unionism (rests) on the three 
main contemporary ideological and philosophical currents, Christianity, Liberalism and Socialism" 
(cf. Hancke and Wijgaerts 1989: 190). 
As the abbreviations indicate, and the same is true for the central employers' association VOB/ 
FEB, the relevant collective actors in the Belgian system of industrial relations each have a separate 
francophone and a flemish organisation. In other words, employers and unions "have split up along 
linguistic lines and have adopted an ideological profile which does not necessarily correspond to the 
profile of the 'sister party' of the other linguistic community" (cf. De Winter 1989: 714). 
In particular within the two largest Belgian labour confederations, the ACV/CSC and the 
ABVV /FGTB, the organisational factionalism between the union headquarters in Brussels and 
independent regional associations is most pronounced. The regional factionalism in the Belgian 
system of industrial relations is supplemented by widely different patterns of interest organisation. 
Both the ACV/CSC and ABVV/FGTB are vertically structured an the basis of industrial bran-
ches, whereas the ACLVB/CGSLB's organisational structure is locally based. A distinctive feature 
of the socialist union is the autonomy of its vertical sub-unions, whereas the ACV/CSC is more 
centralized (cf. Hancke and Wijgaerts 1989: 189). 
Furthermore, the pillarization effect leads to institutional and personal links between respective 
unions and political parties. However, here again one has to bear in mind the linguistic-regional 
connotations: In Wallonia, the FGTB is close to the PS, whereas the ABVV and the Flemish 
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Socialists (SP) share political views. By contrast, the CVP has a strong union faction, the ACV, 
while the French- speaking CSC has established links with the much smaller Social Christian Party 
(PSC) (cf. Noiret 1990: 87). In sum, since the Christian and Socialist pillar of the Belgian political 
system is composed of four parties and four corresponding union organisations, whilst the 
ACLVB/CGSLB shares political interests with the liberal PVV/PRL, the dynamic between labour 
organisations as well as between government and opposition cannot be analysed as a classical two 
party or two union system (cf. De Winter 1989: 712). 
As a result of diverging union structures and contrasting institutional links with political parties, 
the routines of collective bargaining differ considerably between the francophone and flemish 
regions. While Wallonia has a tradition and culture of shop floor industrial unionism, Flanders is 
characterized by a history of bi-and tripartite concertation (cf. Slomp et al. 1984: 10). The 
diverging nature of labour relations can be attributed to opposing spheres of influence between the 
ACV/CSC and ABVV/FGTB. While the Christian union movement is twice as strong as the FGTB 
in the flemish provinces, the relation is inverse in the Walloon region. Furthermore, through the 
gradual shift of industrial activity from the francophone to the Dutch- speaking provinces and the 
Brussels region, the respective power positions of the two largest union confederations have signifi-
cantly changed. Tab. 2 illustrates the overall evolution and intra -union shifts in membership. 
\ 
Tab. 2: Evolution of Union Membership in Belgium 1950-1989 
Year ABVV ACV ACLVB Total 
FGTB esc CGSLB 
1950 584.000 567.600 71.700 1.233.300 
1960 715.500 761.700 97.400 1.574.600 
1965 750.500 844AOO 101.400 1.696.300 
1970 837.500 965.200 106.300 1.909.000 
1975 1.062.600 1.201. 700 161.000 2.425.300 
1980 1.126.800 1.318.800 199.500 2.645.100 
1985 1.097.600 1.365.200 210.900 2.673. 700 
1989 1.029.100 1.424. 700 212.700 2.656.500 
Source: Ebbinghaus et al. (1992). 
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As illustrated, the Christian union ACV /CSC surpassed the ABVV I FGTB in total union member-
ship by 1960. While all three unions managed considerable gains in membership during the 
1960 -1980 period, the prevailing rank order did not change since this historical sorpasso. The 
' Socialist union registered a continuous drop in reported membership during the last decade which · 
makes it likely that the confederation will fall below the one million threshold at the outset of the 
1990s. On the other hand, the uninterrupted gains in membership by both the ACV /CSC and the 
ACL VB/CGSLB have contributed to a steady increase in total union membership in Belgium 
(excluding 1989).6 
The inter- union power shift is further underscored by the social elections at the plant level. 
Given that these elections take place every four years, they constitute the single most important 
indicator of the respective power positions of the three representative labour confederations. 
Tab. 3: Results from the Belgian Social Elections 1975-1987 
• A. Conseil d'Entreprise (CE) 
Organisation 1975 1979 Dif. 1983 Dif. 1987 Dif. 
ABVV/FGTB 47.1 44.8 -2.3 43.3 -1.5 40.4 -2.9 
ACV/CSC 46.7 48.0 +1.3 48.7 +0.7 47.9 -0.8 
ACLVB/CGSLB 6.1 7.2 + 1.1 7.9 +0.7 7.7 -0.2 
B. Comite de Securite et Hygiene (CSH) • 
1975 1979 Dif. 1983 Dif. 1987 Dif. 
ABVV/FGTB 46.0 44.5 -1.5 43.9 -0.6 41.8 -2.1 
ACV/CSC 47.8 48.2 +0.4 47.7 -0.5 49.6 + 1.9 
ACL VB/CGSLB 6.2 7.3 + 1.1 8.4 + 1.1 8.6 +0.2 
* W arks Council. 
* Health and Safety Council. 
Sources: M.E.T(1987), Lambert(1980: 143, 148). 
6) A word of caution is necessary when evaluating these figures. Due to the tendency of 
inflating their accounts, the publication of membership figures by the individual unions is highly 
controversial in Belgium. First, the data is hampered by temporal interruptions and the failure to 
provide yearly membership figures to an independent agency, like the Certification Officer in 
England. In addition, Belgian unions include in their calculations the retired members, the unem-
ployed and those not paying any contributions. For a detailed description of the ambiguities of 
union membership reports in Belgium see Pasture and Mampuys (1990). 
65 
Tab. 3 illustrates that since 1979 the ACV /CSC registered a continuous increase in votes at the 
expense of its main rival, the ABVV /FGTB. The diffusion of electoral gains by the Christian union 
prevails for all the regions and groups of employees. Overproportional increases occurred in Flan-
ders, chiefly among white collar employees where the ACV/CSC is already the majority union (cf. 
Capron 1987). 
In each of the two main labour confederations, membership is concentrated in general, public 
service and white collar unions. With regard to the sectoral and social configuration of its member-
ship, the ACV/CSC is frrmly rooted in the engineering, textiles and construction industries. In 
comparison to the ABVV/FGTB, the portion of white collar employees (especially in teaching) is 
far larger within the Christian union. The Socialist confederation is frrst and foremost identified with 
the francophone provinces where lie its historical roots and its rank- and- file is concentrated. The 
bulk of the union's membership is in the iron, coal and steel industries, concentrated in large 
enterprises and spatially clustered in Charleroi and Liege. The strongholds of the Liberal union 
. confederation lie in the bi-lingual Brussels region (cf. Ebbinghaus et al. 1992). 
The initial responses of the trade unions to the unfolding crisis reflected the highly fragmented 
nature of politics in a segmented society. The regional fragmentation of the Belgian industrial 
relations system made the endorsement of discretionary strategies all the more difficult, if not 
unlikely. As the controversies surrounding the system of automatic wage indexation exemplify, the 
diverging cultures, traditions and problem fields between Wallonia and Flanders hindered the 
relevant latJour market actors from coming up with policy alternatives that targeted the Belgian 
malaise in an encompassing manner, and thus putting particularism on hold. At a point in time 
when it was needed most (late seventies early eighties) organisational heterogeneity and regional 
disparities made the achievement of a Belgian Social Contract unattainable. 
The Consultative Network in Belgian Industrial Relations 
Belgium is characterized by a highly institutionalized presence of unions and employers in the 
formulation and administration of national economic activities and social policy. Katzenstein (1985) 
regards democratic corporatism as enhancing political predictability and incremental adjustment on 
issues of economic and social policy. This pattern of institutionalized consensus formation served as 
the foundation for both political decision -making and the development of collective bargaining in 
Belgian industrial relations. The Social Solidarity Pact from 1945 can be placed in this arrangement 
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of consensus-oriented politics. The agreement constituted the backbone of post-war industrial 
relations in Belgium and provided for the gradual integration of the trade unions into the prevailing 
economic order. 
In the pact, both Socialist and Christian unions and employers assessed their "mutual" depen-
dence, and the "peaceful co-existence" of the collective actors in the industrial relations system. 
The content of collective bargaining was focused on social policy issues and the procedure establi-
shed served to furnish trade-offs between "economic" benefits for the employers and "social" 
gains for the workforce (cf. Hancke and Wijgaerts 1989: 203). An additional characteristic of the 
Social Solidarity Pact was the institutionalization of conflict through the introduction of a multi-
dimensional network of national-level consultation between the government, the employers and the 
unions. 
Followiflg this basic agreement of Belgian industrial relations, various institutions were establi-
shed which allowed for different modes of consultation in the fields of economic and social policy 
making (cf. van den Brande 1987: 95, Vanderstraeten 1986: 671). The most important and influen-
tial of these at the national level is the National Labour Council. Founded in 1952, the CNT is 
generally perceived by the representative7 collective bargaining actors as Belgium's "social parlia-
ment" (cf. M.E.T. 1987: 435). Next to the CNT, the Conseil Central de l'Economie reflects most 
distinctively the consultation arrangements at the national level. Founded in 1948, the CCE embo-
dies the central employers' association and the three largest trade unions. Its primary responsibilities 
concern the provision of recommendations to inquiries from the government and/or parliament (cf. 
Hannequart 1989: 44). 
Conversely, the CNT's field of responsibility includes furnishing advice and expertise to both 
the government and the parliament in areas of labour law and social policy. In addition, the Natio-
nal Labour Council holds an autonomous regulatory competence in matters of collective bargaining. 
As a result of legislative changes enacted in 1968, the CNT is authorized to conclude inter- indus-
try agreements for the privat sector. These collective norms are later legitimized through govern-
7) Representative trade unions (the ACV/CSC, ABVV/FGTB and ACLVB/CGSLB) and the 
employers' associations (VOB/FEB) hold an equal number of seats in the CNT. The definition of 
representativity is included in the 1968 Act concerning collective industrial agreements and joint 
committees. It focuses on the inter-occupational configuration of the labour confederation, its 
establishment at the national level, representation in the Central Economic Council as well as the 
National Labour Council, and the requirement that to be represented organisations must have at 
least 50.000 members (cf. Blanpain 1984: 320). 
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ment regulation. In that respect, "the role of the public authorities was essentially a supplementary 
one of transferring to the judicial and legislative level the contents of the inter- industry agree-
ments" (cf. Bayar et al. 1987: 40). 
This design of interdependent institutions centred on consultation and concertation carried on 
until the beginning of the 1980s the standard operating procedure of transforming collective bargai-
ning provisions into subsequent legal norms. However, as the history of the third national consulta-
tive institution during the second half of the seventies illustrates, the actors involved in the National 
Labour Conferences increasingly failed to arrive at consensual answers as the economic crisis 
intensified. The objective of such conferences between the government and the central collective 
bargaining organisations consisted in the latter monitoring political orientations to the former. They 
were mainly convened "when the social situation risked to aggravate or brought to the forefront 
particularly urgent matters" (cf. Hannequart 1989: 43). 
While the design of consultative bodies was essentially based on the parameters of social and 
economic gains for all actors involved, the trade- off matrix proved not to be constructed for a 
labour market crisis in which unemployment and the expenditure to support the jobless were 
running out of control.8 The hardening of attitudes between the state, the employers and the trade 
unions on issues that essentially touched vested interests of the organisations involved explains why 
the established "culture of compromise" became increasingly strained during the period 1978-1986 
(Katzenstein 1985: 32). For almost a decade the CNT proved unable to outline a new socio-eco-
nomic consensus, thus undermining its role as the central arena of crisis management on employ-
ment and social policy affairs. As Deweerdt and Smits (1982: 265) argue, 
"a climate of mutual trust between the social partners could not be reestablished, and the union-
management negotiations could not break out of the impasse. This confirmed the contention that the 
Belgian consultation syndicalism is effective for periods of substantial economic growth and much 
less for periods of economic crisis." 
The deteriorating socio-economic consensus was furthered by regional divergencies in the impact 
of the crisis and the community tensions thus provoked. The sharpening of differences regarding 
regional economic performance, industrial competitivity and the diverging evolution of the labour 
8) Expenditure on unemployment benefits increased from 2 percent of GNP in 1975 to more 
than 5 percent in 1981. Total social expenditure reached 28 percent of GNP, and the public sector 
deficit rose to 11.5 percent of GNP (cf. Dancet 1986: 122). 
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markets in Flanders and Wallonia placed the identification of common solutions under severe 
constraints. Thus, the process of regionalization was reinforced by the multi- dimensionality of the 
crisis, and policies embodying a comprehensive solution proved to be unachievable . 
. 
Having outlined various structural features of its socio-economic system, and how they affected the 
process of policy making during the crisis in Belgium, we shall now turn our attention to the 
agenda- setting and implementation of working time policies. The analysis of this policy process 
will be elaborated with regard to the framework unfolded in the preceding sections. As shall be 
shown in detail, the strategy of working time reduction was taken up by both the collective bargai-
ning actors and the state, albeit at different time periods and with diverging interests. In the course 
of this undertaking, the goals identified with working time policies changed as did the actor con-
stellations endorsing the respective measure(s). 
3. Issue- Building and Implementation Patterns of Working Time 
Policies 
The Take-off in 1976-1978 
As shown above, after the Second World War Belgium established various institutions of consulta-
tion between the relevant labour market actors. The defining characteristics of the consultation 
network were its multi -dimensionality and high degree of institutionalisation. For the period 
1955 -1975 the CNT, CCE and the National Labour Conferences contributed to what Dancet 
(1988: 217) has called "the golden age of social planning and growth." With inter- industry agree-
ments as the dominant pattern of compromise formation during the two decades, numerous settle-
ments provided for a progressive reduction of standardized weekly working time. 
In 1955 the 45- hour week was introduced through an inter- industry agreement, and the 
43- hour week followed in 1969. Next to curtailing standard weekly working time, the abolition of 
mandatory Saturday working in manufacturing, and repeated increases in paid holidays were imple-
mented between 1955 -1975 (cf. Blanpain 1988: 98). These different provisions were exclusively 
addressed by unions and employers within the framework of social policies and individual wel-
fare gains ( cf. Tollet 1985: 324). 
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The Belgian issue- building process of work sharing as a means of confronting the dramatic 
decline in employment only gained momentum after the signing of the inter- industry agreement in 
1975 which provided for the generalization of the 40- hour week. Initially, the trade unions put the 
demand on the agenda of national and sectoral bargaining institutions. Following the introduction of 
numerous early retirement schemes (see the next section) the objective of implementing the 
36-hour week by 1980 became the new order of the day. As the demand was presented at union 
Congresses under the heading of partage du travail, the two largest Belgian labour confederations 
explicitly agreed that they neither accepted a reduction in purchasing power nor supported a suspen-
sion of wage indexation (cf. Alaluf 1989: 253-254). 
In stark contrast to this position, the employers categorically rejected such an approach to the 
hours issue. Rather, the Patronat favoured the alternative of establishing improved legal provisions 
for part- time working ( cf. VOBIFEB 1979; ibid. 1982). However, this position was subject to 
revisions in the course of the issue-building process. Later, the employers argued for a cost-
neutral working time reduction, linking wage moderation either with the reform of the indexation 
system, or by proposing to suspend wage bargaining for three years (cf. De Backer et al. 1980: 
135). Such diverging positions during the initial agenda- setting of working time policies signalled 
that possible agreements would face a high compromise threshold. 
The lack of interest affinity between the collective actors of capital and labour concerning the 
issue of shorter hours is in stark contrast to the understanding shared by both sides when facing the 
issue of eahy retirement. Unlike demands for working time reduction, the necessary an1ount of 
movement in the direction of a compromise enhancing defensive labour market strategies was much 
smaller right from the outset of negotiations. Whereas the adequacy and desirability of early retire-
ment schemes never became a matter of sustained conflict in the industrial relations system, the 
unfolding work sharing debate was delegated to the branch and ftrm level bargaining levels. 
Early Retirement as the First Working Time Measure Against Unemployment 
In the light of the rapid deterioration of the Belgian labour market during the mid-seventies, both 
the government and the collective bargaining organisations first reacted to the emerging crisis with a 
set of defensive measures. Such labour market policies focused on extensive compensatory public 
sector job creation schemes and reducing the labour force participation rate of older employees. The 
former response involved the creation of more than 125.000 new jobs between 1974-1983, 
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however with a marked slowdown since 1981/82 (cf. OECD 1984: 36). On the other hand, the 
latter measure included the massive implementation of early retirement schemes through both legal 
provisions and collective barg~ning agreements. 
From the outset in 1974 to 1987 over 197.000 employees were registered as having taken 
advantage of one of the many early retirement formules, for instance the prepension conventionelle 
licenciement or the prepension legale (cf. Ronge and Molitor 1987: 40). Through the numerous 
early retirement schemes on the national, branch and enterprise levels (for an overview see Casey 
1985), the labour force participation rate of male employees aged 60- 64 drastically declined within 
two decades. From 70.8 percent in 1961 it dropped to 64 percent in 1970 and hit 32.5 percent in 
1981. Regarding regional effects, the evolution was equally dramatic in Flanders and Wallonia (cf. 
Annuaire Statistique 1986: 501-503). 
In terms of quantitative job replacement, the re-occupation clauses included in some early 
retirement schemes achieved a ratio of 67 percent of early retirees. Generally defined as "maintai-
ning" employment levels, the clause sought to affect youth unemployment (under 30 years of age). 
As data furnished by the Employment Ministry illustrates more than 51.000 persons either found a 
new job, or received an apprenticeship as a result of linking early retirement with re -occupation 
provisions (cf. Commissariat General du Plan 1984: 101). 
However, as impressive as these figures appear, the early retirement schemes did not create any 
new jobs. While dismissals were postponed or directed into early retirement trajectories, unemploy-
ment on the national level could not be curtailed as a result of such programmes. In other words, 
the performance of the strategy contributed neither to the reversibility nor to .the stoppage of unem-
ployment growth during 1974-1986. The resulting dilemma made it increasingly difficult for the 
trade unions to maintain their labour market priorities. As a union official recalled, 
"because the total number of jobs did not increase, the justification for shifting available employ-
ment from one older worker to a younger worker became blurred. Since our strategy was running 
into trouble the search for viable new answers to the labour market drama led to the discovery of 
the presupposed positive potential of work sharing through shorter hours" (cf. Int. CSC). 
In order to successfully popularize the new strategy the labour confederations had to identify to 
what extent their rank- and- file would support the new demand, if need be also with the endor-
sement of voluntary wage sacrifices. 
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Income Policy, Wage Indexation, Wage Moderation 
As a consequence of the Social Pact of 1945, wage bargaining in Belgium was embedded in a 
framework of bi-partite arrangements, and grounded on the explicit agreement between unions and 
employers that state interference was neither desirable nor necessary (cf. Armingeon 1983: 40). 
Therefore, a de facto incomes policy did not exist in Belgium during the 1950-1975 period 
Katzenstein 1983: 107). However, the Belgian system of wage formation included a procedure for 
the automatic adaptation of wages and social incomes to the consumer price index. Established in 
1952, the core element of the indexation system sanctioned a full cost-of-living adjustment for 
employees and recipients of social incomes each time consumer prices rose by more than 2 per 
cent. Automatic wage indexation not only became a benchmark of the Belgian welfare state, but 
also a measure rich in symbolism for the unions, and a source of recurring controversy for the 
employers. 
A core reason for the Belgian malaise during the period 1975 -1982 lay in the diverging 
evolution of hourly real wages and productivity. Between 1970 and 1975 hourly wages grew faster 
than productivity. During the following five years both indicators developed in a similar direction 
while unemployment exploded (cf. Dancet 1986: 118). In fact, with both unemployment and 
inflation re4ching record levels, Belgian employees continued to attain uninterrupted real wage 
increases. As Therborn (1986: 150) remarked, 
"collective bargaining was quite successful for employed Belgian workers and employees. Between 
1978 and 1982, Belgium was alone among the seven small countries of Scandinavia, the Low 
Countries, Austria and Switzerland, in having a real wage increase." 
In contrast to pay rises for those managing to keep a job, private investment was stagnant since 
1973 and declined from 1977 onwards. Under conditions such as these, employers who could not 
manage exhorbitant unit labour costs by passing them on to their pricing policies because of compe-
titive disadvantages in international markets were forced to reduce their manning levels. Approa-
ching the 1980s and with no feasible solution of the domestic crisis at hand, unit wage costs in 
Belgian industry were at least 12 percent above the average rate of its three most important trading 
partners: West Germany, the Netherlands and France. As Grauwe (1983: 102) tells the story, 
"Belgium started the 1970s as a country with a relatively low wage cost in manufacturing and 
ended the decade as a country with the highest wage cost in manufacturing ill the EEC." 
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All told, if Belgium was considered the "sinking ship" of Europe since midway through the 
1970s (cf. Albert 1985: 7), the medicine to be applied for a sound and prompt recovery seemed 
self -evident to the dominant party. alliance in Belgian politics, the Conservative -Social Christian 
CVP/PSC, and the employers: to curb exhorbitant wage increases, and send out a clear message 
that the unions' income strategies of wage-price indexation had to be changed. Under the heading 
of voluntary wage restraint (moderation salariale), and supplemented by calls for austerity measures 
in budget policies, crisis management was repeatedly put on the agenda of tri -partite consulta-
tions. However, various state initiatives could not engender solutions to recurring deadlock situa-
tions. 
The institution of automatic wage indexation created a high threshold for unions and their 
rank- and- file to popularize conditions for voluntary income sacrifices. Among the union member-
ship the question of automatic wage indexation was regarded as a highly symbolic collective good. 
When the VOB/FEB suggested for the first time in 1975 that the existing procedures - not the 
system as such - of indexation should be revised, both the ACV /CSC and the ABVV /FGTB 
judged the employers' proposal as seeking to do away with a cornerstone of Belgian industrial 
relations (cf. Dancet 1986: 116). 
That such unbending approaches reflected aspirations and interests of the union rank -and- file 
was most obviously demonstrated in a paramount case of industrial militancy: the 1979 dispute over 
shorter hours at A.C.E.C. in 1979. The conflict gained nation-wide attention for its 13-week 
duration and the unwavering positions taken by the actors involved. The dispute in the electrical 
engineering firm located in Charleroi, Wallonia initially focused on wages and working time issues, 
but soon turned into a battle over principles of income moderation, the right to strike and redundan-
cy provisions. In time, the fmn conflict witnessed the interference of regional union and employ-
ers' representatives, and later federal courts. 
Two elements during the dispute contributed to its escalation. After four weeks of strikes the 
A.C.E.C. managers responded by laying -off white collar employees, although they were not 
involved in the conflict. In addition, the employers sought to make union officials liable for what 
they perceived to be an illegal strike. What finally ended the bitter dispute was direct government 
intervention. The solution found provided for the introduction of the 37.5- hour week in 1980 and 
wage increases totalling 7.5 percent (cf. Courrier Hebdomadaire 1980). 
While in the perceptions of union representatives the industrial militancy became a landmark for 
"withstanding managerial arbitrariness" (cf. Int. FGTB), employees outside A.C.E.C. were affor-
ded a first- hand glimpse of eventual conflict costs which they would have to bear. Furthermore, 
the strike illustrated that it would not have unfolded such a dynamic solely on grounds of working 
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time demands. Rather, the walkout quickly turned into a conflict in which solidarity for 'our organi-
sation' assumed centre stage. In other words, the mobilization of springs of loyalty at the local 
level, and not a pronounced preference from the workforce for the claims on the national bargai-
ning agenda, explain the shop-floor resolution to meet the employers' confrontation. 
Besides, consumer surveys carried out in 1980/81 suggested that Belgian households regarded 
the economic situation with increasing pessimism. As a reaction to this problem perception they 
amassed "considerable precautionary savings, especially as a safeguard against unemployment" (cf. 
OECD 1982: 11). Hence, confronting the unfolding labour market crisis occurred in an individuali-
zed manner, and in anticipation of the possible future impact of unemployment. 
Finally, the development of a clear preference within the active workforce in favour of work 
sharing policies was considerably constrained by the fact that mass unemployment was becoming an 
omnipresent phenomenon in Belgian society, although the possibility of actually being touched by it 
was very unequally distributed. 
As noted earlier, the evolution of unemployment mirrored widespread regional disparities. 
Accordingly, the dissimilarities between the regions impaired the formulation of a coordinated 
redistributive strategy. Since the collective actors in the respective regions faced a widely different 
configuration of the crisis they were therefore not exposed to the same set of labour market pro-
blems. The subsequent course of the Belgian work sharing debate illustrated that the lack of rank-
and- file support for voluntary wage moderation, and the various structural features of the labour 
market crisis~ could only be overcome by a pivotal strategic adaptation on the part of the collec-
tive actors. In effect, they turned to and called for state- assistance. Hence, the trade unions delega-
ted the work sharing claim upwards by seeking the incorporation of a third ·party into the arena of 
collective bargaining. Whilst the unions hoped that the government would support their working 
time demands, the employers for their part saw the chance for attaining revisions of the indexation 
system. 
From the "Plan V.D.B." to the "Plan De Wulf" 
Given that collective bargaining at the inter- industry level had reached a deadlock since 1976, "!lnd 
in light of unemployment rising to double digits in 1978- 79, the state manifested an urgency to 
act. Since the Christian Democrats and the Socialists had formed a coalition in December 1978, the 
political configuration of the government allowed for an encompassing approach. The various 
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initiatives proposed in the field of labour market policies have to be seen with respect to the 
exacerbation of problems at both the socio-economic and institutional levels. During the formation 
of the coalition, the so-called '!Formateur du Gouvernement"9 - P. Van Den Boeynants -
submitted a detailed socio-economic recovery plan which confronted the collective bargaining 
organisations with the following policy objectives: 
1111- New approaches in working time organisation and manpower policies were to promote additional 
"suppleness" for the competitive performance of Belgian frrrns. The options proposed consisted 
of various early retirement schemes, the phased introduction of the 36-hour week, legislation 
promoting part-time work and sabbaticals. _ 
1111- Firms with more then 100 employees had to meet a job creation target of 3 percent. Companies 
with "difficulties" were exempted from this obligation, and small and medium sized frrms could 
refer to less strict employment conditions. 
1111- The combination of working time reduction and job creation targets had to be supplemented by 
an agreement on "income moderation". For a duration of three years wage increases were not 
to exceed the amount deriving from automatic wage indexation. 
However, the subsequent negotiations reinforced the existing inter-organisational compromise 
problems. The employers labelled the government proposals as "bad therapy" against the unfolding 
labour market crisis (cf. Lambert 1980: 76). Furthermore, the VOB/FEB argued that the scheme 
did not include any guarantees as to how the unions would be commited to respect the three year 
income moderation. The doubts voiced concerned the capacity of the labour confederations to 
endorse and maintain a policy of voluntary self- restraint against the highly independent regional 
union organisations. 
Uncertainty over voluntary wage moderation and the fact that the government could neither 
compel the labour market actors, nor issue negative sanctions in case of non- compliance rendered 
the ambitious distributional scheme null and void. Following its rejection by the collective bargai-
ning organisations the government provided the industrial relations actors with a refined proposal. 
The so-called Plan De Wul/0 included wage subsidies to frrrns which reduced their weekly 
9) The Belgian procedure of forming a government involves a person responsible with the 
"mission de formation du gouvernement". Called -on by the King, this "formateur" is not identical 
with the later Prime Minister. 
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working time to 38 hours by the end of 1980. In order to be eligible for the two- year subsidies 
firms had to either recruit registered full- time job seekers or appoint unemployed youths. 
By downgrading the differences between union demands for shorter hours and managerial 
demands for wage moderation, the Plan De Wulf contributed to extending the process of working 
time reduction to other branches and groups of employees without recourse to industrial action. In 
April 1980 over 40 percent of full- time employees in the private and public sectors had been 
touched by a reduced working week of 38 hours. By year's end more than two-thirds were 
affected by the new hours standard (cf. Internationale Chronik 1980: 10). 
When considering the specific content of such agreements our attention has to be drawn to the 
following facts: Seldom was there any reference to simultaneously reduce weekly working time and 
extra hours. Rather, in many cases the contracts contained provisions linking the hours issue to 
production requirements of the individual firm. In particular, employers in large firms managed to 
leave open the precise defmition of shorter hours. Pending the introduction of the 39 or 38-hour 
week, agreements included a daily reduction of 12 to 24 minutes. Furthermore, contracts stipulated 
to take advantage of free shift regulations during specific periods of the year, for instance Easter, 
Christmas or New Year. As Ronge and Molitor (1987: 16) conclude, the acknowlegement of 
enlarged flexibility options in combination with furnishing productivity gains provided that "the 
agreements ... were used more to protect those actively working than to share work between those 
actively working and those out of work." 
In sum, ~hilst the reduction process was gaining momentum, establishing a tri-partite consen-
sus over labour market priorities repeatedly failed to overcome the challenge of linking voluntary 
wage moderation with binding job creation provisions. Comparing the Plan V.D.B. with the De 
Wulf scheme it is self-evident that the latter excluded the cornerstones of the former: the demand 
for union self- restraint in incomes policies and binding job creation provisions ( cf. Freese et al. 
1988: 87). Notwithstanding its success, the Plan De Wulf implied that redistributive objectives were 
excluded at the expense of providing feasible results on the hours issue as an end in itself. Thus, 
the revisions evidently discharged intransigent collective bargaining actors from the formation of an 
obviously unattainable consensus about labour market policies centered around redistributional 
objectives. 
Following the failure to reach a tri-partite agreement on employment the course of the Belgian 
work sharing debate was marked by an extensive revision of priorities. When the Christia,n-
10) Named after the Employment Secretary, R. De Wulf, a Flemish Social Democrat. 
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Democratic coalition members called for a temporary cessation of the indexation mechanism in 
April 1981, the PS responded with the resignation of its cabinet members. The following general 
elections in November 1981 yielded a stunning surprise in many ways. The Flemish Christian . 
Democrats (CVP) suffered their worst defeat since World War Two, receiving only 19.3 percent 
(-6.8%) of the vote. The much smaller Walloon wing, the PSC, registered 7.1 percent, a loss of 
3.1 percent to the previous elections in December 1978. The Socialist parties remained stable, 
receiving 12.4 and 12.7 percent of the vote in Flanders and Wallonia respectively. The winners at 
the ballot box were the Liberal parties, with the PVV drawing 12.9 percent (+2.6%) and sup-
port for the PRL reaching 8.6 percent ( + 2.0%, cf. Gorvin 1989: 31). On the basis of these 
electoral results, the old and then again new Prime Minister W. Martens (CVP) formed a Cen-
tre-Right coalition (so-called Martens V, consisting of the CVP, PSC, PVV and PRL) which 
quickly administered a remarkable U -turn in Belgian politics. 
The U -Tum in 1982 
Seen from the perspective of Prime Minister Martens, the point of departure in 1982 was "to 
restore the economic and financial environment as a condition for halting the industrial disinvest-
ment, the destruction of employment, and giving new hope to the population of our country" (cf. 
Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers 1981: 67). The new policy approach of the Centre-Right 
coalition entailed a neo -liberal economic concept whose immediate application was made possible 
by resorting to 'volmachten' (special powers). 11 Whereas a social consensus between the govern-
ment, the unions and the employers in the face of the crisis proved to be unachievable, the former 
asked for and received legislative authority to rule by decree through the Parliament in February 
1982. Thus, the unions and employers were henceforth to be confronted with socio-economic 
policy options unilaterally defined by the government. 
11) Referring to the special powers legislation, Prime Minister Martens commented: "This is 
the tenth time in Belgian history that the Government has been given special powers by the King. 
Many of the other occasions were times of war, and I consider this period to be war in terms of the 
economic problems we face" (cf. Burton and Drozdiak 1982: 32, my italics). 
77 
What Smits (1983: 183) has labelled "less democracy for a better economy" focused on the 
restoration of the competitive capacities of Belgian firms in the external sector and the reduction of 
the budget deficit. While limiting government expenditure did ·not mean "parliament's partial 
surrender of its legislative powers" (cf. ibid.: 184), the prerogative of adjusting corporate earnings 
did call for resort to special powers. This was the case because changing the system of automatic 
wage-price indexation was a prime target of governmental regulation. In addition, making use of 
'volmachten' in order to introduce austerity policies allowed the ruling CVP to outmanoeuvre its 
union base (ACV) in parliament. 
With respect to monetary policy, the devaluation of the Belgian franc by 8.5 percent within the 
EMS in February 1982 was the ftrst re-ftx.ing experienced in 33 years (cf. Deschamps 1984: 587). 
Along with its monetary effect, namely to bring an overvalued currency back into competition, the 
exchange- rate adjustment also affected the interaction of the collective bargaining actors. In that 
respect, "recourse to devaluation by a country with a traditional attachment to exchange-rate 
stability had a shock effect on the social partners and faciliated their acceptance of the corrective 
measures" (cf. OECD 1988: 119, my italics). The political repercussions were even stronger when 
the decision to suspend the index linkage and impose a price freeze for three months was taken in 
February 1982. With the exception of the lowest wages and salaries, cutting the cross-linkage to 
the retail price index reinforced the objective of restoring ftnancial equilibrium in the private 
12 
sector. 
FuJI wa~e indexation was only restored in September 1983, but without retroactive effect and 
under conditions strictly limiting the scope of collective· bargaining on the issue of real wage forma-
tion until 1.986. These restrictions concerned the legal introduction of a 'competitiveness norm' 
which provided ample opportunity for the government to interfere in any wage negotiations should 
these result in agreements wherein wages rose faster in Belgium (in common currency terms) than 
in its seven main trading partner countries .13 
In determining pay increases with regard to the evolution of wages and incomes in the seven 
trading partners, the established routine of quid-pro-quo between productivity increases and 
real- wage gains was unequivocally broken. With this means of income regulation the government 
12) According to Dancet (1988: 221), the Belgian government was "advised in strong terms" 
by member governments of the EC to modify its "prejudicial" system of wage indexation. 
13) The countries listed within the competitiveness norm were Britain, the former Federal 
Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and the United States. 
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had in its hands a mechanism of direct intervention, and therefore threatened any process of collec-
tive wage bargaining which was not in line with its policy goals. With such a 'stick behind the 
door' the practice of income formation in the Belgian system of industrial relations was deprived of 
its bargaining autonomy. As Smits (1983: 193 -194) argues, 
"instead of becoming the third partner, the government evolved into the party which defined the 
contents of the material to be discussed and, failing a consensus between the employers and the 
workers, took the final decision itself ... The social partners were thereby faced with a fait accom-
pli." 
A stock- taking of the statutory moderation policy introduced between 1982 and 1987 reveals that a 
major share of households' income was frrst transferred to the corporate and later to the public 
sector. Results of this policy could be observed in the fall of wages paid by frrms. Workers' per 
capita real income dropped by more than ten percent between 1982 and 1986 ( cf. Erlich et al. 
1987: 1382). On the whole, the corrective measures involved sacrifices for the wage earners 
amounting to over 12 per cent of their net earnings (cf. OECD 1988: 122). Furthermore, the 
budget constraints prevented the public sector from continuing to provide compensatory employment 
opportunities. The role it fulfilled increasingly switched from an active labour market policy to a 
defensive and re-active approach. While registered unemployment dramatically increased between 
1982-1985, those drawing benefits steadily declined. In June 1982 more then 510.000 people were 
unemployed, of whom 433.000 were entitled to unemployment benefits. By the end of 1985 the 
unemployment ranks had increased to 608.000, but only 484.000 were dr;lwing unemployment 
cheques (cf. Spineux 1990: 54-56). 
4. Working Time Policy Amidst the 'Stick Behind the Door' 
Placed in the context of the change of government coalition in 1982 and the approval of special 
powers by Parliament, the objectives and the procedures of Belgian labour market policies under-
went a distinctive transformation. The Martens V Government henceforth combined its working time 
initiatives with a restrictive wage policy, thus ruling out full wage compensation for a reduced 
working week. In the course of this change of priorities the institutional arrangement of Belgian 
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industrial relations was reshaped. The post- war consensus of a tri-partite institutional design that 
excluded unilateral state intervention in the arena of capital-labour bargaining was overturned by 
the Centre- Right Government. 
To illustrate the marked turnabout in the process of Belgian policy- making this section will 
focus in detail on two sets of measures introduced during 1982- 1985. The first concerns the 
so-called Operation 5-3-3, while the second is termed Hansenne working time experiments. 
Directed towards work sharing, the former combined working time reduction with state- induced 
wage moderation. By contrast, the latter's common denominator consisted of enlarging flexibility by 
way of decentralizing collective bargaining mechanisms and deregulating legal provisions in the 
employment of labour. More generally, both sets of measures were part of a comprehensive policy 
of readjustment in the fields of industrial relations and economic performance. 
The Operation S-3-3 
Against the background of a national unemployment rate of 16.6 percent, and an expected further 
rise in the nfunber of labour market entrants of 186.000 between 1981 and 1986, the Centre- Right 
coalition chose to make use of its special powers in the field of labour market policies. The initia-
tive was additionally fuelled by information submitted by the National Planing Office which predic-
ted the pointlessness of a labour market policy exclusively grounded on economic growth expecta-
tions (cf. the so-called 'Maribel models', Bureau du Plan 1982). 
The Operation 5-3-3 focused on three elements: In exchange for a compulsory three percent 
wage sacrifice unions and employers in the commissions paritaires14 of the private sector were to 
negotiate a reduction of working time amounting to five percent, and further reach agreements on 
job creation schemes which foresaw a three percent employment growth. In sum, wage savings 
served to fmance compensatory recruitment through working time reduction. As a result of this 
policy package the government underscored the need for a cost- neutral working time redu£tion 
while simultaneously satisfying entrepreneurial calls for a solid application of income moderation. 
Finally, the combination of shorter hours and statutory wage sacrifices was to promote the creation 
of 70.000 new jobs. As the former Employment Secretary and architect of the exchange formula 
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- M. Hansenne - argued: 
"it is not a priority to reduce working hours. Rather, we are focusing on forms of reduction which 
will effectively create new jobs ... Since Belgium is already the country in the world with the lowest 
average working time any further reduction has to adhere to extremely specific rules in order to 
guarantee that the reduction creates new jobs (cf. Hansenne 1985: 53, 57). 
As regards the construction of the exchange formula the degree of commitment on either side of the 
collective bargaining organisations was slanted. As De Ville (1984: 12) has noted, the unions felt 
"somewhat trapped in a biased situation: the wage aspect of the proposal not being negotiable, and 
by definition relatively favorable to management." In other words, while the employers did not have 
to fulfill any preconditions, and could count on established compromise routines in the commissions 
paritaires the unions were hors du jeu concerning wage formation. Besides, while the wage sacrifice 
was non- negotiable, the realization of the other two components of the scheme were to be deter-
mined in capital-labour bargaining. With this procedural element the government discharged itself 
from a direct responsibility regarding the employment component of the 5-3- 3 plan. Delegating 
this component to the commissions paritaires implied that the unions and the employers would have 
to find individual formulae for the creation of new jobs. Apart from this delegation of responsibili-
ties the specific definition of the three percent job creation objective remained a subject of extended 
15 
controversy. 
14) The commissions paritaires are the bargaining institutions at the branch level. As their name 
indicates, they are made up of an equal number of union and employer representatives. In 1983 
over 150 such commissions existed. 
15) The original French version read: "une embauche compensatoire de 3% ... formules alterna-
tives donnant un resultat considere comme equivalent pour l'emploi" (cf. Plettinx 1984: 6, my 
italics). 
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Evaluating the S-3-3 Exchange Formula 
When evaluating the implementation of the 5-3-3 scheme a striking conclusion is the intensive 
bargaining dynamic which it sparked off. Between 1983 and 1984 more than 1.400 agreements 
were signed at the branch and flrm levels. In terms of employees affected by such settlements over 
1.300.000 of the two million private sector employees received new working time schedules (cf. 
Beguin 1985: 37). In case the commissions paritaires could not reach a compromise the compo-
nents of the 5-3-3 scheme were delegated to the firm level. This procedure allowed for a decen-
tralization of the issues on the bargaining table and the enlargement of the spheres of concertation. 
In practice, a marked shift in levels of bargaining and the diversification of procedures could be 
observed: only 84 of the 155 commissions paritaires fostered a compromise, while over 1.300 
firm-level agreements were signed (cf. De Ville 1984: 13). 
Turning to an evaluation of the respective elements of the Operation 5-3-3, let us first look at 
the working time side of the scheme. According to an examination undertaken by the Belgian 
Planning Office the average working time reduction of all branches which signed an agreement 
reached one percent in 1983 and fell to 0.5 percent in 1984 (cf. M.E.T. 1987: 449). This finding 
was consistent with results published by the ABVV/FGTB which yielded a reduction of 1.4 percent 
for the two years (cf. FGTB 1986: 48). The picture presented by the employers' federation allows 
~ 
for a classification according to the size of the companies affected. If small and medium- sized 
frrrns are taken into consideration the reduction reaches 1.4 percent. Omitting these firms from the 
evaluation yields a cut in working hours of 2.4 percent (cf. VOBIFEB 1987: 2). These results lead 
us to a frrst conclusion: despite the differences in the evaluations presented they confirm that the 
target of a five percent working time reduction was not arrived at. 
If the working time target was not attained, how then did the job creation element fare? Tab. 4 
considers the data published by the Employment Ministry which is based on frrms which reported 
an agreement including job creation provisions. 
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Tab. 4: Employment Changes in the Context of the Operation 5-3-3 
Cases I Emp.Dec.1983 Change Emp .Dec .1982 percent 
A2 788.400 812.200 +24.200 +2.9 
BJ 606.300 615.500 +9.200 + 1.5 
d 396.200 365.000 -31.200 -7.8 
Ds 179.600 160.000 -19.600 -10.9 
Totat 1.394.700 1.419.700 +33.400 +1.8 
Total 1.970.500 1.944.700 -25.800 -1.3 
1. Employees in December of 1982. 
2. Large enterprises fulfilling the job creation objective. 
3. Small and medium- sized firms satisfying the job creation target. 
4. No settlement or non -compliance with the presupposed targets. 
5. Construction industry. 
6. A+B. 
Source: Employment Ministry. Taken from De Ville 1984: 13. 
On the basis of the government's evaluation the employment outcomes deriving from the combina-
tion of working time reduction and compulsory wage sacrifice amounted to 33.400 new jobs in 
1983. Classified according to firms' size 9 .200. new jobs were created in small and medium- sized 
plants and 24.200 in large enterprises. The evaluation for 1983 and 1984 yielded a net employment 
effect of 52.100 new jobs (cf. Werner and Konig 1987: 62). 
Given the perceived ownership of the policy, the Employment Ministry regarded the global 
results as a success. Still, it could not ignore the fact that the projected target of 70.000 new jobs 
had not been reached. Nevertheless, the architect of the 5-3-3 scheme, Employment Secretary 
Hansenne, argued that the results made it possible to reduce the adverse consequences of dismant-
ling jobs in sectors and companies with "difficulties". From his point of view the government was 
dealing with an "extremely successful" outcome (cf. Hansenne 1985: 54). His judgement is render-
ed more comprehensible when we additionally take into account the learning implications contained 
in the exchange formula for the collective actors. In his own account Hansenne described this 
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approach as to "force the labour market organisations to negotiate amidst a web of constraints 
which both sides refused. This web consisted in binding the organisations to model agreements 
which fundamentally broke with the routines established in the post-war decades, and which had 
become a rigid practice" (cf. ibid.: 56). 
Hence, this interventionist approach meant that the labour market organisations' actions were 
explicitly bound by policy targets fixed by the government. At the expense of existing institutional 
arrangements the governmental norm setting process in matters of industrial relations emphasised 
that collective bargaining was related to macro-economic parameters. Within this context, the 
second set of working time measures introduced by the Employment Secretary, the so- called 
Hansenne Experiments, focused primarily on concerns for and changes in economic performance of 
individual frrms. 
The Hansenne Working Time Experiments 
With the Royal decree No. 1 79 from March 1983 the Hansenne Experiments introduced a further 
reorientation of Belgian working time policies. In general, they sought to integrate the reorganisa-
tion of short~r hours into the context of restructuring the production system of individual firms. In 
practical terms, the Hansenne Experiments worked towards a twofold objective. The first was the 
creation of additional jobs by way of reorganizing working time schedules at the plant level. The 
most noteworthy move towards this target was the justification of Sunday working in the industrial 
sector: contrary to existing legal provisions and collective bargaining norms the introduction of 
Sunday working could henceforth be approved on economic grounds .16 
Next to the flexibilization options the Hansenne Experiments involved a set of deregulation 
measures which went beyond the objective of restructuring working time standards. Rather, the 
two- year repeal of numerous labour laws sought to reinforce the process of recasting the Belgian 
system of industrial relations. As Hansenne claimed: 
16) In coal mining and the chemical industry Sunday working was legalized according to 
technological necessities of the respective production patterns. 
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"The decree No. 179 also has the objective to establish the conditions for balanced negotiations 
between the social partners. Within this framework the individual fmn is the original place of 
dialogue and collective bargaining. For now and in the future this approach may cause problems 
which especially concern the redistribution of power within the unions' and employers' interest 
organisations" (cf. Hansenne 1985: 66, my italics). 
Considering both the flexibility and the institutional implications of the Hansenne Experiments, the 
deregulation approach aimed at the re-integration of industrial relations in the firm's general 
industrial and commercial strategy. The theoretical backround for this alteration derived from the 
so-called Plan Palasthy. 17 His blueprint called for an encompassing redistribution of time budgets 
in Belgian society. Palasthy's starting point was the individual enterprise and its capacity to reorga-
nize time exploitation. In order to improve domestic profitability prospects and advance the condi-
tions for investment of capital in Belgian fll'IIlS, Palasthy suggested a sound expansion of production 
time. The cornerstone of Palasthy's scheme consisted of the disconnection of frrms' operating time 
from standardized working time provisions. Such a reorganisation involved expanding the frrms' 
time budgets to seven days and round-the-clock production (cf. La Libre Belgique 1983: 40ff.). 
The decentralization drive inherent in the Hansenne working time experiments focused exclusive-
ly on the regulatory competence at plant level, thus excluding the commissions paritaires and the 
inter- industry level from a say in the configuration of the new provisions. In order to introduce 
new forms of working time patterns the Centre- Right Government had to repeal various legal 
provisions. These extended to (i) the ban on Sunday working on economic grounds, (ii) limitations 
on daily working time norms, (iii) the definition of extra hours as well as (iv) regulations concer-
ning the prohibition of female night- working. 
Regarding the implementation process the government decree required a necessary "consensus" 
between the employer and "representatives" of the workforce. This definition implied an important 
refinement of existing practices of interest representation at the company level. Namely in small and 
medium -sized frrms where union structures of interest representation hardly existed (for instance 
the delegation syndicale) the workforce could elect a non- unionizied body of representatives which 
was authorized to sign working time agreements (cf. Vanachter 1987: 231). The possibility of direct 
17) Named after Tamas Palasthy, an economist from Hungary who teaches social and political 
sciences at the Catholic University .of Louvain. Between 1982 and 1985 he served as an advisor for 
the Employment Secretary Hansenne. What made the Plan Palasthy so popular and controversial 
was its direct transfer from academia into the political system. 
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representation of the workforce outside union structures could therefore break the labour confedera-
tions' monopoly of interest representation. In that respect, the notion of advancing 'unionism without 
unions' brought the two largest Belgian unions against the Hansenne working time experiments. 
A stock -taking of the implementation of the Hansenne working time experiments illustrates that 
between 1983 and 1986 a total of 55 agreements were registered by the Employment Ministry 
affecting over 26.000 employees (cf. Denys et al. 1985). If we classify these settlements according 
to branches, size of the firm, regions and form of working time experiment realized we arrive at 
the following configuration: 
~~»- Almost all experiments took place in manufacturing. According to data furnished by the Em-
ployment Ministry, the companies introducing new working time schedules were predominantly 
middle-sized firms (100-500 employees). All firms were characterized as mainly expanding 
and export-oriented companies with capital intensive production patterns (cf. Internationale 
Chronik 1986: 5). 
~~»- The few large enterprises incorporating revised working time standards were subsidiaries of 
multi-nationals, e.g. Philips, Siemens and Samsonite. Their inter-enterprise competitivity 
forced the Belgian subsidiaries to take advantage of the deregulation options. 
~~»- Considering the regional distribution of the working time experiments we find that, with the 
exception of two agreements, all other settlements were signed in Flanders! 
The finding htat the francophone part of Belgium was practically excluded from the implementation 
process can be explained by a combination of economic and political reasons. The former concerns 
the effective economic divide of Belgium on a regional basis in which the industrial 'losers' are 
located in Wallonia. Conversely, most prospering small and middle-sized frrms as well as large 
enterprises with considerable financial investment in technological restructuring are situated in 
Flanders. Political considerations dominated the second factor. Since the PS was not a member of 
the ruling coalition, the francophone union was not inclined to support the government's labour 
market policies. Yet, this orientation neither ruled out that at the plant level in Flanders the ABVV 
signed agreements with the ACV, nor that working time flexibility was introduced in the francopho-
ne region, however excluding the heading 'Hansenne Experiments' (cf. FGTB 1986: 52). 
Given the objective of softening rigidities linked to the problem of working time adaptation, the 
evaluation of the agreements revealed a common element: More than 90 percent of all working time 
innovations consisted of the introduction of shift- working during weekends. In such cases, the 
experiments provided for 12- hour shifts on Saturdays and Sundays. For those employees working 
exclusively on weekends reimbursement of 24 hours was equivalent to 36 or 40 hours, depen-
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ding on the standard weekly working time norm (cf. Denys et al. 1985: 61). By and large, the 
experiments merit the conclusion that weekly working time patterns were made more flexible by 
integrating unavailable time blJ;dgets on weekends into the existing production patterns ( cf. Leroy 
1988: 37). If we further consider the question of how employees reacted to the revised code of 
practice, it emerges that a certain time period allowing for individual adaptation and overcoming 
initial resistance was necessary. Thereafter, as various studies have underlined, 
"absenteeism dropped substantially, especially among weekend workers ... 80 percent of the workers 
were willing to continue working on weekends and 40 percent preferred Saturday and Sunday 
working against any other working time regulation, even standard weekly working time patterns" 
(cf. BIRR 1986a: 16, 18). 
The reason for such high acceptance lay in the attractive leisure time options and the advantageous 
financial remuneration for the 12-hour weekend shifts. In addition, many of those receiving a job 
on grounds of the Hansenne working time experiments knew all too well what it meant to be 
unemployed for years, or to be faced with recurring joblessness and sinking unemployment benefits. 
In 1980 those unemployed for more than two years constituted 38.2 percent of the jobless., By 1986 
the proportion had increased to 50.5 percent (cf. Spineux 1990: 48). 
Looking at the employment performance deriving from the Hansenne working time experiments 
the evaluation is controversial. It is not possible to clarify in detail if the firms under consideration 
would have created new jobs without the provisions of the Hansenne initiative. However, some 
cases were reported of companies in the engineering and mineral oil sectors turning to lay-offs 
during the period of experimentation (cf. FGTB 1986: 51). Bearing these reservations in mind an 
overview furnished by the Employment Ministry stipulated that 850 additional (full and part- time) 
jobs were created between 1983 and 1986 (cf. Werner and Konig 1987: 63). Such direct employ-
ment gains were supplemented by indirect effects like cancelling redundancies and turning tempora-
ry into unlimited employment (cf. Internationale Chronik 1986: 5). In the face of registered unem-
ployment reaching over 440.000 in 1986 these results were practically negligible. But for the 
respective firms which introduced new working time patterns the number of jobs created was by no 
means marginal (cf. Freese et al. 1988: 95). In light of these different results we shall now turn our 
attention to the interpretation of the state- induced working time policies by the labour market 
actors. 
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Evaluating State- Induced Working Time Policies 
The Belgian employers firmly welcomed the Hansenne working time experiments. The VOB/FEB 
considered the deregulation measures as options which the individual employers could take advanta-
ge of, instead of being forced to implement government regulations as had occurred with the 
5-3-3 scheme. Furthermore, the employers federation valued the refined working time policy as 
the complementary element of an economic policy focused on competitivity and deregulation. Seen 
from this perspective, the Hansenne Experiments not only centred on questions of working time 
organisation and rigid labour legislation. At the same time the new opportunities handed to the 
employers emphasised that industrial relations at the frrm level were regarded as a critical parameter 
of commercial activity and competitive adjustment. As the VOB/FEB claimed, the Hansenne project 
"promoted a reflection concerning the reorganisation of working time. Simultaneously it advanced 
the idea of flexibility, introducing this notion into the mentalities of the respective companies. It 
thereby created a climate of dialogue and new forms of reflection to enter into the system of the 
organisations" (cf. Kohnenmergen 1987: 90). 
Furthermore, as the Operation S-3-3 exemplified branch agreements could hardly arrive at 
stipulating t~e future employment levels of an enterprise or a sector without taking into considera-
tion the uncertainties of changing macro-economic and technological circumstances, the specific 
orders in hand of a company, and the qualification profile of labour sought by frrms. Of the three 
dimensions in which unions have a central regulatory interest - wages, working conditions and 
employment levels - only the former two are established as viable bargaining issues; the latter 
remaining a by-product of investors' discretionary decisions. 
However, reducing these constraints to employers' intransigence and state intervention would 
only lead us to disregard the inter-organisational pressure with which the labour confederations 
were confronted in the course of introducing shorter hours strategies. Where working time reduction 
was implemented without real wage losses (1978-1981), and in those cases where it was linked to 
a statutory wage sacrifice (1982-1986), the results were more than ambiguous for the unions' 
rank-and-file. Both variants yielded small reduction steps and high compromise costs, therefore 
off-setting any intended work sharing objectives and contributing to a lasting disillusionment within 
the workforce over the 36-hour week target (cf. Colpaert 1987: 41). Thus, the lesson deriving 
from this experience consisted in the "acknowledgement that any further decrease in working time 
had to be accompanied by a simultaneous readjustment of wages" (cf. Int. CSC). 
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In practice, the issue of temporal flexibility did not receive a comparable degree of union 
attention as did the demand for work sharing. Nevertheless, this reluctance did not imply "a general 
rejection of all kinds of flexib~lity" (cf. Syndicaliste CSC 1987: 17). In effect, the ACV/CSC opted 
for a strategy of limited cooperation which was mainly influenced by political considerations 
towards the ruling CVP. Accordingly, the Catholic labour confederation refused to participate in 
strike actions organized by the FGTB and the PS. As the ACV/CSC claimed "regarding the crisis, 
the actions do not provide an honest response to the workers .. .instead they are meant to develop a 
party and union opposition dominated by electoral considerations. The CSC is not willing to partake 
in such an obvious game" (cf. Syndicaliste CSC 1984: 26). 
Removing legal constraints on employment patterns and the decentralization of regulatory 
competence had two inter-organisational consequences for the unions. With the delegation of 
collective bargaining to the realm of frrm level actors, thus excluding other regulatory institutions in 
the field of labour market policies, a far reaching "fragmentation of bargaining issues" was establi-
shed (cf. -Tuchszirer and Greffe 1986: 75). With the growing diversification of working time 
patterns, income configuration and interest representation at the frrm level the formulation of a 
unifying demand structure forwarded by unions at the national level became increasingly difficult 
and contested. More generally, the Hansenne Experiments reduced the role of national unions to 
participant observers who could not control the regulation of weekend working and employment 
conditions (cf. Michan 1983: 5). 
Juxtaposed to this understanding stood the experience which parts of the unions' social base 
were having with regard to the Hansenne working time experiments. Not only did flexible working 
time agreements prove to be feasible, but they also provided far longer portions of leisure time than 
a weekly working time reduction of one or two hours. Although limited in quantitative terms, the 
qualitative effects of these experiments considerably contributed to de-mystifying the controversies 
surrounding the concept of temporal flexibility. Furthermore, as an opinion survey commissioned by 
the FGTB/ABVV revealed in 1989, two-thirds of Belgian workers preferred flexible hours and 
chose higher pay in preference to further working time reductions (cf. IRE 1989: 4). The conse-
quence of this popularization for the unions' leadership gradually manifested itself in a revision of 
bargaining priorities. After overcoming initial reservations they addressed the issue of flexibility and 
started to map out their own blueprints (cf. FGTB 1987, Syndicaliste CSC 1988: 3). As the engi-
neering union within the FGTB conceded with a degree of self -criticism: 
"The union has to give pragmatic answers. We now accept the changes underway, but they have to 
be supplemented by security of employment as the counterpart ... our goal is to socialise these chan-
ges, e.g. when we approve weekend working, fixed-term contracts, the expansion of part-time 
work, and even night working" (cf. Centrale des Metallurgistes FGTB 1988: 17-18). 
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The quotation highlights the dynamic transformation of Belgian working time policies: formerly tied 
to work sharing the policy was gradually understood as a means to enhance the temporal flexibility 
of firms' commercial activities and their utilisation of labour. This transition shall be illustrated in 
more detail by drawing attention to the regulation of flexibility provisions through the collective 
bargaining actors in the following section. 
5. The Return of Tripartism 
After winning the parliamentary elections in 1985, the Martens VI Cabinet (Social Christian-
Liberal coalition) convoked the social partners to begin central negotiations within the National 
Labour Council. The field of issues to be treated included the competitive position of Belgian firms, 
the promotion of employment, and improving the flexibility of the labour market. This undertaking 
implied that unions and employers would also have to arrive at an evaluation of the Hansenne 
working time experiments. However, the government's initiative was explicit regarding a possible 
failure to reach an agreement. After having obtained special powers from parliament for the third 
time any la'\k of success in central negotiations would subsequently lead to the imposition of measu-
res by means of excecutive decrees (cf. Couttenier 1987: 370). In this respect, the framework of 
negotiations in the CNT had changed profoundly. Anticipating interference by the political system 
forced the unions and the employers "to take into account the wishes of an absent third party - the 
Government" (cf. BIRR 1991: 16). 
The renewed importance attributed to inter- industry negotiations must be explained with 
reference to the legal context, and the collective bargaining organisations' common interest in 
reinstating unrestricted negotiations in the private sector. The legal framework prohibited real wage 
increases for 1985 and 1986 outside of the existing indexation provisions. Furthermore, in the 
context of austerity measures the Social Recovery Law of 1985 included a 'competitiveness norm' 
which gave the government a "general mechanism to intervene at almost any moment in wage 
developments" (cf. BIRR 1985: 10-11). Finally, agreements concluded on grounds of the 5-J-3 
exchange formula in 1983/84 were automatically extended for another two years. This decision of 
the government had serious consequences for industries and companies in the private sector since 
they were confronted with the unilateral and binding extension of their previous obligations. 
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Resentment at and growing awareness of the limits of sustained state intervention in collective 
bargaining affairs led both the employers' association and the trade union confederations back to the 
bargaining table. On the one hiJnd, the legal framework forced the labour. market organisations to 
negotiate, albeit within an intricate framework. On the other hand, it was increasingly questioned 
how much longer, and in which areas of labour market policies, direct government intervention 
could be economically rational and politically legitimate (cf. OECD 1988: 121). More and more the 
VOB/FEB resented the government's approach on pay policies. The employers' criticism focused on 
the uniformity of the measures which were applicable across- the- board, thus ignoring differences 
between profitable and non -profitable companies and sectors. In addition, such is the nature of 
repeated statutory incomes policies that they tend to impose a squeeze on income differentials. Still, 
employers who are seeking a comprehensive strategy of industrial recovery that entails lasting 
cooperation with and commitment from the workforce cannot be interested in a recurrent decline of 
income differentials. 
Given that the state had created different means to take decisions instead of and against the 
unions, the Catholic and Socialist labour confederations were inclined to make considerable conces-
sions, if only the further limitation of collective bargaining could be halted. With their authority and 
competence in income policies curtailed, and industrial governance restricted by statutory legislation, 
the role of the Belgian labour confederations "was more and more being reduced to that of any 
other lobbying organisation" (cf. BIRR 1986b: 10). In particular, the Socialist union confederation 
was faced with a major questioning of its legitimacy and credibility. Since the ABVV /FGTB was 
not linked to any of the coalition parties its isolation from the decision making process over core 
labour market issues severely threatened its raison d'etre. 
During the ensuing negotiations within the National Labour Council the unions' readiness to 
make substantial sacrifices in order to re-establish their bargaining authority was most pronoun-
ced in the field of working time policy. The way this adjustment took place was "defensive, 
wavering and often contradictory" (cf. Alaluf 1989: 263). The signing of the first inter-industry 
agreements within the National Labour Council for over a decade mirrored both the constraints as 
well as the transformation of the Belgian system of industrial relations. The legal framework proved 
to be a convincing 'stick behind the door' of the CNT, and the desire to regain authority in matters 
of collective bargaining governed the consensual approach exhibited by the central labour market 
actors. 
Limited and constrained as the bargaining arrangement was the Central agreement on flexibility 
and the Framework agreement on employment promotion, minimum wages and shorter hours -
both signed in 1986 - can be understood as a successful effort to return to the traditional system of 
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concertation in Belgium. While the former comprised the introduction of new systems of work 
organisation, the latter framework contract contained a number of guiding principles focused on the 
commitment to unrestricted collective bargaining. Since the derogation laid down in the flexibility 
agreement essentially diverged from existing labour legislation, the signing parties requested the 
enactment of a new law on flexible working time. Consequently, the government used the terms of 
the National Labour Council agreement as the basis for its legal framework which was finalized in 
March 1987 with the Law concerning the introduction of new working time regimes. 18 
Considering the working time provisions of the two CNT agreements, the policy shift from 
demands for substantial hours reductions to the explicit acceptance of new systems of flexible 
working time organisation is noteworthy. The central framework agreement on employment and 
working conditions stipulated that "it shall be left to sector level negotiations to consider the eventu-
ality of establishing a general average working week of 38 hours" (cf. Blaise 1986: 33, my italics). 
Concomitantly, the flexibility settlement made no reference at all to reducing the working week. 
The non- binding formulation of the former and the exclusion of shorter hours provisions from the 
latter stood in stark contrast to combining different forms of working time flexibility under the 
umbrella of one set of regulations (cf. Aslin and Oyce 1987). 
Regarding the implementation procedures for new working time regimes, the CNT agreement 
placed decentralised bargaining within the norm-setting process of prior branch settlements. In 
contrast to ~e plant level focus of the Hansenne working time experiments, the flexibility agreement 
re-affirmed the predominance of the sector over the individual enterprise (cf. Alaluf1989: 250). 
In sum, both central agreements were trendsetting not so much because of their individual 
content which some observers interpreted as an "empty box" to be filled by different levels of 
concertation (cf. BIRR 1986b: 11). Rather, what is noteworthy about the agreements was that the 
parties involved returned to and managed to remain at the bargaining table, eventually producing a 
compromise. Considering the institutional transformation in Belgian labour relations during 1981 -
1987, the fact that unions and employers resumed their bargaining responsibilities and averted 
government intervention was by no means a matter of course. 
18) The new law excluded the distribution sector. The organisation of small and independent 
companies - USCM - feared that through revised Sunday opening hours the competitive position 
of smaller independent members vis -a -vis large retail companies would diminish ( cf. De Gols 
1987: 29). 
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6. Conclusion 
Two features, emerge most forcefully from our analysis of Belgian working time policies: The 
dramatic labour market evolution starting in the second half of the seventies, and the breakdown of 
a multi- dimensional consultation system in industrial relations. Programmation sociale primarily fell 
apart because of widespread disagreement between the collective bargaining actors on a number of 
central policy issues. Standing out as the most prominent were the reform of wage -price indexa-
tion and the modalities concerning working time reduction. A consensus among employers and the 
Christian- Democratic Party singled out the automatic index linkage as the principal cause of 
exhorbitant wage costs and diminishing competitivity of Belgian firms. Given this construction of 
the problem they urged a revision of the indexation system and called for voluntary wage restraint 
as the order of the day. 
The trade unions did precisely the opposite. The two major union confederations focused their 
priorities on safeguarding automatic wage indexation and rejected income limitation as a one- sided 
measure of economizing. Their resoluteness can be placed in the context of a specific policy dilem-
ma. With rising inflation, relinquishing such a symbolic social achievement as automatic indexation 
would have been incomprehensible to their rank- and- me. Throwing the indexation system into 
question would have implied encouraging incomes sacrifices for which unions would have had to 
bear responsibility. Instead, the 'safety net' provided by the existing wage indexation system appea-
red more convenient than the painful search for new institutional arrangementS and compromises. 
Beginning in 1976 Belgian unions advocated shorter hours with explicit reference to work 
sharing objectives. To a significant degree such an orientation of their working time demands 
explains the increased level of disagreement between the collective actors. During the initial stages 
(1976/78) of this policy process the dominant collective actors were the unions and employers at the 
branch level. In a second phase the government undertook initiatives with the objective of contribu-
ting to a reconciliation of the positions of the collective bargaining organisations ( 1979- 81). The 
small success of this approach ultimately fuelled the decision to directly intervene in collective bar-
gaining affairs (1982 -1986). 
This periodization not only illustrates changing actor constellations concerned with the imple-
mentation of working time policies. It also reflects what compromise dimensions can be generated in 
situations of manifest conflict over shorter hours. During the second phase state regulation (see for 
instance the De Wulf scheme) managed to overcome employers' resistance to shorter hours. The 
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government provided employers with non -standardized patterns of working time organisation, 
while simultaneously discharging the unions from voluntary wage moderation. By contrast, the third 
phase reflects the transformation of the institutionalized policy making process in the Belgian system 
of industrial relations. During the first half of the eighties the government repeatedly intervened in 
the content of negotiations, deprived the bargaining organisations of their wage fi .. ~o\,'&~~u 
and placed them under the obligation of adhering to state-monitored policy ti\tgets. 
As a result, collective bargaining actors who were either ill-disposelttJr~r~~ .. 
voluntary self -limitation were forced into cooperation with the governme\:s ~u~>~~r o{policy 
prerogatives. Henceforth, collective bargaining became "a planned and s~Jirv~~,;,~frefdom of 
negotiations" (cf. Smits 1983: 195). In that respect, both the competitiveness norm and recourse to 
special powers could force the labour confederations into lasting cooperation with the austerity 
measures of the Martens Government. Since the unions had no alternative resources at their dispo-
sal, the only promising way out of these restrictions lay in the adoption of revised incomes policies 
and a marked adjustment of their working time demands. 
This transformation process was reflected in significant changes of the bargaining agenda. In 
1978 the Belgian unions could claim pole position in Europe for successfully seeking to break the 
40- hour threshold. But the demand forwarded by the labour confederations during the first phase 
of the issue- building process, in particular the introduction of the 36-hour week, did not arise 
again in the central agreements worked out within the CNT in l 986. 
In these~circumstances, regaining bargaining authority and re-establishing their contribution to 
legitimate industrial governance had a price tag attached. For the provision of these essential collec-
tive goods in industrial relations the Belgian unions downgraded their shorter. hours demands, and 
instead turned to strategies aiming at enhancing efficiency and competitiveness under the principal 
heading of flexibility. In that respect, the objective of the unions shifted towards getting the em-
ployers and the government to take into account the labour and social dimensions of flexibility, for 
instance concerning terms of employment, adjustment of working time and workplace re- organisa-
tion. Nevertheless, the general issue of flexibility is no longer put into question by the Belgian 
unions. While they rejected enlarged flexibility options in work organisation and working time 
patterns up to the mid -eighties, the Hansenne Experiments proved most clearly that the labour 
confederations were unable to prevent such measures at the plant level. 
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Chapter IV 
France: Stepping Back Into Line 
1. Introduction 
The year 1968 marked a watershed in the post- war evolution of working time policies in France. 
Under the- impact of the general strike supported by over 10 million employees, the de Gaulle 
Government, employers' associations and union representatives signed the Protocole d'Accord de 
Grenelle. The history of political crisis management in France dictates that under such circumstan-
ces the state seeks to introduce new forms of social concertation. Focal points of the tripartite 
agreement included wage increases of 10 percent, a rise of 35 percent in the minimum wage 
(SMIC) and greater participation rights in companies for the trade unions. In addition, the protocol 
included a commitment on the part of the industrial relations actors in favour of reducing working 
time, but did not specify its size. 
A decade later the d 'Estaing/Barre Government opened a series of bilateral talks with the unions 
and employers on the design of working time. After a three -year marathon negotiation an agree-
ment was reached in mid- 1981. But as the ink dried on the signatures of the unions' and employ-
ers' representatives a major turning- point in the politico- institutional fabric of the V. Republic 
was underway: the victory of President elect Fran'ois Mitterrand and the subsequent formation of a 
coalition government between the socialist (PS) and communist (PCF) parties. Only in light of this 
distinct change, after 45 years a Leftist President again resided in the Elysee, did the inter-industry 
negotiations produce a compromise. 
The policy of work sharing introduced by the Socialist Prime Minister, P. Mauroy, its antece-
dants and the various responses it evoked from the relevant labour market actors form the core of 
this chapter. In the analysis that follows, I highlight the complex interaction between the state and 
the collective bargaining organisations in the field of work sharing and illustrate how the lack of 
support from the latter influenced the decision of the former to jettison the objective of the 
35-hour week. 
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The French case is particularly rich because not only do we have inter-organisational interplays 
but intra -organisational conflicts as well. Two structural features define the contours of the analy-
sis. The flrst is the concept of etatisme long characterising the French state and labour relations. 
The singularity of French politics during the 1981-1983 period and the proven limits of national 
economic strategies to overcome recession and solve sustained labour market problems form the 
second structural element. The process account will illustrate how the policy terrain was profoundly 
changed during the socialists' tenure in government. This transformation was as much influenced by 
decisions to alter certain institutional routines of policy making in France as it was by structural 
constraints for which the government bore little responsibility. 
The chapter is organised into three parts. First, in keeping with our definition of the multi-
dimensional policy process, the dynamic in the agenda- setting, implementation and evaluation of 
working time policies is explored. In addition, the first section of the chapter includes a short 
historical digression of the legacy of previously instituted redistributive policies. Here we treat the 
working time policy introduced by the Common Front in 1936. Its legacy determined for over forty 
years the position of work sharing strategies on the agenda of French labour relations. Only with 
the socialist victory in the elections in 1981 did this situation change. The second part of the 
chapter analyses in detail the early Mitterrand years. The political desirability of shorter working 
hours then assumed top priority on the agenda of active labour market policies introduced by the 
Leftist Government. It is this change of prerogatives which especially interests us. By then drawing 
attention to \he profound policy transformation under Prime Minister L. Fabius, the third part of the 
chapter explores further structural problems and institutional dilemmas of collective bargaining in 
France. 
2. Interest Formation of the Labour Market Actors 
The State Takes the Initiative in 1978 
The timing of the government's initiative is central to understanding the inter- industry negotiations 
on the redesign of working hours. Directly after the RPR/UDF alliance had defeated the United 
Left (PS/PCF) in the General Elections in 1978, employers' associations and trade unions were 
'invited' to open bilateral talks. This process replicated the logic of events. in the French polity 
........ 
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during the 1970s. The political authority of the state was used to stimulate socio-economic change 
and the position of the collective bargaining organisations rested on regulations and initiatives that 
were shaped by the state. 
The government's objectives for the bilateral talks had crystallised in the course of several 
official inquiries into the state of the labour market (cf. Chalendar 1974), the division between 
working time and leisure time (cf. Labrosse 1975) and public proclamations by President d'Estaing. 
During his electoral campaign d 'Estaing introduced the Charter for the Quality of Life which sought 
to modernize working and living conditions of French employees. However, missing from the 
Charter was an explicit commitment to shorter hours. Why? D'Estaing explained that, "it would be. 
difficult to envisage a reduction of working time in Europe if nothing comparable takes place in the 
US" (cf. Chauve 1979: 29). Furthermore, working time organisation was designated as outdated and 
overly rigid. The bete noir were the anachronistic working time legislation dating from 1936, and 
the traditional standardization of summer vacation in the months of July and August (cf. Mosse 
1979). Thus; the reorganisation of working time was seen as an instrument to "correct economic 
dysfunctions" (cf. Echange et Projets 1980: 124). 
A fabric of institutions had been established to reinforce the socio-economic objectives of the 
state. Already in 1961 the Comite National pour l'Amenagement des horaires de Travail (CNAT) 
had been founded. The CNAT's role lay in contributing expertise for the reorganisation of collec-
tive working hours in overcrowded regions. In 1966 the Comite pour I'etude de l'Amenagement des 
horaires de Travail et des temps de Loisir dans la Region Parisienne (CATRAL) was established. Its 
central objective was to map out new schemes for working hours, traffic streams and leisure options 
in the region of Paris. In addition, the Secretary for Environment and the Quality of Life founded 
the Mission pour l'Amenagement du Temps in 1976. Its mission was primarily concerned with 
introducing differentiated vacation schemes for the French regions. Finally, with the creation of the 
Agence National pour l'Amenagement des Conditions de Travail (ANACT) in 1978 a national 
agency was established which supported companies which implemented new working time schedu-
les. In sum, such institutional innovations provided stepping stones for a strategy of state -led 
economic transformation, societal modernisation and (working) time organisation. 
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The Working Time Interests of the CNPF 
The central organisation of the French Patronat1, the CNPF, was the first collective bargaining 
association to accept the government's invitation in 1978. Such acceptance was a turn- about of the 
CNPF's earlier bargaining strategies. Until the mid-seventies the proprietorial response to union 
claims for policy innovations in the Held of working hours was either professed ignorance or an 
unyielding 'no'. The source of such unbending positions lay in the political orientation of the 
CNPF. E. Maire, at the time general secretary of the socialist union CFDT, observed: 
"since 1974 the CNPF has transformed itself into a political laboratorium. The closer we faced the 
presidential elections, the more the whole of the patronat's efforts were focused on a victory of the 
right. Negotiations with and concessions to the unions did not assume top priority" (cf. Maire 1979: 
83, emphasis in the original French citation). 
After the elections in 1978, with the defeat of the Leftist parties, the CNPF strategy changed 
considerably. The victory for the existing Conservative Government provided ample opportunities 
for the introduction of policies that otherwise would have been rendered insecure by electoral 
uncertainty. In practical terms the CNPF's bargaining demands focused on new approaches in the 
Held of management-workers relations, flexibility of the workforce and working time innovations 
(cf. Sellier aAd Silvestre 1986: 198). The "Idea of the 2.000 Hours" became the catchphrase of the 
patronat's bargaining agenda. F. Ceyrac, president of the CNPF in 1978, explained the idea: 
"I have proposed to flx yearly working time at 2.000 hours. Our present system of 40 hours a week 
dates back 40 years. It is not only much too rigid for the companies, but also for the employees" 
(cf. CNPF 1987: 2). 
The CNPF's criticism of "archaic forms" of working time regulation in the French labour market 
suggested a far-reaching revision of existing rules and regulations. Its catalogue of propositions 
included the introduction of yearly working time schemes, overtime work with reduced permission 
procedures, week-end working, enlargement of female night-working and specific bonus-pay-
1) The term Patronat as the collectivity of all the individual Patrons originally derives from 
guardian angel, head of family. It is therefore not easily comparable with entrepreneur, employer or 
even head of enterprise. 
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ments for continuous presence at work. Notably, the reduction of weekly working time was exclu-
ded from the patronat's bargaining agenda. Ceyrac underlined that, "a systematic reduction of 
working time would be fatal for the whole of our economy and an inefficient tool to overcome 
unemployment" (cf. Chauve 1978: 8). 
Bargaining Positions of the Trade Unions 
When the inter-industry negotiations on the redesign of working time commenced, the French 
Patronat faced five representative2 unions at the other side of the bargaining table. CGT, CFDT, 
FO, CGC and CFTC represented a union pluralism which was unique in Western Europe. Such 
pluralism reflected widespread organisational fragmentation and was characterised by long -standing 
ideological differences between the five unions. Rivalry between the labour confederations forebode 
that a common bargaining strategy would be difficult to establish. Hence, the chances of reaching a 
compromise between the CNPF and all unions were rather low. In this section we shall focus on 
three representative unions in terms of their individual bargaining positions. CGT, CFDT and FO 
represent the three leading labour confederations judged according to votes and union membership. 
They thus provide a telling illustration of specific union configurations within the French industrial 
relations system. In comparision to the 'big three', the CFTC and CGC are rather particularistic 
interest organisations. In fact, they rely on the other three unions for rank-and-file mobilisation 
and lack enforcement resources in collective bargaining. 
The CGT and its Strategy 
While all unions shared the objective of cutting working hours they diverged on how to achieve it. 
Only the CGT enumerated its sought-for reduction of working time: the industry-wide imple-
mentation of the 38- hour week "in the foreseeable future". Full wage compensation for the hours 
2) The legal status of a representative bargaining organisation is attributed by government 
decree and gives the organisations the right to negotiate and sign inter-industry agreements. 
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reduction was a non- negotiable issue (cf. Chauve 1978: 10). CGT bargaining priorities correspon-
ded with the interests of its constituency. Reflecting its history as a communist class organisation 
whose social base is rooted in the manufacturing industries, the CGT pursued a strategy of general 
and selective working time reduction. General because it defines itself as the leading and most 
resolute representative of the working class. A selective strategy was also in play because shorter 
hours were to benefit shift workers in traditional industrial sectors (for instance employees with 
"aggrevated working conditions" in engineering, steel, and transport industries, cf. Sellier and 
Silvestre 1986: 179). 
The particularistic bargaining priorities of the CGT are rendered more comprehensible when 
looking at the approach the union took towards overtime working. In contrast to the CFDT which 
placed central importance in this issue, the CGT "was rather reluctant" to do anything against 
overtime working (cf. Barou and Rigaudiat 1983: 103). This position reflected the CGT's loyalty to 
groups of members in low income jobs. A cut in overtime levels would have meant a sacrifice of 
much-needed additional income for such workers. Hence, the CGT did not want to overtask these 
workers by supporting wage restraint and a reduction of overtime. 
However, the promotion of these objectives was subject to a precondition which dominated all 
CGT strategies from 1975 onwards: under the heading of "Union, Action, Programme commun" all 
organisational energies were concentrated on a victory for the Left in the legislative elections in 
1978. The Common Program between PCF and PS had been signed in 1972. Henceforth, political 
' mobilisation ih favour of the Union de Ja Gauche became the overriding objective of the CGT. 
Thus, the CGT diverted all union resources towards politics and expected lasting solutions of the 
economic crisis through the victory of the Left and the subsequent implementation of the Pro-
gramme Commun. 
The Strategy of the CFDT 
The CFDT's bargaining strategy also has to be placed in its political context. After the electoral 
defeat of the Unified Left the second largest French union initiated a significant shift of policy 
priorities. Under the heading of recentrage the CFDT sought to reclaim collective action instead of 
subordinating union policies to political mobilisation for a left victory in the legislative elections of 
1978. Recentrage was defined as rebuilding union power at the plant level, and sought a new 
approach in collective bargaining. Developing solutions for growing labour market problems instead 
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of identification with political parties of the Left became the new order of the day. In practice, the 
policy shift led to the subsequent termination of the CGT- CFDT unity- in- action platform which 
had been established in 1974. , 
The inter- industry negotiations on the redesign of working time were to be a first test of the 
intra - confederal acceptance of recentrage. The central demand of the CFDT consisted of the 
phased introduction of the effective 40- hour week. In addition, under the heading of Temps libre 
pour vivre mieux the CFDT called for a substantial reduction in working time through the limitation 
of overtime. Compared to the CGT demand for the 38-hour week the CFDT claim seemed rather 
modest. The implementation of the 35-hour week in one step and only in France was considered 
as unrealistic. Conscious of France's growing vulnerability to external economic shocks, Maire 
warned against a French isolation in working time policies. Thus, the CFDT placed strong emphasis 
on a European- wide union coordination of working time policies. By contrast, such a transnational 
harmonisation of policies did not figure among the CGT's priorities (cf. Chauve 1979: 26). 
It is further noteworthy that the CFDT publicly acknowledged that "working time reduction is 
not a collective demand supported by the majority of the workers" (cf. Salies-Cours 1988: 371). 
By contrast, the CFDT was forced by its rank-and- file to elaborate a concept of flexible working 
time which sought to reconcile different preference patterns within the workforce. The CFDT's 
preparedness to draft such a concept stemmed from the articulated interests of the rank -and - file 
for a greater say in the determination of chronometrical and chronological dimensions of working 
hours. The CFDT -sections in service industries and the public sector were especially vocal about 
this concern. Therefore, the CFDT was confronted with a twofold problem: the introduction of 
flexible working time schemes by the employers, and the articulation of different working time 
preferences by employees and CFDT members. While the former were subject to increasing 
criticism, the latter proved difficult to amalgamate into a single demand. As one union official 
recalled: 
"We were all fully surprised by the strong demand for variable working time arrangements by the 
employees. The Patronat took advantage of this claim and popularized its own flexibility catalogue 
as being employee oriented. We were therefore forced to modify our position on flexible hours. We 
had to make it clear that we would not strictly reject such options, but renegotiate them by presen-
ting our own concept of union controlled flexibility" (cf. Int. CFD1). 
3) While the former refers to the length, the latter focuses on the order of time. 
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In order to prevent the Patronat from unilaterally defining the modalities of temporal flexibility, the 
CFDT developed a concept of its own which included yearly working time schedules and the 
promotion of part-time work (cf. Maire 1980). 
The Strategy of the CGT-FO 
The desire for the aforementioned European coordination of working time strategies was shared 
between the CFDT and FO. The latter voiced its acceptance of a phased introduction of the 
35 -hour week on the condition that "the realisation includes a parallel and joint development in the 
other Western European countries" (cf. PO 1984: 169). Yet, parallels were also apparent between 
CGT and FO in their respective working time demands. Like the CGT, Force Ouvriere rejected an 
individualisation of working hours and strongly opposed the introduction of yearly working time 
arrangements. In particular, the FO concentrated its demands on the introduction of the fifth week 
of holidays (cf. Echange et Projets 1980: 173). 
Such bargaining priorities were articulated in terms of defending the principle of collective 
bargaining agreements and realising the inter- industry standardisation of working time conditions. 
This double emphasis leads us to a central characteristic of FO. It largely defines itself by the 
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principle of union autonomy from political parties, in particular from parties linked to the labour 
movement. As Jansen et al. (1986: 31) have noted, FO is the "organised expression of a nega-
tive demarcation from the PCF". 
Within the French industrial relations system FO has always considered itself as a contractual 
union. Accordingly, collective bargaining results are its raison d'~tre. Given this self-definition FO 
established itself as the privileged social partner of the French Patronat and the state during the 
1970s. If we consider the membership structure of FO, a further characteristic is revealed. The core 
of its rank- and- file is drawn from the public services and the nationalised enterprises. Its recrui-
ting success in both fields was impressive. FO membership increased by 30 percent between 1975 
and 1980, reaching approximately 900.000 members (cf. Le Monde 25.01.1989 and Adam 1983: 
42). This increase is contrasted by the fact that FO is only weakly organised in manufacturing 
industries. Hence, FO lacks mobilization resources during inter-industry negotiations. This defi-
ciency is partly compensated for by 'free-riding' on the organisational capacities of CGT and 
CFDT. 
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3. Structures of and Background to Collective Bargaining in France 
As will be clear from the previous parts, elaborating a compromise between the flexibility interests 
of the employers, the divergent reduction demands of the unions and the working time interests of 
the government was akin to the task of squaring a circle. Economic factors, like the increase of 
inflation and the worsening of the labour market situation, added to the existing difficulties. The 
national unemployment rate which had reached 4.0 percent in 1975 surpassed 7 percent in 1980, 
while annual price inflation averaged 10.5 percent between 1976 and 1980. But the decisive factor 
explaining the negotiation marathon was explicit political considerations on the part of the bargai-
ning organisations. Not only did the looming 1981 presidential elections increasingly shape political 
controversies, they also haunted the decision-making process of the labour market actors. A 
possible victory of the most promising leftist presidential candidate, F. Mitterrand (PS), increasingly 
became a working hypothesis for all parties involved. This political consideration was even more 
present in the minds of the leftist unions. 
Mindful of the political partisanship of industrial relations actors we can identify three central 
structural elements of the politico-institutional arrangement of France. First, there is the extent to 
which the state can orchestrate collective bargaining. The prominence of state intervention in 
matters otherwise reserved for collective bargaining reflects the etatist tradition in French politics. 
Usually associated with France, etatism concerns the capacity of the state as a cohesive unit to 
implement policy, if necessary, even over the objections of key social groups. With regard to labour 
relations etatism expresses itself through a government that either encourages negotiations or expres-
ses a public interest in their conclusion. ~ one of the participants in the bilateral talks on the 
redesign of working time recalls, 
"The majority of negotiations on a national level are suggested by a government initiative, either 
because legislative or presidential elections are forthcoming, have just taken place, or because the 
Prime Minister has changed while the President remains in office" (cf. Int. CNPF). 
Furthermore, the incapacity of organisations to reach a compromise before such elections serves to 
demonstrate bow negotiations are regularly overtaken by evolving electoral campaigns. While 
negotiating in a condition of pre-electoral mobilization in the lead- up to the 1981 presidential 
elections, the collective organisations oriented their bargaining positions according to the political 
calendar. Correspondingly, the labour market .actors contributed to a political moratoriwn and the 
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industrial relations system ground to a halt. The dependency of centralized collective bargaining on 
political cycles is a direct product of the institutional core of the fifth's Republic constitutional 
design. Within this framework the excecutive is preponderant. 
Finally, the constitution emphasises the extraordinary powerful position of the President as the 
head of the excecutive. The closer presidential elections are the more they tend to take front stage 
of political life in the V. Republic. Hence, there can be a 'freeze' of ongoing negotiations thus 
placing on hold a possible compromise until after the outcome of the elections. In other words, "it 
has long been traditional for French unions to moderate labour market activity in preelectoral 
periods (and) diverte union energies towards politics" (cf. Lange et al. 1982: 53). The consequences 
of this moderation directly affect the modus operandi of the French industrial relations system. 
Such politics- induced standstills in collective bargaining help in explaining why central negotia-
tions can be so time consuming in France. Their over-long duration further draws attention to a 
thrid structural feature relevant to the French industrial relations system: legally the degree of 
institutionalization and the framework governing the procedure of negotiations and compromise 
formation are weakly formalised. Given this regulatory lacunaee the timing, evolution and compro-
mise opportunities of central negotiations are guided by the 'invisible hand' of the third actor. 
Although the state is not directly represented at the bargaining table, it casts a long shadow. 
Here we touch on a key structural feature of industrial relations in France. In light of its politi-
cal alignment, collective bargaining is subject to a continuous politicisation. In practice, the state is 
made the prime address of and regulatory institution for associational politics. One or a combination 
of these faders may contribute to labour market actors relying on the state to settle associational 
politics, thereby aiding and abetting the politicalization of collective bargaining. Besides, since the 
collective bargaining framework is underinstitutionalized in legal terms the outcome of negotiations 
is determined by the prevailing balance of political power. 
During the 1981 electoral campaign working time issues were subject to intense politicisation 
when the leftist presidential candidate Mitterrand announced that the objective of the 35-hour week 
would constitute a central element of his labour market policies. By publicly advocating legal 
working time innovations the resolution of the controversial issue was effectively postponed until 
after the elections. While CGT and CFDT hoped that the French Left would achieve political power 
and then introduce new legislation, the CNPF could not expect promising outcomes from such a 
scenario. 
Since Mitterrand's propositions shared many objectives with the working time policy of L. 
Blum's Common Front, we shall briefly focus on this historical legacy. In 1936 like at the begin-
ning of the 1980s working time reduction was constructed as an anti - crisis policy under the 
heading of work sharing. Identifying similarities and variations of both will help us to see the 
options and constraints of a state- induced working time policy. 
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4. The Historical Legacy of the Front Populaire in 1936 
Of all the reforms which the Front Populaire4 introduced during its short term in office one clearly 
stands out as the most controversial: the legal establishment of the 40- hour week. In order to 
better understand motives and interests of Blum's working time policy, and the conflicts it created, 
one has to take the then political situation of France into consideration. After the Front Populaire 
won the national elections France experienced the largest strike movement it had hitherto witnessed. 
Partly due to the hopes awakened by the victorious Front, partly as a spontaneous expression of a 
working class reaching power, a wave of strikes and company occupations began. Furthermore, the 
electoral victory of the Front Populaire and the mass mobilisation contributed to an unprecedented 
rise in membership of the organized French labour movement5• Between 1936 and 1937 member-
ship in the CGT grew from less than a million to over 5.3 million! In only one year the CGT 
became the accepted and unified6 representative of the French working class. 
Within organised labour the demand for a general working time reduction accompanied by full 
wage compensation was at the top of their bargaining agenda since 1931. But no progress was made 
until 1936. Shortly after taking office the Blum Government introduced new legislation on working 
time and collective bargaining provisions. The intervention in favour of active labour market 
policies had many parallels with President Roosevelt's policy in the United States. Blum was, as 
Hentschel (1984: 76) recalls, "an almost emphatic admirer of Roosevelt and explicitly saw his 
reforms as a French variant of the New Deal". Focal points of the new legislation were: 
...,.. Implementation of the second week of paid holidays; 
4) Led by Prime Minister Leon Blum, the Common Front was in office from June 1936 to 
April 1938. 
5) For the constitutive formation of the French labour movement see Pruss-Kaddatz (1982). 
Regarding the organisational history of the French trade union structures between 1900 and 1945 
see Jansen et al. (1986: 15ff.). 
6) In March 1936 the socialist CGT and the CGTU united into the CGT. Overcoming organi-
sational and political fragmentation followed the creation of the electoral Front Populaire alliance 
(SFIO, PCF and Radical Party). 
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Ill>- establishment of the 40-hour week with full wage compensation; 
Ill>- introduction of obligatory collective bargaining between employers and trade unions. 
In contrast to the working time legislation of 1919 when the eight-hour day was introduced Blum's 
reform was to be implemented without any compromise provisions. Only on these grounds did the 
Front Populaire expect that its primary objective - reducing unemployment - could be reached 
most lastingly. Hence, after six months of implementation one-third of the industrial labour force 
was affected by the new regulation. After one year in office the 40-hour week was implemented 
throughout French industry and had become the symbol of the social policy legislation introduced 
by the Front Populaire (cf. Kindleberger 1973: 265). 
With the substantial wage increases and the full wage compensation for the working time 
reduction, industrial workers were able to avoid income loses. But otherwise significant distributio-
nal effects were apparent. Because of inflationary consequences deriving from the legislation 
purchasing power of pensioners, large parts of the agricultural population and white collar employ-
ees decreased (cf. Kalecki 1938: 35). 
While the reform was vigorously defended by the majority of the working class, it gained a 
symbolic importance for the employers who repeatedly criticised, resisted, and even sabotaged the 
legislation (cf. Sauvy 1967: 302). With restricted flexibility options and a compulsion to reduce the 
working week within short time limits, companies had to mobilise an adaptation capacity which was 
unsustainable \or many, in particular those in export oriented sectors. Hence, between March 1937 
and May 1938 production fell by 13 percent, and reached only an index volume of 82 percent of 
the 1929 performance (cf. Hinrichs 1988: 90). 
Unemployment was profoundly affected in the short-term: whereas in July 1936 registered 
unemployment had reached 20.800 persons, it had fallen to 307.500 ( -113.300) by September 
193 7. However, the decline of unemployment cannot exclusively be credited to the reform. During 
1937 unemployment also fell significantly in other Western European countries, but without state-
induced working time policies, as for instance in Britain and Hitler's Germany (cf. Weir 1989: 
53ff.; James 1989: 231ff.). While the hours legislation was able to create an additional employment 
impulse during its initial stages, it eventually proved counter- intentional the more the whole of 
industry had to implement the legislation without leeway (cf. Marjolin 1938: 185). 
What can we learn from the working time reform of l 936? The controversies provoked by 'the 
legislation, and its politically motivated implementation by the Front Populaire had lasting conse-
quences for the re-entry of work sharing demands onto the agenda of labour market policies in 
France. While the legal principle was maintained by subsequent governments in order to keep the 
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peace in industrial relations 7, in practice the realisation of the 40- hour week never surfaced again 
on the agenda (cf. Kindleberger 1973: 266). 
The implementation process .further illustrates how controversial work sharing strategies are 
when they (i) ignore the need for cooperation by auxiliary social organisations during their introduc-
tion, (ii) underestimate structural features of unemployment and production patterns, (iii) and expli-
citly aim at transforming the politico-institutional balance of power between capital and labour. 
Finally, the historic legacy of the Blum reform applies especially to the leftist parties and trade 
unions. After the Liberation in 1945 they strongly defended the symbolic importance of the law but 
did not undertake any effort to bring it back on the political agenda. For over forty years legal 
working time reduction remained a distinctive non-issue. 
5. The Early Mitterrand Years: Keynesianism a Ia Mode Fran~se 
The Context 
With Mitterrand 's victory in the presidential elections of May 1981 a Leftist Government consisting 
of a coalition between PS and PCF took office after 23 years of uninterrupted conservative rule. 
The importance attributed by the Socialist Government to active labour market policies set it widely 
apart from its conservative predecessor - a new era was underway. The macro- economic policies 
adopted had a Keynesian calibre. In combination with selective structural policies that were designed 
to have enduring effects on the labour market,. the reflation programme was a major shift from the 
d'Estaing/Barre Government. Upon submitting this programme package to the newly elected Assem-
ble Nationale in July 1981, the Socialist Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy defined the intentions of the 
government as follows: 
"We are primarily seeking to make France a country in which everybody can work. This constitutes 
the central objective of the economic policy which I shall propose to you. In light of the current 
employment crisis we want to bring France back to work" (remettre Ia France au travail). 
7) Even the Vichy Regime did not dare abolish the reform of 1936. 
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In order to place this policy initiative in its proper context it is first necessary to outline the core 
elements of Mitterrand's macro-economic policy. Given the partnership between active labour 
market policies and macro-economic policies, the latter's performance had immediate consequences 
for the success or failure of the former. 
The Reflation Programme 
Under the heading of Politique de Relance the Keynesian programme concentrated on reducing 
foreign trade constraints, reflating economic growth and gradually stimulating aggregate demand. In 
order to establish confidence in the government's economic policy the programme underscored 
concern for the EC-trading partners. Thus, protectionist measures sought by the PCF, CGT and 
the CERES- faction8 within the PS were rejected by the Finance Minister J. Delors ( cf. Uterwedde 
1988: 142ff.). In political terms, the moderate approach was based on the singularity of France in 
1981 when four members of the PCF became ministers9 of the Mauroy cabinet. Against this back-
ground, the government had an interest in demonstrating its credibility. 
"This cautious path was the direct result of the government adopting a low profile as regards 
foreign trade ~nd international policy in order to avoid any outright rejection of the first socialist-
communist government in a large western country since the early post-war years" (cf. Petit 1986: 
393). 
Moderation in macro- economic policy making was reinforced by taking a low- profile on reflating 
demand. This target included increasing the SMid0 by 10 percent in July 1981 and raising various 
welfare provisions. By and large the emphasis of these measures was placed on redistributing 
income towards the elderly, the poor and low income sectors of French society. Thus, the govern-
ment stressed that increasing overall household consumption was not its intention. Accordingly, the 
administration's incomes policy in the public sector was concentrated on avoiding inflationary 
consequences. 
8) A marxist oriented faction within the PS which was represented by J. - P. Chevenement. 
9) The four PCF-members in Mauroy's cabinet were Charles Fiterman for transport, Anicet 
Je Pors as special envoy for reforming the civil service, Jacques Ralite received the health portfolio 
and Marcel Rigout was named Minister for adult education. 
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Keeping public sector wages down was largely influenced by the costs deriving from the job 
creation schemes implemented in the public sector (180.000 new jobs in 1981-82 alone, cf. 
Fonteneau and Muet 1985: 1P9). In addition, wage rises were seen as institutionally risk -prone. 
Since 1946 the system of income formation for public sector employees had been so interlocked that 
each increase for one group promptly triggered -off a chain reaction. To circumvent such a snow-
ball effect was a central concern of the new government. In practice, the government's commitment 
contributed to the fall of real income of public sector employees in 1982 by 0.6 percent (cf. Petit 
1986: 394). 11 
Nevertheless, the decision in favour of Keynesian reflation strategies carried the risk of consi-
derable budget and balance of payments deficits preceding the intended positive effects on invest-
ment and growth. This risk was merited by the expectation that short- term economic growth was 
just around the corner. This faith was based on the central, but in the event seriously mistaken, 
expectation 12 of Mitterrand that the world economy was about to undergo a marked recovery. 
Implementing reflation policies also had to take into consideration when and in what economic 
environment the programme was undertaken. Just when the Socialist Government decided to favour 
Keynesian reflation most OECD- countries 
"were adhering to the very different kind of strategy for the medium term that took shape around 
1980 in the wake of the second oil price shock, and which emphasized control of inflation, budgeta-
ry rig our and market-oriented initiatives to improve the functioning of economies ... From the 
viewpoint of the French authorities the episode constituted an acute dilemma situation, arising from 
goals and policies which were largely out of step with those of their major trading partners" (cf. 
OECD 1988: 11-12, my italics). 
When comparing macro-economic politique de relance and active labour market policies, it 
becomes apparent that they were each subject to very different time perspectives. Even where rapid 
employment gains materialised, for instance through the public sector job creation scheme and the 
10) The SMIC increase was even supported by the conservative oppOsition parties UDF/RPR 
(cf. Delors 1984: 114). 
11) For a general overview of the reflation programme see Fonteneau and Muet (1985: 102ff.); 
Hall (1986: 193ff.). 
12) In Keynesian terms this is nothing extraordinary. Keynes' line of argument in the General 
Theory (1936) relied heavily on the influence of expectations, the 'feeling' among policy makers 
that conditions would improve, and could be influenced by politics. 
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government's early retirement policies, the overall emphasis was put on a multi -year project of 
confronting the labour market crisis. As its central element the project included the March towards 
the 35-hour week (Marche aux 35 heures '). Its successful conclusion was timed for 1985; yet 
without any reference to harmonisation with other EC countries. In short, Keynesian budgetary 
policies in partnership with active labour market policies constituted a test case as to how sufficient-
ly coordinated and compatible both were. The programmes were inter-related not only in the sense 
that all the elements were implemented simultaneously, but also in that they each had to work. 
Objectives of the State-Induced Working Time Policy 
As part of a multi- dimensional active labour market policy, working time reduction was supple-
mented by measures introducing early retirement, part-time employment and public sector job 
creation schemes. This catalogue was based on calculations that in the absence of structural policies 
yearly economic growth would have to reach 5 percent in order to stem the continuing rise of 
unemployment. Likewise, labour force participation trends indicated that over 800.000 new entrants 
into the labour market were registered between 1976 and 1983 ( cf. Barou and Rigaudiat 1983: 15). 
Working ~time reduction had a two- fold appeal. First, unlike his predecessor, the Socialist 
Prime Minister valued working time reduction as a means "to change life" by establishing a better 
balance between working and leisure time (for instance reduced working hours, prolonged holidays 
and early retirement). In addition, the "march towards the 35-hour week" represented a "privile-
ged" avenue for regaining full employment via "work sharing" (partage du travail). During his 
inaugural address in July 1981 Mauroy lifted the objective of the 35-hour week to the plane of a 
war target: 
"The war we are fighting against unemployment shall not be won without a strong reduction of 
working time ... Cutting working hours constitutes by far the most effective measure against unem-
ployment. . .It will only promote new employment if and when we really achieve the 35-hour week 
in 1985" (my italics). 
As ambitious as the battle plan appeared, it was nonetheless based on a precarious point of depar-
ture. In France effective yearly working time was reduced by 15 percent in the period 1960 to 
1980. This curtailment took place in an economy that was growing at the rate of 5 percent a year. 
By contrast, the 35-hour week objective and the introduction of the fifth week of paid leave, 
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representing the same magnitude of reduction, were to be achieved within five years and in the 
context of an economy which would grow at a rate of 2 percent on the most optimistic assumptions 
(cf. Thierry 1982: 143). 
Regarding the implementation of the "focal point" of the labour market programme, Mauroy 
stressed the willingness to reach a negotiated compromise with the relevant labour market actors. 
The prevailing ideology held that the realisation of work sharing should not result from a uniform 
and generalised decision of the state. Thus, prior to governmental initiatives the reduction process 
had to be the outcome of capital-labour negotiations and should mirror sectoral diversity. Finally, 
the redistribution of income, as Mauroy claimed, was to be "equivalent to the amount of work 
sharing" (cf. Uvi 1984: 15). In short, the government was interested in expanding contractualism, 
therefore reactivating the inter- industry negotiations and encouraging the conclusion of a collective 
bargaining agreement before it would implement legal measures of its own. 
What had not been possible to compromise on during the three year negotiation marathon 
proved manageable in the aftermath of the change of power. Following proclamations by the Leftist 
Government to make working time policy a central reform project, and in the wake of a tripartite 
discussion round initiated by Mauroy, the Protocole sur Ia Duree du Travail was signed on July 17. 
1981. Central points of the contract were: 
..,.. Generalised introduction of the fifth week of holidays; 
..,.. Reduction of weekly working time to 39 hours. Branches could implement other margins, either 
by introducing yearly working time schemes, or by going below the new hours norm; 
..,.. Establishment of flexible yearly overtime schemes; 
..,.. Branch negotiations were to reach agreement on the issue of wage compensation. 
Except for the CGT, all unions signed the agreement. On the employers' side the association of 
small and medium sized firms (CGPME) disapproved of the settlement. If we recall the working 
time positions of the labour market actors mentioned earlier, we can understand the refusal of the 
CGT and the willingness of the CNPF to sign the protocol. The two organisations had very different 
interpretations of the inauguration of a Leftist Government in France. The CGT saw the agreement 
as a failure on the volume of working time reduction, and as a breakthrough for employers regar-
ding the flexibility and branch- related deviation provisions. 
But such an assessment of the CGT's position would underestimate the collective bargaining 
dynamic which the most influential French union faced in mid -1981. For the confederation the 
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opportunity for sustained changes in labour relations seemed exceptional: the conservative parties 
had lost the elections and four communist ministers were ensconced in the Mauroy cabinet which 
had drawn up the new working time regulations. Accordingly, the strategy of the CGT was concen-
trated on milking further these favourable political conditions. 
The approach of the CNPF was of a different nature. The employers' association opted for an 
agreement which would give the branches sufficient leeway, and simultaneously predetermine the 
working time legislation of the Mauroy Government. At a time when the political balance of power 
was shifting, an early compromise would have been less cumbersome for the CNPF. Given these 
strategic considerations within the strongest employers' association it may come as a surprise that 
the two interest organisations of the small and medium sized patrons (CGPME and SNPMI) 13 did 
not approve the agreement. The employers' strategy of compromise on the one side and rejection 
on the other becomes comprehensible when a major structural property of French employers' 
organisations is taken into consideration. The central interest organisations of French employers 
have a limited range of power in the field of collective bargaining. Most prominent is the fact that 
the CNPF can only fix minimum wage rates with the unions, while the determination of nominal 
and real wage developments is reserved for the branch representatives and company negotiators. 
The~ Introducing the 39-Hour Week 
On numerous occasions during his presidential campaign Mitterrand had emphasised that, if elected, 
he would "break the barrier of the 40- hour week". In early 1982 he followed through on this and 
introduced new working time legislation by decree. With this the government acknowledged the 
need to deal with the labour market problems at a rapid pace. However, the frrst step towards the 
35-hour week not only brought the government into opposition with the reluctant employers. 
Mauroy also faced criticism from the unions, the employees and from within his own administra-
tion. The nub of the issue was to what extent work sharing implied income sharing. 
13) In November 1981 the SNPMI received recognition as a representative employers' associa-
tion. The decision by the Leftist Government broadened the by-partism of the syndicalisme patro-
nale with a third actor, therefore enlarging the representational pluralism of the employers. 
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In theory, the government decree stipulated that wage compensation was to be graded according 
to levels of income. This objective was in line with the Plan Interimaire which documented the 
economic and social policy priorities of the Leftist Government for 1981-82. Within certain limits 
working time reduction was regarded as being compatible with "maintaining" or "slightly" increa-
sing the purchasing power of employees (cf. Commissariat General du Plan 1982: 85). 
Notably the Secretary of Employment Jean Auroux emphasised that it would be "desirable" if 
the question of wage compensation was linked to both the amount of working time reduction and 
the configuration of individual income groups. As Auroux claimed, "one cannot simultaneously 
demand more leisure and more income. Whoever promises such a thing betrays the people" (cf. 
Der Spiegel1982: 122, italics added). As maintained by the Minister of Labour, the answer to who 
pays the bill for work sharing should reside within the (working) class through income sharing in 
one form or other. In practice, recipients of the minimum wage SMIC and public sector employees 
were guaranteed full wage compensation for the hours cut. Regarding wage compensation for 
private sector employees, the decree deferred to the negotiation autonomy of the collective bargai-
ning organisations. 
But it quickly became apparent that on the "vast economic and political construction site" - as 
the CGT General Secretary Henri Krasucki described the reform project of the coalition govern-
ment - the regulation of income sharing was the wrong test case for proving unions' support for 
Mauroy's labour market policies. The government's decision to leave the regulation of wage 
compensation to autonomous negotiations quickly triggered-off a wave of social conflict. Wild-cat 
strikes ensued, and except for the CFDT, all other unions called for an early clarification by the 
new government. Mitterrand, aware of the mobilisation capacities of the CGT and keen to avoid 
widespread industrial militancy during his first months in office, intervened and announced that "no 
worker has to fear for his purchasing power on account of implementing the 39-hour week" (cf. 
Le Monde 12.02.1982). 
Mitterrand's intervention ended the industrial dispute, thus overruling his Employment Secreta-
ry's proclamations. Hence, the regulation of wage compensation did not result from a negotiated 
compromise. It was rather the outcome of a generalising political declaration by the Republic's 
President. In that respect, the major trade-off question between work sharing and income sharing 
was unilaterally decided in favour of abstaining from the latter. Likewise, the February strikes 
signalled a sustained setback for what had been coined the Socialisme a la Fran9aise policy model: 
to establish a negotiative partnership between the government, the Patronat and the unions. Etatisme 
a la mode fran9aise reared its head yet again. . 
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The CGT voiced its opinion that Mitterrand 's decision was "a step in the right direction", and 
the FO articulated "satisfaction". Through the presidential fiat both labour confederations were 
discharged from the task of internally popularizing a compromise in favour of voluntary wage 
moderation. It was the CFDT which reminded the Leftist Government of the fact that, avoiding to 
set the conditions for income and working time redistribution within the workforce would subse-
quently jeopardise the employment objective, and - given the precedent - most likely impede 
further reduction steps. 
"Unfortunately the emphasis is not put on employment ... The President's declaration focuses unilate-
rally on purchasing power. It will henceforth be difficult to mobilize workers for the creation of 
new jobs. If one wants to generate new employment opportunities, then we have to touch upon the 
high salaries" (cf. Le Monde 13.02.1982). 
The Implementation of the Working Time Decree 
Only after the government's intervention did an intensive process of collective bargaining emerge. 
Yet, these negotiations were prejudged with regard to their compromise options. By and large the 
dynamic imp~ementation at the branch level concerned the adoption of the governmental decree. 
Only 9 percent of industrial employees and less than 6 percent in commerce received partial wage 
compensation (cf. Marchand et al. 1983: 9). Deviations from the standard agreements only occurred 
in the engineering and chemical industries. In the latter the 38-hour week was introduced while 
the former reached agreement on the 38.5 hour week. 
In both cases wage compensation above the revised legal hours norm was limited: in the 
chemical industries 66 percent and in engineering 70 percent. Looking at the general pattern of 
implementation we can conclude that where small steps in working time reduction were agreed 
upon, full wage compensation was not a matter of controversy. But more extensive reductions were 
only attainable when (some) unions made concessions on the issue of wage compensation. 
The implementation of the hours reduction made considerable headway during 1982. By January 
1983 over 73 percent of the gainfully employed in industry and 86 percent of white- collar 
employees worked less than 40 hours a week. A year earlier the proportion was only 8.4 for the 
former and 12.9 percent for the latter (cf. Fonteneau and Muet 1985: 239). On an average scale the 
reduction process led to an almost complete matching of effective (39.3) and legal (39) working 
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time duration by mid -1983. In sum, while the implementation of the 39- hour week did not cause 
major problems once the issue of wage compensation had been decided upon, the ordinance did not 
trigger-off a process of reducing working time which surpassed the statutory provisions. 
While effective working time was dropping during the first half of 1982 official surveys investi-
gating the response of firms to the hours' reduction reported widespread productivity-enhancing 
innovations, especially in larger companies. On a macro-economic scale, the labour input (in 
hours) fell by 2.7 percent and output (in terms of value added) increased by 1.5 percent in 1982. 
Furthermore, the statistical review reported that hourly productivity rose by 6 percent in 1982, 
compared with 2 percent in 1980 and 1981 (cf. White 1987: 15). 
Compensating for the introduction of the 39-hour week were productivity measures which 
derived from the second - often underestimated - focal point of the government's decree of 
January 1982. The field of working time reorganisation reflected Mauroy's compromise between 
reduction claims stemming from the unions and flexibility demands which the employers advocated. 
While the decree largely adhered to the reduction elements in the negotiation protocol, it introduced 
new options of temporal flexibility for ftrms. Most notably, the flexibility provisions included: 
..,.. the introduction of week -end working. If such shifts were limited to Saturdays and Sundays, 
they could extend to 12 hours a day, 
..,.. deviations from collective working time settlements. Firms could introduce individualised 
working time schemes 'a la carte'. 
The central analytical issue now is how the ensemble of flexibility options, small steps in working 
time reduction and state-induced wage regulation affected the government's central objective for 
the work sharing project: achieving job creation through working time reduction. Macro-economic 
simulations carried out by the French Planning Office (cf. Commissariat General du Plan 1984: 
253ff.) had suggested that a phased reduction of working time (the so-called Marche d'Esca-
lier) could yield more than 84.000 new jobs in the first year, followed by 130.000 in the second. 
On the basis of an official survey directed by the statistical institute (INSEE) 26 per cent of all 
industrial firms interviewed claimed that they had carried out additional recruitments as a result of 
the reduction of working time in 1982. Another 11 percent maintained that they had preferred 
temporary employment contracts. The INSEE evaluation of the effectiveness of employment perfor-
mance read that it was "pretty small ... a span of 10.000 to 20.000 new employment relationships 
have been created in industry, and about 4.000 to 8.000 in commerce" (cf. Marchand et al. 1983: 
11). 
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The IN SEE- analysis promptly triggered- off a lively debate on its applied method of measu-
rement and the conclusions drawn from the empirical findings. Enlarging the scope of analysis to all 
branches (except for agriculture) was the approach taken in the study of Frank and Tregoat (1983). 
Since the government's working time policy was multi- dimensional the authors also considered the 
outcomes resulting from the generalisation of the fifth week of holidays. On the grounds of this 
enlarged empirical basis, the authors extrapolated employment effects reaching 66.000 jobs in 1982. 
These jobs were either newly created or claimed to be prevented redundancies (cf. ibid.: 23). 
Proportionately differentiated, 60 percent of the employment effect derived from the industrial 
sectors (mainly called -off dismissals), and 40 percent were attributed to the services sectors 
(mostly recruited new employees). 
All things considered, the balance sheet of the first reduction step could be said to be mediocre. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the evaluations differed in their methodological approaches and used 
diverging criteria of employment outcomes, they nevertheless shared the conclusion that the results 
were below the numbers anticipated by macro-economic calculations. But not only were the 
blueprints obviously erroneous: the published analysis also ran counter to the government's procla-
mation that the strategy to reduce working time would be the most effective weapon against unem-
ployment. Fonteneau and Muet (1985: 246) identify a conversion ratio of liS of the hours reduction 
which fostered new jobs or prevented redundancies. The rest of the impact of shorter working hours 
was offset by productivity improvements, making use of flexibility measures and restructuring work 
practices of firms (for instance, staggered working schemes to cover meal periods). 
Henceforth, public discussion on the prospects a.Qd adequacy of working time policy was 
decisively influenced by the rather disillusioning findings concerning its work sharing potential. 
How the labour market actors reacted to these findings, and how they evaluated their own imple-
mentation experiences, shall be considered in a moment. First, to follow this through further, we 
must turn to the second cornerstone of the government's working time policy: the so-called 
'solidarity contracts - early retirement'. 
Solidarity Contracts - Early Retirement 
The official results published by IN SEE of the implementation of the 39-hour week contrasted 
sharply with the exceptional success of the 'solidarity contracts - early retirement' ( contrat de 
solidarite - preretraite) introduced in January .1982. The early retirement schemes allowed employ-
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ees from 55 years onwards to retire on 70 percent of their salary before reaching the legal retire-
ment age of 60 years. The core idea of such a solidarity contract was that for each employee going 
into early retirement firms had to, recruit an unemployed person. 
At first glance, in distributive terms the contracts were a great success, even outstanding in 
1982- 83. More than 53.000 early retirement contracts were registered in the flrst year of imple-
mentation, and their number more than doubled (148.000) in 1983. As various evaluations showed, 
a replacement ratio of 1: 1 was generally attained. But when scrutinized more closely, the balance 
sheet had quite a different slant. The new recruitment only partly affected the unemployment ranks, 
8.000 jobless were recruited in 1982 and over 66.000 a year later (cf. Bernard-Bouillaguet (1987: 
73) . 
Redistributing employment through early retirement schemes was essentially easier to implement, 
and less conflict prone between unions and employers than the introduction of the 39-hour week. 
But even if the 1:1 ratio was reached it has to be borne in mind that the solidarity contracts created 
no additional 'jobs. Their remarkable success rather underlined that the Mauroy Government aimed 
at influencing labour force participation through the social treatment of unemployment. Such an 
approach contributed to significantly reduce labour force participation of older employees, but 
simultaneously reinforced labour market segmentation (cf. Petit 1986: 402). 
The more the solidarity contracts grew in quantitative terms the more they led to serious side-
effects. By the fall of 1982 massive financial burdens were apparent for the two institutions which 
bore the costs: the budgets of the Secretary of Labour and of the unemployment insurance system 
(UNEDIC). While the former repeatedly had to adjust its contributions, the latter spent over 45 
percent of its resources in 1982 on the early retirement schemes (cf. Kraker and Daraspe 1983: 40). 
In particular the long-term costs for the UNEDIC - only after reaching the official retirement age 
did the costs shift to the pension insurance system - made it necessary for the Leftist Government 
to pull the emergency brakes. In December 1983 the dictate of empty coffers obliged policy makers 
to stop the popular early retirement programme. 
The decision was significant for two reasons: (i) it illustrated the end of the social treatement of 
unemployment on which the Mauroy Government had grounded the solidarity contracts, (ii) and it 
reflected a revision of active labour market policies. However, both reasons have to be seen in 
context. This is to say that the termination of the early retirement scheme mirrored the general 
re-evaluation of distributive priorities which the Mauroy Government undertook in stages between 
1 982 and 1983. The reasons for this shift of priorities will be treat(!d in more detail in sections 6 
and 7. 
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6. The Actors' Reading of the Working Time Policy 
The CNPF: The "Party" of the Employers 
In line with the framework of analysis organising the previous chapter, we shall now focus on 
perceptions informing collective actors' evaluations of policies. We begin with the interpretations 
and strategic (re- )orientations of the French Patronat. The policy evaluations on the part of the 
three representative employers' associations have to be understood in the broader context of the 
changes sweeping through the French political system during 1981-83. The intra- and inter 
associational clarification of these changes yielded a first result when Yvon Gattaz was elected the 
new President of the CNPF in December 1981. Gattaz sought to realign the conservative PME with 
the modernistic, expanding medium- sized firms. Large enterprise which had formerly dominated 
the CNPF was the loser in this coalition (cf. Uterwedde 1988: 222). As a reaction more then 40 of 
the largest Patrons left the CNPF and joined ranks with the AFEP, an organisation exclusively 
advocating the interests of large corporations ( cf. Berger 1985: 234). 
Gattaz' reorientation of CNPF priorities was grounded on the assumption that in light of the 
evident pofitical majorities employers' organisational unity had to be (re- )established. Only then 
did it seem possible to confront the Leftist Government with the "Party of the employers". The 
macro- economic and labour market policies of the Mauroy Government provided good reasons to 
close ranks, in particular (i) the decision on full- wage compensation, (ii) nationalisation of banks 
and (ii) extended participation rights for unions and employees (the so-called Auroux reformst. 
Furthermore, political judgements by the government advanced employer unity. When equally 
legitimate representative status was conferred on the SNPMI, the traditional organisation of small 
and medium sized firms, the CGPME, was confronted with a rival business association. As a 
strategy intended to weaken the privileged bargaining position of the two traditional employers' 
associations, it backfired. Seeking to enlarge the representative pluralism of employers' associations 
only strengthened the perceived need for the "unitarism of the Patronat" (cf. Kolboom 1983: 
14) Named after the Minister of Labour, Jean Auroux. These industrial relations reforms were 
designed to extend contractualisation at the plant level. They are treated in more detail in section 7. 
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231ff.). The mass-meeting of 25.000 employers from all parts of the country in Villepinte (Paris) 
in December 1982 testified to a rank- and- me mobilization ( cf. Henissart and Kowalsky 1983: 
124). 
Regarding the CNPF's policy evaluation the central organisation of the French Patronat was 
counting on a failed experience that would help promote realism within the Leftist coalition. The 
focal point of this approach was to seek a "radical reform of the 1982 decrees" (cf. CNPF 1984). 
Instead of taking a second step on the path of working time reduction, the door for extended 
temporal flexibility should be opened by the government. 
After Mitterrand's ruling on full wage compensation the employers' associations saw no credibi-
lity in working time reduction. The CNPF focused its criticism on the fact that the President's 
intervention infringed on the autonomy of collective bargaining as well as wage formation, and 
rendered the resolution of controversial issues a "mere parody" (cf. Le Monde 12.02.1982). Besi-
des, a CNPF-survey of the working time agreements signed between 1981 and 1983 confirmed the 
"vitality" of collective bargaining but also underscored that no settlements included a further 
engagement in favour of shorter hours (cf. CNPF 1983). 
The CNPF's strategy of flexible response illustrates how well the French Patronat learned its 
historical lesson from the experiences of 1936 and 1968. During both historical landmarks unions 
and their rank- and- me countered employers' intransigence at the bargaining table with mass 
strikes and the occupation of firms. But in 1981/82 no such forms of protest occurred against the 
Patronat. Rather the boot was on the other foot: the unions and the Leftist Government had to 
realise that employees went on strike against measures of the new government. 
Employees' Experience with the 39-Hour Week 
The wave of strikes in favour of full wage compensation articulated the limits of a distributional 
project within the class. Hence, wage militancy demonstrated that the unions and the Leftist Go-
vernment could not rely on employees' unconditional support for work sharing with voluntary wage 
restraint. The experience confirmed that "French voters who wear their hearts on the left wear their 
wallets on the right" (cf. Hall 1986: 225). Why there could be no initial workers' support for the 
Socialist Government in the field of solidaristic incomes policies was largely due to optimistic 
expectations of a sustained economic expansion. In other words, worker consent to wage madera-
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tion depended, inter alia, on their economic expectations about the longer-term future and the 
political constellation which sought to craft conditions for sustained· growth of the French economy 
(cf. Lange 1984: 114). 
Turning to the implementation of the new hours' norm at the workplace we can identify the 
prominence of reorganising working (time) conditions, in particular shift working, paid holidays and 
length of ftrm's operation time. Table 1, which presents some results from an opinion poll of 
employee attitudes carried out by CREDOC, highlights the salience of temporal flexibility. It 
illustrates employees' interest in a larger mobility and self- determination of the length, location and 
distribution of working time. By the same token, the representative opinion poll shows that income 
aspirations predominated over shorter hours preferences among the workforce. 
Tab. 1: Preferences for disposable income or increasing leisure time 
What is your preference: 
Improving purchasing power 
Longer 1eisure time 1 
Preferred form of shorter hours 
Shorter daily working time 
Half a day off each week 
Enlarging weekends 
Longer holidays 
No statements 
1982 
54.9 
44.4 
15.9 
34.6 
29.4 
12.0 
8.1 
1983 
61.5 
37.0 
17.2 
29.2 
33.4 
8.9 
11.3 
1984 1985 
63.6 66.2 
36.0 33.2 
19.7 15.7 
33.5 31.0 
28.1 35.9 
12.7 11.8 
6.0 5.6 
1. The question asked was: "In case of reducing weekly working time what would be your main 
preference?" 
Source: CREDOC (1985). 
Clearly, the preference for an increase of income over an additional reduction of working time grew 
after the implementation of the 39-hour week. While in 1982 more then 44 percent of all employ-
ees were in favour of longer leisure time, only a third were of this opinion i.n 1985. More general-
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ly, after being confronted with the income risks and workplace consequences of shorter hours, 
employees increasingly rejected further cuts in working time. Hence, a higher wage packet was 
preferred. 
Such changes in the working time and income preferences of the workforce were strongly 
influenced by two factors. On the one hand, the implementation of shorter hours seldom correspon-
ded with the articulated (leisure) time preferences of those employed. Contrary to the preferences 
voiced in the above table a government report showed that the 39-hour week was being implemen-
ted in 43 percent of the cases by reducing one hour of work on Friday afternoons. Cutting daily 
working time by 12 minutes was introduced in 40 percent of the cases. In only 10 percent of cases 
was an additional full day- off granted for every eight weeks worked ( cf. Detape et a/. 1982: 14). 
Secondly, the shift of preferences in favour of purchasing power is explained by the six months 
freeze on wages and prices which the Mauroy Government introduced in May 1982. For the first 
time the law of 1950 concerning the freedom of collective wage bargaining was suspended. This 
second case of governmental intervention in autonomous wage formation "was of an authoritarian 
and statutory nature ... nothing like a genuine negotiation took place" (cf. Goetschy 1987: 179). 
Far from identifying the Socialist Government with the redistribution of income, employees were 
confronted with the unhappy consequences of statutory wage policies. Real disposable income 
dropped by 0.3 percent in 1983 and by 0.7 percent in 1984 (cf. Hall 1986: 223). With their minds 
focused on income preservation employees' support for further work sharing policies could not be 
counted upon. In sum, while employees saw their standard of living threatened by new policy 
priorities of the Leftist Government, they only partly benefited from the proclaimed improvements 
of collective. working time reduction, and did not witness significant labour market outcomes 
deriving from the introduction of the 39-hour week. 
The Unions' Dilemma: Who Pays for Distributional Policies? 
As shown, a lot hinged on the unions. The government's labour market policies relied on the 
unions' preparedness to support its distributional objectives with a bargaining strategy that gave 
employers sufficient leeway in the fields of income policy and working time flexibility. If such a 
cooperation could not be secured and the unions chose not to act as promoters of governmental 
reform, then a central plank of the active labour market policy was going to be in trouble. In 
addition, the employers could then be expected to match the unions' non -cooperation in the field 
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of wage moderation with intransigence, for instance regarding further working time reductions. But 
in the shade of the Socialist election victory, public calls for union wage restraint faced an acute 
dilemma. Under the circwnstances of the reflation project introduced in mid- 1981 and the 
government's proclamation to re-establish full employment, employees and their interest organisa-
tions first expected rewards from the government, rather then having to furnish sacrifices themsel-
ves. 
As the industrial militancy over full wage compensation illustrated, the competitiveness between 
the five representative unions could not be overcome without state intervention. By the same token, 
the six months freeze on prices and wages signalled to the unions and their social basis that a 
further step towards the 35-hour week would only be implemented if and when the hours' reduc-
tion was supplemented by parallel wage restraints. Having to learn the lesson of work sharing in 
this manner implied that the (i) procedures, (ii) compromise options and (iii) income preconditions 
of additional working time reductions would assume top priority in union bargaining practices. 
Through the wage freeze the Leftist Government unequivocally displayed to the unions the new 
rules of the game: so as to avoid inflationary consequences any further steps towards the 35 -hour 
week were to be financed through income sharing in one form or other. 
In responding to this challenge, the established scenario of pros and cons in the French union 
system prevailed. The CGT unambiguously refused an "amputation" of disposable income (cf. 
Chavrot 1984: 17). The FO voiced its opposition against intra- class income redistribution since 
such an optibn "would only find the keen hearing of the Patronat" (cf. FO 1984: 171). Of the three 
largest French trade unions only the CFDT was willing to support a policy of voluntary wage 
restraint. At its 1982 Congress the CFDT evaluated the previous working time arrangements. As 
Maire claimed, the union's signature on the protocol of 1981 was intended to "start the train in the 
direction of the 35 -hour week" ( cf. CFDT- Syndicalisme 1982: 19-20). In order to steer the 
train towards the appropriate labour market destination, the CFDT approved a motion which sought 
full wage compensation only for those income groups which earned twice as much as the minimum 
wage (SMIC). Above that income threshold, partial wage compensation became the bargaining 
priority of the CFDT. 
But while the CFDT was advocating a second phase of work sharing supplemented by income 
sharing, the Leftist Government introduced its wage and price freeze. Accordingly, this bargaining 
position could not be put to the test. Confronted with statutory income regulation and state- induced 
wage moderation directives (negociation encadree)15 , progress towards the 35-hour week was 
halted. Besides, shifts in the preference structure of employees (cf. table 1) indicated that the 
distributional project of the CFDT lacked support within the workforce. While the CFDT was 
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calling for a trade-off between income sharing and work sharing, the CGT and FO voiced their 
rejection of a policy project which sought to popularise solidaristic income policies. 
With labour organisations d~voting as much time and energy to contending with each other as 
with employers, the CFDT's solidarity project was without inter-union approval. Given the balance 
of power within the French union system which favoured the communist CGT over the socialist 
CFDT while the reverse was the case within the government - the CFDT lacked the enforcement 
resources for a unilateral approach. Finally, the austerity measures which the Mauroy- Govern-
ment introduced in 1982/83 underlined that the union strategy was hardly applicable against a 
background of shifting policy priorities at the state level. 
The Dilemma of State- Induced Working Time Policy 
In 1981 the Socialist Government had taken the risk of domestic economic expansion. Redistributive 
policies combined fiscal expansion, nationalisation, recasting welfare state provisions and active 
labour market policies. As shown earlier, such a combination was based on the expectation that 
economic recovery on a world- wide scale, in particular in the United States, was only a matter of 
time. In addition, the government counted on ancillary labour organisations to garner support for its 
distributional policies. Hence, the government expected a compromise prone patronat and regarded 
trade unions not only as industrial relations activists, but also as political actors. 
In practice, the implementation of the reflation project required cooperation from the unions in 
the field of incomes policies. However, as Mitterrand 's ruling over the issue of full- wage compen-
sation exemplified, the Socialist Government could not rely on such organisational support. Fur-
thermore, the deeply-rooted rivalries between the trade unions undercut the government's ability to 
foster quasi- corporatist arrangements between the state and industrial relations organisations as a 
means of regulating social conflict and effectively implementing policy (cf. Streeck and Schmitter 
1986). 
This disillusioning experience added to the variety of problems and non -intended macro-eco-
nomic side- effects of Keynesianism which the Socialist Government was facing from mid -1982 
15) Wage increases were to remain below·the state's 5 percent guideline for 1984. 
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onwards. On the one hand, the Keynesian expansion strategy led to a drop of long- term interest 
rates in the autumn of 1981. But already in early 1982 the government had to cede to the realities 
of the international capital markets (cf. Scharpf 1987: 302). As a result the French franc was 
devalued by 5. 75 percent in February 1982. In addition, unemployment as well as inflation increa-
sed again in mid- 1982, therefore proving the fallacy of the economic calculus on which the Leftist 
Government had gambled: to have less unemployment amidst a short- term period of more infla-
tion. 
Both experiences contributed to reconsider the room for policy manoeuverability amidst an 
isolated redistributive Keynesian context. As a central element of Keynesian reflation strategies the 
restricted action margins of monetary policy subsequently affected other problem areas which the 
Mauroy Government was facing, in particular growing budget deficits and an exploding balance of 
payments' deficit (especially with its main trading partner, the Federal Republic of Germany). 
Adding to the predicament was the unique position of France in 1981/82. The contrast in timing 
with other OECD countries was striking. With the world economy in the throes of a recession and 
the neighbouring countries reacting by shifting to deflationary policies and trimming the welfare 
state, the Mitterrand-Mauroy Government opted for a completely different trajectory. With its 
reflation programme the Leftist coalition managed to produce domestic growth amidst an unfa-
vourable economic environment. However, this success was isolated, yielded non- intended side -
effects and proved to be of limited duration. 16 
Socialist\policy-making which had embarked on a path of social growth in 1981 was subse-
quently transformed into the Delors plan under the ~ading of rigueur. The austerity plan of the 
Finance minister made a clear decision about what the top policy priorities .would be: instead of 
further addressing reform projects like the 35-hour week and stimulating demand through redistri-
butional policies, the objectives of consolidating public expenditure, curtailing inflation and reducing 
the unprecedented deficit in the balance of payments were now given top priority on the politico-
economic agenda. As Petit (1986: 398) noted "the aim was to change precisely those expectations 
which had boosted household consumption in 1982 ... this move depended upon widespread acceptan-
ce of wage restraint as the core of this politique de rigueur." 
The Leftist blueprint of austerity not only implied a far-reaching renouncement of the reflation 
phase but also a gradual convergence with the conservative economics being applied in neighbour-
16) For an overview of the macro-economic costs and constraints they fuelled see Hall 1986: 
195ff., OECD 1988: JOff., Fonteneau and Muet 1985: 191ff., Lauber 1987: 26-29). 
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ing countries. In addition, the Delors plan had significant parallels to the cure which the d'Es-
taing- Barre Government had favoured between 1975 and 1981. By and large the new medicine 
suggested a disavowal of the tr~jectory taken in mid -1981 which was made partly responsible for 
the encountered difficulties and subsequent goal failures. As the Prime Minister explained: "We 
want to have wages rise more slowly than prices in order to curb consumer purchasing power and 
increase profitability" (cf. Business Week, 10 January 1983). 
In the face of a limited range of support from the trade unions and growing hostility from the 
employers, the government decided without consulting the labour confederations to retreat from 
redistributive Keynesianism and rather focus on introducing restrictive income policies and suspend 
any further legal steps towards the 35-hour week. Since the government had repeatedly experien-
ced that labour organisations could not be counted on as relay stations for policy implementation, 
the unions henceforth were put at arm's length. Instead of seeking union cooperation "wages were 
frozen (with) absolutely no prior consultation ... even though (the unions) were the ones most affec-
ted" (cf. Intervention 1983: 47). 
The IXth macro-economic Plan (1984-1988) reinforced the shift of policy priorities in favour 
of 'desinflation competitive' most distinctively. The emphasis of economic policy making was placed 
"on the irrefutable necessity to increase efforts in favour of investment. This objective implies a 
moderation of public expenditure and a restraint on household consumption" ( cf. Commissariat 
General du Plan 1983, Tome I: 5). Regarding the prospects of the 35-hour week the ninth Plan 
stipulated a progressive reduction of working time on a selective, decentralized and contractual basis 
(cf. Malkin 1986: 311). Rather than reinforcing the governmental commitment, the 35-hour week 
appeared as a distant ideal, only to be advanced in negotiations between the collective bargaining 
organisations. 
Abstaining from further statutory intervention and pointing to the necessary "modernisation of 
French industry" became the cornerstones of rigueur in the field of industrial relations. While the 
Mauroy Government began to drive the nails in the coffin of the 35- hour week objective, the new 
approach underlined the shift in the Socialists' policy prerogatives. It is this sweeping change of 
practice and objectives during their tenure in government which will be addressed in the following 
section. 
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7. The Modernisation Concept of Fabius 
The macro- economic policy shift described in the previous section was followed by changes in the 
composition of the government. After the Mauroy Government had taken notice of its devastating 
results in the June 1984 elections to the European Parliament, and following the postponement of 
the controversial private school legislation 17 , Mitterrand initiated a major shake-up of the Social-
ist-Communist coalition. Prime Minister Mauroy was replaced by Laurent Fabius who had been 
Minister for Industry and Research since March 1983, and held the budget portfolio from 1981 to 
1983. An advocate of austerity and representing a pragmatically oriented understanding of policy 
making, Fabius quickly became identified with "the withdrawal from Leftist ideologies" (cf. Der 
Spiegell984a: 126). 
The summer transition pushed ahead by the Elysee was completed when the Central Committee 
of the PCF decided to leave the coalition government formed in 1981. The PCF did not want to be 
further identified with an austerity policy whose content was decided outside the posts which the 
PCF- ministers held. In addition, the PCF observed that the social costs of rigueur increasingly 
affected its constituency. The elections to the European Parliament bode ill for the Communist 
\ 
party: the PCF fell to a historic low of 11.2 percent. Thus, with the drastic electoral decline of the 
PCF, the Communists decided that rebalancing the forces of the Left was timely, rather then 
continuing to· partake in a government which was said to lose its socialist character (cf. Marchais 
1990: 51). 
The conceptual signpost of Fabius' policy shift was the modernisation of the French economy 
and the state. Thus, redistributional reforms like in 1981 were ruled out. Instead, the new Prime 
Minister proclaimed "a socialism of the possible" and focused on withdrawing from state dirigism. 
Fabius described the role which the state was to play as follows: 
17) Mitterrand had promised in 1981 to end the long- standing rivalry between catholic (mostly 
private) and laic schools. The government intended to establish a uniform secular and public edu-
cation system. However, the (private- )school controversy brought almost two million people onto 
the streets of Paris in June 1984, protesting against the legislation. 
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"The state should not be in charge of everything. Traditionally in France the state assumes the 
initiative in the economy, industry and defense, as well as correcting forms of injustice. There is 
nothing wrong with such a proceeding, but this does not imply that the state should interfere in 
each policy area at any given time" (cf. Der Spiege11984b: 135). 
This change in the operation of state regulatory agencies could be identified in major policy fields. 
In the course of such a U- turn a Ja Fran9aise the focal points of labour market policy were 
profoundly transformed. The political discourse about the objectives of working time innovations 
was now explicitly governed by the intention to utilise such innovations as an instrument for advan-
cing temporal flexibility and the adaptation capacities of firms. As Fabius explained, 
"it would be unreasonable to reduce working time unilaterally in a standardized manner, and 
moreover only in one country. We rather favour negotiations. Each firm has to discuss its necessary 
options. What can be introduced in one company may not warrant adequate solutions in another. 
Therefore, we have to proceed in a cautious way and indulge in concertated action" (cf. Der 
Spiege11984b: 135, italics added). 
Within this framework the industrial modernisation of France was linked to the simultaneous restruc-
turing of collective bargaining institutions. The partnership of both was regarded as essential. 
Mindful of this interplay the Auroux reforms saw a new lease of life. Introduced in 1982, this 
industrial relations legislation provided for employees' right of collective expression within the firm, 
in particular on the content, organisation and conditions of work (so-called groups d'expression). 
In practical terms, these reforms were designed to stimulate contractualisation and strengthen the 
bargaining positions of labour at the plant level. On a more normative level, the Auroux reforms 
were to promote workplace democratisation and establish basic citizenship rights for employees (cf. 
Wilson 1991: 441). 
However, such new- style participation did not necessarily imply union representation on the 
groups d'expression. In fact, enlarged shopfloor democracy could be introduced without unions, or 
with only a minority of unions being represented in the new institutions. Furthermore, the workpla-
ce legislation provided that only firms with more than 200 employees were obliged to conduct 
annual negotiations on wage formation and working time organisation (cf. Eyraud and Tchobanian 
1985: 241). However, in case no compromise was reached the employer could unilaterally introduce 
new norms and regulations (cf. KiBler et al. 1985: 169). Thus, a prescription that such negotiations 
also had to produce a collective agreement was not included in the Auroux reforms. 
The obligation to negotiate, but the non -commitment to arrive at an agreement, reinforced the 
duality and contradictions in the French industrial relations system. On the one hand, the Auroux 
reforms provided extended participation rights for employees and obliged the. Patronat to acknow-
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ledge the legitimate presence of unions and their collective bargaining rights within the firm. On the 
other hand, the legislation did not go as far as to re-model the established balance of shop- floor 
power and conflict resolution. Instead, the relative power position of industrial actors, reflected by 
their mobilisation capacities (so-called rapport de force) continued to determine if negotiations 
would lead to a compromise about wage levels, working time patterns and conditions of work. 
In the event, the implementation of the Auroux reforms gradually changed the complexion of 
collective bargaining procedures in the French industrial relations system. Increasingly, the firm 
developed into the central regulatory agency for workplace innovations while a parallel reform of 
branch and inter- industry bargaining institutions was not undertaken by the Socialist Government. 
Such an acceptance of the virtues of a market economy signalled a profound policy transition which 
the Minister of Labour, I. Auroux, captured in the following words: 
"Twenty years ago, the workplace was a battleground; now it is simply a place to work ... The Left 
has learned to accept the market economy. It has been a cultural revolution in our ideas ... We are 
rediscovering the virtues of liberalism or rather the virtues of economic liberalism" ( cf. Wilson 
1991: 455). 
The decentralisation of collective bargaining which the workplace legislation established led to a 
multiplication of company agreements. In 1984 over 1.600 contracts were signed, in 1985 more 
then 1. 800 and over 2. 000 in 1986 ( cf. Boulin and Taddei 1988, Tome I: 1). These agreements had 
in common ~at they were neither based on previous branch or inter- industry contracts, nor could 
their diversity be filtered into a unifying compromise pattern. Under conditions such as these, 
branch and inter- industry level bargaining organisations experienced a serious loss of regulatory 
capacity while the pattern of labour relations in French enterprises underwent a marked transition. 
Participatory management styles as a means of stimulating workplace innovations and unions' 
acknowledgement of economic constraints which influence their frrm's competitiveness can be 
positioned in the context of a "new spirit" evolving at the frrm level (cf. Wilson 1991: 454). 
In the section that follows we shall focus on the conceptual shift of labour market policies. The 
logic behind the new orientation derived from identifying two properties - flexibility and moderni-
sation - as the central planks of industrial recovery and the reorganisation of production. The 
individual frrm was singled out as the primary agent to bring about such a transformation, and the 
key task for industrial relations actors consisted in providing the necessary instruments for economic 
adjustment. Accordingly, the Fabius Government encouraged the collective bargaining actors to 
open talks on labour market deregulation and working time flexibility in 1984. In particular, the 
inter- industry negotiations gave the unions the opportunity to demonstrate their adaptability to 
changed environmental conditions. 
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The Inter -Industry Negotiations on Labour Market Deregulation and Working 
Time Flexibility 
It was the CNPF which took the initiative in the bargaining rounds. Encouraged by the high place 
attributed by the Fabius Government to modernisation prerogatives and the promotion of firms' 
competitivity in increasingly challenging international markets, the CNPF launched a flexibilisation 
campaign in 1984 under the heading of "Emplois nouveaux a constraints allegees"18• The aspiration 
was that inter- industry bargaining would establish a framework for extended flexibility margins in 
the management of manpower and the reorganisation of working time schedules. The diversity of 
the bargaining topics, and - if agreed upon - their consequences for the subsequent deregulation 
of French employment and labour legislation (so-called Code du Travail) made these negotiations 
highly contentjous. The constraints which the CNPF wanted to be curtailed included: 
~ Procedures to facilitate technological innovation, 
~ Threshold levels for the application of labour law guarantees within firms, and the introduction 
of low wage provisions for new appointments, 
~ Revised modalities for dismissals carried out on economic grounds, 
~ Extended options for part-time work, shift-working, employment with limited duration and 
working time schedules which differed for various groups of employees. 
The cumulative effect of these demands would give life to a new mobility in the operation of firms, 
their management of human resources, methods of job placement and the diversification of forms of 
employment. If the unions would accept these demands and the government approve the deregula-
tion measures, then the CNPF foresaw the creation of 450.000 new jobs, in particular in vocational 
training and youth unemployment (cf. Belier 1985: 81). 
For the unions the negotiations offered the chance to regain control over the unemployment 
problem and thereby re-establish their authority in industrial governance. This objective seemed all 
the more necessary since the decentralisation of bargaining authority effected by the Auroux reforms 
had disempowered the confederations of regulatory responsibility. From the outset the CGT instru-
18) New forms of employment with reduced legal constraints. 
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mentalised the negotiations. Its bargaining strategy was to emphasise the assault of the "reactionary" 
Patronat on hard won labour rights and social legislation. The CGT framed its approach in terms of 
an "anti-crisis struggle" (cf. Poussy 1985: 2). The resignation of the four Communist ministers in 
the coalition government had untied the hands of the party and union: neither the PCF nor the CGT 
were hereafter bound to government solidarity. 
Given its self -definition as a contracting union the FO accepted to negotiate. However, during 
its Xll Congress the FO adopted a motion which included an unconditional repudiation of the 
employers' claims (cf. FO 1984: 410). Organisational considerations deriving from a far reaching 
change in the French union system played an important role in shaping this position. In the social 
elections of October 1983 which determined union delegates to labour market institutions like the 
unemployment and social security systems, both CGT and CFDT registered significant losses while 
the FO increased its support at the polls to 25.2 percent. 
This meant that for the first time in post- war French industrial relations the established balance 
of power between CGT and CFDT was changed by the FO's second placing. In addition, of the 
three largest French unions, the FO was the only labour organisation which did not suffer a decline 
in membership during the Socialists' tenure in government. Rather, the FO profited at the expense 
of the Leftist confederations who were identified as being too close to the government. 
In stark contrast to the uncompromising positions held by the CGT and FO, the CFDT decided 
on a strategy of flexible response. The central bargaining issues (i) facilitating legal regulations on 
employment ~onditions (ii) and the organisation of work offered the CFDT opportunity to prove its 
capacity to adapt to new developments in the labour market and to match these with corresponding 
collective bargaining strategies. Thus, the CFDT argued that flexibility was a (growing) reality in 
the labour market and needed appropriate governance through the industrial relations actors. The 
CFDT- chairman Maire outlined the role of the CFDT in this process as follows: 
"The task of changing work structures must become the principal goal, the concrete and immediate 
objective of the trade union movement in the firm. To modify work and make it more flexible, to 
establish a greater inter-relation between conceptual and practical tasks and to make workers better 
skilled, endowed with greater occupational mobility, more autonomous and creative, more responsi-
ble and closer to their work: these ambitious objectives for the transformation of work would lead 
to the mutual satisfaction of the interests of workers and the collective interests of the firm, the 
economy and society" (cf. Maire 1986: 162). 
As challenging and innovative as the CFDT approach appeared when compared to the hardline 
positions of both CGT and FO, it also has to be taken into consideration that the union's strategy 
was influenced by electoral considerations. Seen from this perspective, the CFDT bargaining 
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strategy included an obvious political bias. After the elections to the European Parliament in June 
1984 in which the PS recorded only 21 percent of the vote, the collective bargaining associations 
could expect that the federal elections in early 1986 would provide a change of government. If this 
happened, the CFDT expected that the RPR!UDF opposition alliance would alter the working time 
decree of 1982 and give the firms the flexibility options they were persistently calling for. Hence, 
the CFDT strategy sought to limit the possible drawbacks resulting from neo-conservative regula-
tion. 
Political prerogatives could also be identified within the employers' associations. Many CNPF, 
CGPME and SNPMI members regarded the negotiations as unnecessary. Their doubts were directed 
towards the obligatory character of inter-industry bargaining agreements. Besides, the Patrons 
opposed the prospect of a national agreement which obliged them to compromise on a reduction in 
weekly working hours while the flexibility options they received in return would not match innova-
tions which iliey had already introduced at the flrm level. 
The Auroux reforms - although often criticised because of their union bias - had given many 
employers the leeway they needed for introducing flexible forms of work, and establishing new-
style labour relations at the plant level. The implementation of the reforms allowed management to 
reconsider the role of their employees in the effort to improve productivity and competitiveness in 
international markets (cf. Wilson 1991: 455). Instead of being bound to an unsatisfactory inter-
industry agreement these employers were committed to ftrm -led innovations and hoped for a 
change of government which would give them satisfactory action margins, but without the compro-
mise component of working time reduction (cf. Soubie 1985: 96). 
Taken together, different inter- temporal strategic considerations ruled the interests of the CFDT 
in favour of an agreement, while members of the Patronat sought to take advantage of the emerging 
politico-institutional development. Hence, the former wanted, while the latter did not need, an 
agreement. While the employers could afford to wait, the unions had no time to lose. Since em-
ployers could count on their autonomy in firm level regulation, the unions were caught in a dilem-
ma. If they were to reach a compromise, criticism of the agreement within the organisations was 
almost certain to surface. Were they to refuse, i.e. adhering to the logic of membership rather than 
to the logic of influence, then they would most likely reinforce the impression of union immobility 
and organisational backwardness (cf. Priouret 1984: 37). 
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The 1984 Syndrome 
Given the actors' constellations as described the agreement of December 1984 came as something of 
a surprise. Only the CGT remained commited to its negative position declining to sign. The COT's 
refusal was contrasted by the willingness of the other unions to support the settlement. Yet, their 
support proved premature and the union delegations found themselves without a mandate to translate 
the protocol into a formal collective bargaining agreement. In particular, the FO- and CFDT-
leadership were confronted with bitter criticism from their rank -and - file. On! y one of the 
CFDT's regional representatives supported the protocol while all sections of the FO refused the 
compromise (cf. Amadieu and Mercier 1986: 117). The rank-and-file protest focused on the 
discrepancy between union obligations in the field of labour provisions while the employers only 
provided declarations of intent like "contributing to safeguarding employment" (cf. Delamotte 1987: 
64). Deference to internal democracy and respect for the voices of their rank- and- file led the 
leadership of both unions to exercise its exit option in late 1984. 
Intra -organisational consensus problems were not confined to the unions. The employers faced 
similar problems; but the controversies within the Patronat focused on general questions of associa-
tional strategy. Was the dialogue approach which CNPF President Gattaz favoured still appropriate 
in the new political climate? Or was this strategy rendered obsolete by the Socialists conversion to 
capitalism's rules of the game in the form of wage discipline and budgetary austerity? In addition, 
PME membeh criticised the inter -industry agreement in the face of the importance which the 
government attributed to firm -led innovations. 
The circumstances leading to the failure of the negotiations gave the Patronat plenty ammunition 
to emphasize the indecisiveness and (inter- )organisational weakness of the French unions. The 
CNPF was able to point to the evident gap between a union leadership willing to compromise, 
intermediate units refusing the agreement and a workforce whose 'real' problems and aspirations 
were neither recognised by shopfloor militants, nor adequately represented by the union leader-
ship. The metaphor of a union tanker unable to navigate the rough waters of industrial modernisa-
tion reinforced public opinion of the French trade union system as clinging to images and practices 
instead of orchestrating new labour regulations in the light of sustained labour market problems. 
With the repeated failure of negotiations the ball was in the court of the Fabius Government. 
The Prime Minister had to take into consideration the apparent lack of commitment on the part of 
the collective bargaining actors to re-open negotiations during the electoral campaign for the 
Assemble Nationale. Only the results of the General Elections in early 1986 would determine the 
chances for and the scope of a new round of talks. In this scenario, Fabius opted for unilateral 
regulation. 
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8. The Regulation of Temporal Flexibility 
The DeJebarre Law 
Just before the Socialists' tenure in government ended in 1986 the Minister of Labour, M. Delebar-
re, presented a law on the 'adjustment of working time'. Next to its details, the timing and proce-
dural aspects of the legislation provoked sustained criticism from the industrial relations actors. With 
an expected change of government in view, Delebarre received special powers from the still existing 
socialist majority in parliament. 19 However, proceeding in such a manner only reinforced the 
intention of the conservative/liberal opposition alliance to change existing working time legislation 
once it took office. Accordingly, the fate of the Delebarre law was seen to "land on the grave yard 
of outstanding ideas" (cf. Liberation 21.11.1985). 
The conceptual background of the legislation was based on the Taddei Repon submitted to 
Prime Minister Fabius in 1985 after the failure of the flexibility negotiations. Taddei's report 
reflected most distinctively the shift of priorities which French working time policy had experienced 
since 1981. The PS member of the Assemble Nationale had been appointed by Fabius to compile a 
report on the modalities of implementing new forms of temporal flexibility in the labour market. 
The new lynchpin of working time policy was to disconnect individual working hours from the 
firm's operation time. This objective killed the earlier one of redistributing employment by way of 
reducing standard weekly working time. The former panage du travail objective was considered as 
a manifest failure, and Taddei warned that a renewal of this approach would be detrimental for 
firms' competitivity and wage discipline (cf. Taddei 1985: 12). 
In consequence, Taddei proposed to extend daily and weekly shift working. This included 
round- the- clock operating time, whilst standard weekly working time was reduced to 32 hours 
within a four-day schedule. In short, Taddei's propositions aimed at the "resocialisation of 
working time patterns between men and machines" (cf. Taddei 1986). By extending capital's 
19) Because of a Communist filibuster, the Socialists had to use article 49/3 of the Constitution 
and needed support from opposition members of the Senate to get the law passed two weeks before 
the parliamentary term ended. 
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operation time Taddei expected that the combination of longer production time, better use of equip-
ment capacities and enlarged productivity potentials would furnish 365.000 new jobs within a five 
year period whilst full wage compensation was guaranteed (cf. Taddei 1985: 98). 
By incorporating Taddei's proposals the Delebarre Jaw provided for the regulation of working 
time on a yearly basis and within the framework of branch negotiations. Two flexibility options 
ruled the legislation: the duration of the working week could be extended to either 41 or 44 hours if 
the average weekly working time within a 12 months period did not exceed 38 or 37.5 hours. 
Thus, in practice the Delebarre law sought to link two different elements of working time regula-
tion: the differentiation of working time and the simultaneous reduction of hours. 
From the perspective of Fabius' industrial and social modernisation concept, the Taddei report 
reflected its subsequent translation in the field of working time policy. This translation was not only 
based on revised policy priorities in the labour market, but also corresponded to a "discrete flexibi-
lity" being implemented at the firm level that mainly affected female employees (cf. Le Monde 
16.07.1985). In that respect, the Delebarre law marked a departure from the former focus on 
firm -Jed working time innovations as advocated in the Auroux reforms. Given its claim for branch 
level negotiations, the Delebarre legislation evaluated the company framework as too limited in 
scope, and as too insecure regarding the protection of employees' rights. 
This procedural shift has to be placed in the context of two alarming developments taking place 
in the French labour market since the beginning of the eighties. First, the reform targeted on the 
belated standhdisation of numerous company agreements on working time flexibility. In addition, 
the legislation was directed against the multiplication of fll'lll -level working time agreements which 
reflected a non- compliance with existing legal provisions. In particular, the latter trend underlined 
that management had often used provisions of the Auroux reforms to bypass union structures at the 
plant -level and introduce working time schedules on grounds of individual deregulation agreements 
with employees (cf. Meurs 1987: 20). 
Regarding the reactions of the main labour confederations, only the CFDT supported the 
Delebarre bill, while it was vigorously opposed by both CGT and FO (cf. Sellier 1986: 176, 
BiJJling 1988: 114). The former confederation underscored its "principle of adaptative syndica-
lism". Opposition as an end in itself, as the CFDT- chairman Maire argued during the confedera-
tion's 1985 Congress, would not contribute to more employment. Maire recalled that: 
"Within a first period we exclusively concentrated union strategy on working time reduction. The 
debate over the price tag attached to the reduction demand, in particular who was to pay the bill -
the employers, the state or the workforce - dominated the deliberations, and later hindered the 
reduction process ... With hindsight, we are now capable of evaluating these experiences, and based 
If 
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on their interpretations to focus on different models of working time reduction which can pave the 
way for the reorganisation of working conditions and the improvement of job qualifications. This 
approach rests on the diversificljtion of solutions from one firm to another. It allows us to link 
productivity gains with the problem of wage compensation. Therefore, the trajectory may open up 
new options for the creation and preservation of jobs" (cf. CFDT 1985: 6). 
The lengthy quotation well illustrates that the CFDT leader acknowledged that attained productivity 
gains can only be shared once, and if so, then with complementary compromises in the fields of 
wages and/or working time. In other words, the CFDT reckoned most distinctively that distributio-
nal labour market policies cannot be realised by exclusively charging the bill to the employers or by 
delegating the costs upwards to the state. 
By contrast, the employers faced significant internal consensus problems over the question of 
how to treat the new working time legislation when it was most likely that the expected change of 
government would lead to the suspension of the contested Delebarre law. The CNPF valued the 
legislation as "substitution flexibility" and advised its branch associations and individual member 
firms to hold-off on negotiations on the basis of the reform (cf. Liberation 21.11.1985). Consi-
dering its political engagement in favour of the UDFIRPR alliance, the CNPF leadership counted on 
a forthcoming change of government, and thereafter, an immediate amendment of the law. Like-
wise, the notion of a 'social revenge' after five years of Leftist Government could not be excluded 
from the minds of some members of the CNPF leadership, namely the nationalised fums. 
As well as explicitly political considerations the controversies within the Patronat exemplified a 
continuing problem of employers' interest representation: how to deal with the trade unions. From 
the perspective of numerous employers several indicators justified a debate on the priorities of 
associational politics. First, the two Leftist unions were massively losing members since the mid-
seventies, and this evolution accelerated during the Socialists' tenure in government. 
The CGT officially acknowledged to having lost 55.6 percent of its membership between 1977 
and 1987 (cf. Le Monde 28.05.1989). The CGT, which last published officiae0 membership figures 
in 1983/84 (1.622075 members, including 259.133 pensioners), had lost another 10 percent of its 
membership by 1988 and currently counts 428.542 members in employment and 200.000 members 
registered as pensioners (cf. Liberation 18.06.1992). Such a membership depletion may further be 
exemplified by the case of the CGT engineering union: while the symbolic and historical heart of 
the national confederation counted 420.000 members in 1974, only 74.000 remained in 1987, a 
decrease of 83 percent in 13 years (cf. Le Monde 17.09.1988). 
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In 1985 the CFDT-membership was reported to be 830.000 active members and 70.000 
pensioners. Three years later the number of active members had fallen to 469.200 and 26.000 
pensioners. Taken together, the total loses amounted to a drop in membership of 44.9 percent (cf. 
Bevort 1989). In 1989 the CFDT claimed to have 539.000 members (defined as those making 
regular contributions). Compared to former membership figures, this would mark a slight increase. 
Secondly, as a result of these membership losses a steady fall in the level of union density could 
be observed. While French labour confederations never set an example for high unionisation levels 
since the 1950s in Western Europe (cf. Ebbinghaus and Visser 1990: 4), the drop from 14 percent 
in 1980 to 10.6 in 1986 is still remarkable. Rosanvallon (1988: 14) even speaks of a unionisation 
level of under 10 percent in 1988. These figures represent the lowest level of union density in 
Western Europe. 
The impoverished state of French unionism is further reflected in the increasing number of 
employees abstaining from company elections. In 1982 more then 41 percent of the active labour 
force abstained from the prud'homales21 elections. In 1987 electoral abstention reached the record 
high of 54 percent, i.e. more employees stayed away from the ballot boxes than supporting union 
candidates (cf. Le Monde 11.12.1987). 
In view of these manifest organisational problems of unions, numerous employers questioned 
why the French Patronat should further consider the labour confederations as representatives of the 
workforce, and therefore recognise them as legitimate collective bargaining organisations (cf. Berger 
1987: 193). Answering such a provocative question would require mapping out, and justifying, what 
kind of industrial relations should henceforth be established. Representatives of the enterprises 
nationalised in 1982, which expected their reprivatisation in case of an UDF/RPR victory, articula-
ted this frontal attack against the unions' legitimacy most distinctively (cf. Rijot 1986: 2, similarly 
Bunuel and Saglio 1984: 259). 
However, the most influential branch association within the CNPF, the engineering employers 
organised in the UIMM, opted for negotiations on the grounds of the Delebarre Law. While the 
UIMM left no doubt about the fact that the bill had come too late, it stressed that the CNPF could 
not coerce branch associations on certain policy priorities (cf. Liberation 21.11.1985). Political 
20) The alleged inaccuracy of unions' membership figures remains a perennial problem' in 
French industrial relations (cf. BIRR 1990/199: 5). 
21) The prud'homales committees are responsible for the solution of industrial disputes at the 
frrm level. 
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considerations governed the engineering association's decision. As the UIMM argued, the employers 
had to take into consideration that, if the change of government was forthcoming, a Socialist 
President would still hold office in the Elysee. The politico-institutional arrangement which was 
unfolding in 1986 was referred to as cohabitation. Since Mitterrand had been elected for seven 
years while the Assemble Nationale's term is five years, some form of cooperation between a 
Socialist President and a RPR/UDF government would be necessary. In practical terms such an 
arrangement implied that Mitterrand could either veto certain legislation, or that in anticipation of 
possible confrontations with the President the new government would have to soften its policy 
initiatives. 
The Seguin Law 
Instead of surrendering their bargaining strategy to the electoral outcome, the engineering employers 
opened negotiations with the unions on grounds of the Delebarre Law. In July 1986 a branch 
agreement was signed between the UIMM and two unions, the FO and the CGC. Only after the 
national engineering agreement on working time adjustment was finalised did the new coalition 
government under the RPR Prime Minister J. Chirac22 introduce legislation on extended working 
time flexibility. A first attempt to reshape working time legislation had been vetoed by Mitterrand. 
In addition, the constitutional court had overruled a bill in December 1986 on the grounds of proce-
dural deficiencies. 
The bill finally approved in June 1987 - which is commonly referred to as the Seguin Law23 
provided the possibility of a 44- hour week if on a 12-months basis the 39- hour week was 
kept in practice. While the Socialist's ordinance on working time reduction from 1982 was not 
changed, the Seguin reform expanded the options for introducing so-called variable working time 
schedules and favoured the implementation of cyclical working time patterns (round- the- clock 
22) In the 1986 elections the PS lost its majority but remained the largest single party in the 
Assemble Nationale. Emerging as the dominant force was the Centre-Right coalition UDF/RPR 
which had to count on minor right- wing parties in order to command an overall majority. Benefi-
ting from the change of voting procedures to proportional representation was the National Front 
(FN) which received 35 seats. 
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working) in firms with shift working. Furthermore, special regulation for sunday working and 
enlarged possibilities for female night working characterised the new legislation (cf. Schoenaich 
1988: 43-44). 
Compared to the Delebarre law Seguin's approach emphasized temporal flexibility without any 
parallel obligations to reduce weekly working hours. In case branch negotiations failed, companies 
were free to proceed with autonomous regulation. Finally, explicit labour market objectives had no 
special place in the Seguin law. They were regarded as incommensurable with meeting the demands 
for temporal flexibility and were displaced into a by-product. 
In practice, the premises of the Seguin Law corresponded with distinct transformations in the 
French labour market. The improvement of flrms' economic performance and adaptation capacities 
fundamentally derived from their increased recourse to irregular and precarious employment sche-
mes since the mid-eighties. The rise in such non -standard employment patterns reflected the 
government's approach in labour market policy. Reducing fmns' labour costs and exempting them 
from certain tax and social security contributions constituted the primary elements of Chirac's labour 
market policies. 
This restructuring process manifested itself in the drastic change of certain parameters of the 
French labour market and the quality of jobs being created. Part-time work, which accounted for 
10.9 percent of the labour force in 1985, exceeded over 12 percent in 1989. The most significant 
transformations in irregular employment have taken place in the field of travail temporaire. This 
type of temporary work increased by 15.6 percent in 1986, almost doubled the previous gain in 
1987 (+28.4\,ercent) and sky-rocketed by 40 percent in 1988, affecting 280.000 employees, or 7 
percent of overall employment (cf. Le Monde 09.01.1990). 
The so...,. called contrats a duree determinee have followed the trajectory for flexible employment 
patterns. Such ftxed-term contracts increased by 23 percent in 1986 and by 22.8 percent in the 
following year. In the meantime, irregular employment schemes represent 70 percent of the three 
million yearly new recruitments. By 1988, nearly 600.000 people were employed under such 
precarious or unstable conditions in France. According to Ministry of Labour figures, these forms 
of employment "are running at a level equivalent to around 240.000 full-time jobs" (cf. BIRR 
1989/181: 4). In short, while the duration of limited employment contracts is falling, the quantitati-
ve increase of peripheral work illustrates that such employment types are more and more shedding 
their exceptional character. Far from creeping they have marched in to take a steady hold of the 
French labour market. 
23) Named after the RPR Minister of Labour, Ph. Seguin. 
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Whereas the transformations as outlined indicate that flexible and precarious employment sche-
mes are an expanding feature of French labour market policies, the standard duration of weekly 
working hours has stagnated siJ?ce the singular reduction step was introduced in 1982. Average 
weekly working time reached 40.6 hours in 1981, and subsequently dropped to 39.06 hours in 1984 
as a result of governmental legislation in the field. But any further development in working time 
reduction was slow to come and there has been a virtual standstill since the mid-eighties (cf. 
INSEE 1988: 122). 
In contrast to this stagnation, effective yearly working time is on the rise again: in manufactur-
ing since 1986 and across economic sectors since 1987 ( cf. ibid.: 123). In 1988 more than 28 
percent of all workers faced a standard weekly working time beneath 39 hours, while 51.4 percent 
clocked in at 39 hours a week. But 20.2 percent of all workers - and the figure is rising - had 
working time contracts above the legal 39-hour norm (cf. ibid.: 124). 
The expansion of irregular employment patterns and rising working hours is matched by a 
noticeable increase in shift and weekend working. Newly introduced 24- hour shift systems mainly 
account for the rise in the former. While shift working was stagnant until 1974, and later fell 
continuously, a steady increase can be identified since 1982/83. Over 12 percent of all dependent 
employees - among them 30 percent of all workers in manufacturing - are subject to different 
configurations of shift working. Paralleling this development, firms' operation time has also expan-
ded. Rather than falling as it did between 1974 and 1982, duration of utilisation time has annual-
ly increased by 0.4 percent since 1984, and in 1988 registered an accretion of 2.2 percent. In 1990 
a further increase by 2.3 percent was attained (cf. Banque de France 1990). 
Supplementing the prolongation of firms' utilisation time is the employers' growing take -over 
of the weekend. According to an INSEE study, in 1988 only 43 percent of all dependent employees 
never worked on saturdays; four years earlier the proportion had been 10 percent higher (54 .3 
percent). Sunday working shows a similar revision. In 1984 over 80 percent of all employees never 
worked on the seventh day of the week, whereas in 1988 the figure had dropped to 74 percent (cf. 
Le Monde 03.07.1990). 
Mindful of these trends in the French labour market the relationship between flexibility and 
precarious employment patterns has assumed increasing importance on the agenda of industrial 
relations. The debate on temporal flexibility can be depicted as an attempt to link industrial relations 
with concerns for, and changes in, manufacturing strategies. Instead of focusing on expansive labour 
market policies like in 1981/82, or advocating the "social treatment" of unemployment as imple-
mented by the Socialists between 1983 and 1986, the cohabitation arrangement between President 
Mitterrand and the RPR/UDF government accorded top priority to an economically-driven con-
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frontation of the sustained labour market crisis. Employment plans this came to be dominated by 
reducing labour costs, primarily tax and social security contributions, and removing legislative 
restrictions which regulated employment. 
9. Conclusion 
The central objective of this chapter was to chart the transformation of French working time policies 
in the context of opportunities and constraints. In 1982, the Socialist Government was hit with the 
disillusioning fact that the necessary organisational support for a multi- dimensional and redistri-
butional labour market policy did not exist within the French industrial relations system. This 
experience was a blow in the light of the extraordinary initial confidence in the ability of the 
Mitterrand Government to 'do the right thing'. Activism and voluntarism were seen as a sign of 
leadership on the part of the Leftist Government. 
Buoyed by a confidence in Keynesianism, unemployment was regarded as amenable to influence 
and direct regulation by public policies. This implied both the intentionality and desirability of the 
macro-economic and active labour market policies introduced between 1981 and 1983. Endorsing 
the 35-hour\ week was both politically and economically attractive. Its political appeal lay in its 
contrast to the conservative -liberal predecessor government; economically the 35- hour week 
looked promising in the context of the models provided by the Commissariat General du Plan. 
Furthermore, the Socialist Government could appeal to the historical precedent of the Common 
Front policy of working time reduction in 1936 and saw its own approach as a continuation of 
labour market reforms introduced over 40 years earlier. 
However, the nature of France's industrial relations system has rendered unionism a fragmented 
and competitive entity. Unable to effect the government's labour market objectives in 1981/82, the 
unions focused on and sought assistance from politics. The controversy about wage compensation 
for the introduction of the 39-hour week exemplified such a necessity most clearly. Instead of 
becoming a matter of autonomous compromise formation, the state was called on to intervene with 
regulation of its own. The intervention displaced collective bargaining from the resolution of a 
wedge issue, thereby diminishing the autonomy of industrial relations. The need to revert to state 
intervention illustrates how governmental regulation assumes subsidiary functions in collective 
bargaining conflicts. Moreover, such an approach cemented the interventionist tradition in the 
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French industrial relations system, irrespective of the incumbency of the government. As Lange et 
al. (1982: 71) put it: "If there is a 'web of rules' about industrial relations in France, then it has 
been predominantly spun by the s~te." 
The Keynesian approach followed by the French socialists in 1981/ 82 provided unequivocal 
evidence of the limits and constraints of national economic and labour market policies. This is all 
the more true, when we take into consideration the unique position of French politics between 1981 
and 1983. In fact, the political desirability of an active governmental involvement in labour market 
policies neither implied nor advanced, its economic efficiency. With the policy shift introduced in 
1983, solutions to the sustained unemployment crisis were henceforth placed in the context of the 
internationalisation of the economy. As advocated by Fabius, solving the sustained employment 
crisis relied on changes in external markets and bringing economic policy more closely into line 
with those of its major trading partners. The demise of national policy making faciliated the trans-
formation of various policy objectives and contributed to the relegation of labour market policies as 
subsidiary. In short, political voluntarism gave way to acknowledging the structural constraints 
under which France operated. 
In the event, the emerging paradigm of world market competitiveness entailed the introduction 
of various modernisation prerogatives. This re-orientation substantially affected the premises and 
further course of French labour market policies. Instead of advocating work sharing through shorter 
hours policies, introducing public sector job creation schemes and remaining committed to the 
objective of full-employment, the French socialists' new agenda concentrated on improving firms' 
adaptation capacities by liberating them from rigidities and providing them with greater options in 
the field of industrial adjustment. 
Drafting a comprehensive policy for accomplishing modernisation objectives demanded a high 
price from the relevant labour market actors. The breakdown of the central negotiations on labour 
market deregulation and working time flexibility in 1984 is a case in point: the collective bargaining 
organisations exemplified "the middle way between defending the Fordist logic and drawing up new 
agreements that are favourable to employment" (cf. Boyer 1988: 256). In the light of this failure the 
modernisation course was introduced without integrating the collective bargaining organisations into 
the political decision making process. This proceeding was determined by the fact that the abiding 
organisational fragmentation between the French labour confederations left the Socialist Government 
without union cooperation in major policy fields. Thus, repeatedly statutory legislation replaced 
collective bargaining in the resolution of key labour market issues. 
In addition, the reform of collective bargaining institutions shaped by the Auroux Laws put the 
labour confederations in a paradox: while the institutionalisation of trade unionism in the company 
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gained somewhat from the reforms, de -unionisation advanced within the workforce. Besides, the 
five representative unions faced major challenges through the new recognition of the legitimacy of 
union action on the shopfloor while complementary reforms seeking corporatist arrangements at the 
branch and inter- industry levels were not forthcoming from the Socialist Government ( cf. Segrestin 
1990: 115). 
The reality of expanding precarious employment patterns and enlarged temporal flexibility 
further presented the industrial relations actors with a new set of constraints and challenges. Almost 
a decade after the inter-industry bargaining rounds on working time policy opened, the pro-flexi-
bility Delebarre and Seguin reforms illustrate how far the issue field under consideration had been 
transformed in scope and content. Confronted with such transformations the labour market actors 
repeatedly faced the task of enlarging their respective spheres of concertation while simultaneously 
coming to terms with the limits of their own and other policy resources. In the end, the limits 
proved too great. 
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Chapter V 
Britain: From Pace- Setting Bargaining to Stagnation 
1. Introduction 
Given the various measures considered by the Labour Party and the TUC during the mid- seventies 
to confront the first oil price crisis and rising unemployment, it came as a surprise that both sides 
agreed to an anti- inflation programme which required voluntary wage restraint from the affiliated 
unions. While the Tories and neo-classical economists saw price stability to be re-established 
through restrictive monetarist and ftscal policies (cf. Friedman 1977, Brittan and Lilley 1977), the 
TUC-Labour Party Liaison Committee (established in 1972) preferred another trajectory. Their 
blueprint included union cooperation with a policy of voluntary wage restraint. The Social Contract 
institutionalised this collaboration in 1973. 
Concerning its structural character - which shall be elaborated in more detail in the course of 
this chapter .:.. the British system of industrial relations hardly seemed suitable for implementing a 
macro-economic policy which included as its core element incomes policy and union self- cur-
tailment in wage formation. Of the structural features of Britain's unions and employers' associa-
tions at the outset of our study period, three are most prominent: 
..,.. Over 250 unions existed within the TUC during the 1970s. Inter-organisational competition 
over membership and collective bargaining strategies reinforced the highly fragmented nature of 
British unionism. Until the end of the 1970s trade union membership, in particular in the public 
sector, grew consistently (cf. Undy et al. 1981) . 
..,.. Collective bargaining on pay determination is concentrated at the shop floor level. The move 
away from national agreements started in the 1960s, leading to a decentralisation of union 
bargaining structures and internal decision -making procedures that persists to the present day 
(cf. Marsh 1992). The influence of the union shop stewards at the firm level is unmatched in 
other Western European industrial relations ·systems. 
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~ Because of union decentralisation, British employers' assoc1a1:1ons are traditionally weakly 
organised, and often lack the enforcement capacities to implement associational priorities among 
their member flrms. 
In what follows we shall review each of these particularities and draw out its influence on the 
opportunities and constraints of work sharing strategies in Britain between 1975 and 1990. This aim 
requires us to look closely at the specific institutional arrangement of the British industrial relations 
system. Here the capacity of unions and employers associations to act as positive contributors 
towards active labour market policies becomes especially important. 
The change of government in 1979 and in its wake the major upheavals within the British 
system of labour relations adds to our institutional focus. For a start, the economic doctrine of 
post- war Britain was repudiated. Keynesianism constituted both an economic policy and an institu-
tionalised mode of class-compromise formation. With Margret Thatcher taking office in 1979, the 
Keynesian consensus was renounced in favour of economic doctrines associated with monetarism. 
Of particular importance here is how such a U -turn in British policy making affected the balance 
of power in industrial relations. In other words, what were the consequences for union advocacy of 
work sharing when the explanation for unemployment shifted towards excessive pay settlements, and 
when statutory intervention sought to alter the institutional design of British labour relations ? 
In order to address these questions the chapter is organised into three parts. First, I focus on the 
Social Contract as Labour's reaction to the evolving economic crisis. Only when the agreement on 
incomes polic~ between the last Labour Government and the TUC was rejected by member unions 
in 1978/79 did the issue of work sharing gain currency. in British labour relations. This change of 
policy priorities constitutes a major event for our analytical purpose. The second part of the chapter 
treats the detailed elaboration of working time policies and the pre-eminent constraints that inhibi-
ted a second step towards the 35 -hour week objective. It also includes an analysis of the effects 
and the perceived effectiveness of this and other labour market policies on the part of the key 
actors. By concentrating on distinct transformations in the British labour market and organisational 
changes within labour relations, the third part of the chapter illustrates why the re-entry of work 
sharing onto the collective bargaining agenda did not make significant headway. In this context, I 
treat the expansion of temporal flexibility as an environmental factor and I am mainly interested in 
how this factor makes its way onto collective bargaining agendas. 
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2. The Social Contract as Labour's Reaction to the Crisis 
Under the heading of "Economic Policy and the Costs of Living" the Social Contract provided a 
wide range of social and economic measures1• Distributional objectives were their focal point (cf. 
Marsden 1984: 384). As the Labour Party and the TUC pledged, they were committed to a 
"fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of power and wealth in favour of working people 
and their families", To curb inflation, which reached 25 percent in the Spring of 1975, direct price 
controls were to take effect immediately. In exchange, the TUC would seek to temper unions' wage 
demands according to the overall state of the economy. In effect, the General Council of the TUC 
required its affiliated unions to "limit" their bargaining claims to the objective of maintaining, but 
not increasing, real take home pay (cf. TUC 1974: 17). Jack Jones, leader of the largest union 
within the TUC - the TGWU - and a main architect of the Social Contract, described the agree-
ment as follows: 
"A government which is prepared to tackle the problem of prices in the shops, rents and housing 
costs and put up pensions, will certainly get the co-operation of the trade union movement and 
there will be moderation" (citation taken from Jenkins 1987: 16).2 
1) The Social Contract also called on the Labour Party to abolish the Industrial Relations Act. 
The legislation had been introduced by the Tory Government under Prime Minister Edward Heath 
in 1971. The act reflected the legal reading of the Donovan Report (1968). In 1965 the Labour 
Government had asked a Royal Commission (the so- called Donovan Commission) to investigate 
the prospects of reforming industrial relations in Britain, in particular the activities of the shop stew-
ards. Numerous recommendations of the Commission later shaped an industrial relations bill (In 
Place of Strife) which the Labour Government sought to implement. However, after fierce rejection 
from the TUC, the legislation had to be repealed. The core conclusion of the Donovan Report, and 
the central objective of the Industrial Relations Act, consisted in a primarily state- induced restruc-
turing of industrial relations (cf. Streeck 1978: 107ff.). Soon after the change of government in 
1974 the legislation was abolished. 
2) As Coates (1989: 86) claims "the initial version of the 'social contract' on which the 
Labour Party won the 1974 General Election must stand as a high- water mark of trade union 
political influence in the post-war years. The unions were not the only force pushing for that 
contract inside the Labour Party, but their support was vital to its adoption, and the resulting 'width' 
of trade union influence was as impressive as it was unusual". 
145 
In practice, operating the Social Contract gradually assimilated the unions into central fields of 
decision making on economic policy. But labour confederations within the TUC also had good 
reason to be wary of a direct involvement in politics in general, and a policy of voluntary wage 
restraint in particular. First, union influence in the political arena opens the door to governmental 
intervention in matters affecting the evolution of trade union policies. Earlier intervention had left a 
sour taste: negotiations on pay determination had been restricted by the legal incomes policy of the 
Conservative Heath Government in November 1972. Repeatedly, rank-and-file unionists had 
demanded a return to free, unrestricted collective bargaining. 
Most importantly, however, none of the labour actors involved could ensure that their own 
commitment would be honoured by other unions, and in particular by the shop stewards. Such 
uncertainty is endemic in a fragmented and competitive system of industrial relations where distribu-
tional conflicts are primarily decided in decentralised bargaining arrangements. The uncertainty is 
exacerbated where national unions, like in Britain, lack enforcement resources to control the 
behaviour of their rank-and-me. In sum, TUC support for the Labour Government under Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson, which had taken office in March 1974 with a policy commitment to wage 
restraint, did not elicit unanimous approval within the union subdivisions. 
The first wage demands voiced during the bargaining rounds in early 1974 quickly illustrated 
the magnitude and the futility of the task. In point of fact, the unions, shop stewards and employees 
expected feasible wage increases because of the changed political environment. The striking miners, 
who had con~buted decisively to the Heath Government calling a general election, wrung out of 
the National Coal Board a 22 percent wage increase. Even the government's pay settlements in the 
public sector reached staggering levels: civil servants' wages increased by a third and manual gas 
workers negotiated a 34 percent pay rise. 
The NUM lead-off was like a lightening conductor: a 'free-for all' ensued which catapulted 
upwards the wage-price spiral. This worrisome process was additionally fuelled by a legacy of the 
former Heath Administration. In November 1973 stage three of the state- regulated incomes policy 
had come into effect. So-called threshold agreements incorporated into the policy ordained that 
whenever the inflation rate increased by one percent wages would rise equivalently. These agree-
ments became a fast- triggering· form of wage indexation and the impact of higher oil price was 
compounded by large increases in nominal wages (cf. OECD 1988: 66). 
Given this failure of a co-determined incomes policy between the Labour Government and·the 
TUC during 1974- 75, it came as a surprise that 1975 saw a second attempt to integrate the 
affiliated unions into a national system of wage determination. Moreover, against the odds, the 
attempt was widely successful! Two factors mainly explain this turnaround: the person of J. Jones, a 
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long -established and respected figure in the British labour movement (see Scharprs 1991: 77 
description); and the nature of the refmed approach which he proposed. Concerning the former, the 
TGWU -leader 
"was persuaded of the need for the TUC to embark on a new initiative. Fearing the consequences 
for international competitiveness and unemployment if no action was taken, and deeply concerned to 
keep the Labour Party in power, Jones proposed in May 1975 that pay increases for the 1975 round 
be limited to a flat-rate figure" (cf. Boston 1985: 77). 
Jones' proposition had a twin interest: (i) to bring inflation, which was reaching Latin American 
dimensions, down to reasonable levels, (ii) and to prioritise distributional effects towards lower 
income groups via solidaristic wage moderation. The first objective was seen to be economically 
decisive, therefore being urgently welcomed by the inflation-rid9en Wilson Government. Likewise, 
lone's flat-rate wage strategy was a refmement of the Social Contract and found instant approval 
with those TUC unions which predominantly organised low- paid employees in the public and 
private sectors. Flat-rate incomes policies of six pounds a week for one year (starting in July 
1975) as Jones' proposed implied average gains of 10 percent for qualified employees, while lower 
income groups would benefit by 20 percent and more. Hence, existing wage differentials were 
partly reduced. As Scharpf (1987: 107) concluded, "during the first year of incomes policy, in 
particular women ... reached the goal of wage equation." 
Tab. 1: Inflation, wages (changes in percent compared to the previous year) and unemployment 
(in percem of the labour fon:e) in Brilain 1974-1979 
year Inflation Weekly- Real standard unemploJ-
• I 2 
mcome wage wage ment 
1974 16.1 17.8 1.5 19.7 2.5 
1975 24.2 26.5 1.9 29.5 3.9 
1976 16.5 15.8 -0.6 19.3 5.4 
1977 15.8 10.2 -4.8 6.6 5.7 
1978 8.2 14.4 5.7 14.1 5.6 
1979 12.2 15.6 3.0 14.7 5.2 
1. All industries and services. 
2. Employees in manufacturing (without seasonal adjustment). 
On the basis of weekly income. 
3. Seasonally adjusted, including school leavers. 
Sources: Central Statistical Office (1987: 114), Department of Employment Gazette (1980a: 
701), OECD: Historical Statistics 1960-1986. 
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As Tab. 1 demonstrates, between 1976 and 1978 real wage increases fell below the rate of price 
inflation.3 Politically this entailed that defection of individual unions from the wage guidelines was 
prevented. This interpretation is supported by the large majorities in favour of a coordinated wage 
policy which the TUC General Council and the TUC Conference of 1976 proposed (cf. TUC 1976: 
341-379). In addition, opinion polls reflected widespread public approval (cf. Sunday Times 
11.04.1976). Even the shop stewards - otherwise the most vigorous opponents of interference into 
wage determination - held ranks. 
The poor shape of the labour market was an additional spur to union support for wage modera-
tion. Between 1973 and 1977 unemployment increased from 500.000 to 1.6 million. Besides, policy 
makers and union leaders had nothing favourable to expect from three other options: (i) to over-
come the recession with the power of economic growth alone, (ii) demographic trends in the labour 
market and (iii) the disproportional growth of long-term unemployment during the second half of 
the seventies. 
The state of the economy in Britain from 1974 onwards frustated the assumption that growth 
rates would be capable to single-handedly fuel a turnaround of the employment crisis. Structural 
changes in the labour market also gave a rather disturbing outlook. The number of people seeking 
entry to the labour market continued to grow· throughout the seventies. Whereas 620.000 school 
leavers were registered in Britain in 196 7, the annual cohort reached 750.000 a decade later and 
was expected to rise above 800.000 by 1979/80. In addition, the number of unemployed without a 
job for more\ then a year had increased to over 25 percent of the total by 1978 (cf. Department of 
Employment Gazette 1979: 1179). What the compiled data suggested, and what policy makers as 
well as collective bargaining actors gradually had to come to terms with, was that the employment 
crisis displayed structural characteristics which would not be overcome by the established assortment 
of policy tools. It is within this context, an extraordinary combination of pressing problems, that the 
acceptance of wage moderation at all organisational levels of the British union system constituted a 
unique situation. As Boston (1985: 79) analysed, 
"there were strong moral pressures on trade union leaders and members to sacrifice their immediate 
wants and demands in the national interest, and equally strong pressures for them to abide by natio-
nally agreed policies. Such pressures were magnified in this instance by the realisation that, unless 
they pursued a cooperative approach, the future of the Labour Government could be imperilled." 
3) However, if the issue is manufacturing wages, then real wage increases only fell below the 
rate of price inflation for one year, namely in 1977. 
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Yet, the conditions for the government-labour consensus were short lived. In part, this derived 
from domestic problems and on the other hand from outside institutions which forced Britain to 
improve its books. The governm'ent quickly found itself out of favour with major OECD trading 
partners and increasingly encountered resource problems in sustaining its economic trajectory. The 
Labour Government had reacted to the repercussions of the oil crisis in a different way from the 
Germans and the Japanese. Instead of cutting expenditure to take account of the massive oil price 
increase in 1973/74, the Chancellor of the Exchequer decided to maintain public expenditure and 
borrow to meet growing budget deficits (cf. Barnett 1982: 23). 
Amidst growing pressure from the IMF and the loss of its majority in Parliament, which entailed 
dependency on minority party support, economic policy under the new Labour Prime Minister 
James Callaghan 4 underwent a dramatic U- Turn. Following the so- called 'sterling crisis' in 1976 
the Labour Government had to seek a standby agreement with the IMF. The deflationary measures 
which followed entailed large cuts in public expenditure and tight monetary control. Whereas the 
reorientation of the operational guidelines of macro-economic policy making were not triggered-
off by the IMF negotiations, "the discipline of the IMF was deemed useful for the implementation 
of socially and politically contentious policies like those decided upon in 1976" (cf. OECD 1988: 
71). 
The changed course of policy priorities entailed a major shift from the defence of employment 
to the stabilisation of the exchange rate and the reduction of inflation. Accordingly, the U- Turn 
implied a farewell to core elements of post-war economic policy-making in Britain. With 
inflation, at the expense of unemployment, capturing centre stage, Keynesianism and the maintenan-
ce of full-employment were weakened if not severed. Incomes policy became the indispensible 
supplement to expenditure cuts in order to fight inflation, while the government was unable to 
prevent unemployment from rising inexorably. Callaghan's move away from Keynesianism and the 
adoption of a limited range of monetarism as the basis of economic strategy set up a scenario for 
government-union relations which was unprecedented in the post-war evolution of British politics. 
4) In spring of 1976 Wilson resigned. He was replaced by the former Secretary of State, J. 
Callaghan. Minority party support depended on the Liberal Party. 
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The Failure of Coordinated Incomes Policy 
In the British context, coordinated incomes policies had a key weakness - they were only legiti-
mate and applicable as a temporary instrument of crisis management. When they are sought to be 
kept in place as a regular policy instrument during a labour market crisis they increasingly become 
subject to adaptation tensions between the government and union leaders (cf. Boston 1985: 80). In 
situations of intensified politico-economic urgency like in 1976, wage moderation could be imple-
mented because the strategy appeared reasonable with regard to its temporal limitation. 
The longer voluntary wage restraint is to stay in effect, the more demands for modifications and 
criticism of asymmetrical pay-offs are voiced by individual actors involved in the trade-off 
constellation. In these cases, the challenges often derive from a central aspect of incomes policy: 
collective wage sacrifices draw attention to wage differentials. In other words, they aim the spotlight 
on what manual as against non-manual, skilled as against non-skilled, older compared to younger 
groups of employees earn, as well as how men and women are paid. Besides, wage restraint 
triggers-off debate over the issue of who contributed with what degree of sacrifice to the success 
or failure of coordinated incomes policies, while others were fortunate enough to take a 'free ride'. 
The issue is most likely to re-surface on the agenda of labour relations when macro- economic 
\ 
indicators suggest better economic prospects, and when this turnaround is being attributed - at 
least in the perception of some collective actors - to the positive effects of wage moderation. 
Precisely this conjunction of circumstances prevailed in 1977- 78. By the Summer of 1977 
nominal wages increased on an average 14 percent while price inflation slowed down to 13 percent, 
and dropped to a single digit in 1978. By contrast, real earnings decreased in two successive years. 
Income declines of the order of -0.6 percent in 1976 and -4.8 in 1977 were not only hard to 
accept for many employees, but also unprecedented, especially while a Labour Government was 
holding office (cf. Department of Employment Gazette 1980: 701). Furthermore, union leaders' and 
shop stewards' support for incomes policy began to wane considerably in the face of unaccompli-
shed commitments from the government. 
When the time came for a stock-taking of the Social Contract the union side argued that.the 
quid pro quo for wage restraint had not been delivered by the Callaghan Government. Emphasising 
their own sacrifices and concessions5, union leaders perceived the macro-economic pay-offs as 
unsatisfactory. With unemployment figures remaining well above the one million threshold, the 
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underachievement in the field of labour market policies was pronounced. In addition, severe public 
spending cuts followed the consolidation measures worked out with the IMF. 
In light of this disillusioning assessment, union congresses voted in 1977 against a continuation 
of unilateral wage moderation. Likewise, the annual TUC Conference passed a motion which 
stipulated that the upcoming pay round would be one of unfettered collective bargaining. But the 
government proved uncooperative and sought to further trade tangible wage gains for concessions in 
macro-economic policy making. As Callaghan remarked: "I say to those who are calling for a 
return this year to free collective bargaining that in my view that would be a return, to free collec-
tive chaos" (cf. Jenkins 1987: 20, my italics.). 
The beginning of the end of wage moderation took place in the public sector. Parallel to a strike 
by lorry drivers, industrial action started at the Ford Motor Company in September 1978. The 
agreement reached two months later included a 17 percent wage increase. The pay settlement 
provided the 'take-orr for similar claims in the private sector. As Boston (1985: 82) claims, the 
effect of the settlement was that "from this point onwards everything went against the govern-
ment". TUC unions answered the symbolic question posed in 1974 by the former Primer Minister 
E. Heath "Who rules Britain?" in their own way: waves of industrial action over pay bargaining 
shook the country initiating what came to be termed the Winter of Discontent. 
But the working class militancy proved to be a double-edged sword. As much as it suggested 
that the Labour Government was running out of capacity to influence union wage demands, the 
union leaders were also encountering legitimation problems. The breakup of the Social Contract had 
a specific intra -organisational hue, reflecting both (i) the internal weakness or' the TUC vis-'-vis 
its affiliated unions, and (ii) that union leaders could no longer honour their commitment in the face 
of growing resentment on the shopfloor. The first refers in particular to the institutional complex of 
unionism in Britain. The TUC lacks the resources to enforce decisions on individual unions, in 
particular large unions like the TGWU. Furthermore, the confederation has a limited influence over 
sanctions like industrial action and non- cooperation with the implementation of government poli-
cies, which are both controlled by the individual unions (cf. Marsh 1992: 34). 
5) How far apart political and union perceptions were on the· issue is best illustrated by the 
interpretation of J. Barnett, former Chief Secretary to the Treasury. As he recalls, "to my mind the 
only give and take in the contract was that the government gave and the unions took" (cf. Barnett 
1982: 49). 
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Besides, it has to be borne in mind that the dominance of enterprise-level bargaining, and the 
power position held by shop stewards therein, had been interfered with by the Social Contract. 
Thus, the regulatory competence of shop stewards on pay structures with management was circum-
scribed by the principles of centralised incomes policy. If the shop stewards are repeatedly stripped 
of this fundamental competence, then the alternative is either to re-establish the principle of free 
collective bargaining, or to remove power resources and established customs from the firm level 
bargaining system. In effect, the intra-organisational conflicts which the TUC faced when trying to 
continue implementing the Social Contract demonstrated the relatively weak influence of the national 
union leadership upon its various constituents. As Hall (1986: 83) observed, 
"the Trades .Union Congress had just enough authority over its member unions to persuade them to 
accept a period of restraint in the face of a serious economic crisis. However, it did not have 
enough control over the rank -and- me to prevent serious challenges from eroding the policy 
within a year or two. A powerful layer of shop stewards ... and the presence of competing unions 
gave the individual unions more incentives and power to break from the policy so as to protect 
wage differentials." 
The refusal of the union rank -and- file to continue supporting coordinated incomes policies shines 
a bright light on the institutional constraints of distributional policies within the British system of 
industrial relations. Incomes policy and repeated wage discipline of the shop stewards are not only 
central preconditions for work sharing strategies but also entail addressing major properties of 
British industrlat relations. But to do so, statutory action would have to be forthcoming. However, 
such legislation was not feasible anymore since the Labour Government had abolished the Industrial 
Relations Act in 1974. 
Thus, instead of integrating the unions into a national system of wage determination, the pay 
revolt during tbe Winter of Discontent contributed to the organisational disintegration of the TUC at 
the national level, and the return to the previous format of wage bargaining at the local level. Shop 
stewards not only waged a series of strikes which increasingly eroded the authority of the state, but 
also enlarged tbeir power position over wage determination at the expense of hapless national union 
leaders. The industrial militancy shattered the feasibility of the national incomes policy and manifes-
ted the considerable veto power which the union rank -and - flle could bring to bear. Yet, such 
militancy seriously put the credibility of the Labour Government into question and strengthened the 
determination of the Conservative Party in opposition to seek a new focus in industrial relatiens 
policy. 
( 1 
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The Change of Government in 1979 
Following the May 1979 General Elections, the political and institutional geography of Britain was 
thoroughly reshaped by what henceforth came to be labelled the Thatcher factor. With the new 
Conservative Prime Minister - Margaret Thatcher - came 'conviction politics', and the unions 
were among the fi.I'St to experience what this implied. According to her political conviction free 
collective bargaining between the two sides of industry was completely acceptable. However, there 
was a distinct sting in its tail. With unemployment rising to over 12 percent, the government 
attributed it to excessive pay settlements. Thus, by tolerating a rising level of unemployment the go-
vernment's new approach was used to discipline the unions and shop stewards. In the wording of 
Sir Geoffrey Howe, the fli'St Chancellor of the Exchequer in Thatcher's cabinet, 
"if workers and their representatives take pay decisions, which are unwise because they seek too 
much, they will flnd they have crippled their employers and gravely harmed themselves by destroy-
ing their own jobs" (cf. Holmes 1985: 98). 
Seen from this perspective, rising unemployment and increasing inflation were the result of union 
policies that ignored macro-economic realities and enterprise level requirements. Under the 
conditions of a tight monetary environment which the Thatcher Government introduced in 1980, 
unions' 'irresponsible' wage policies would price their rank-and-ftle out of existing jobs. Hence, 
economic policies which focused on rigid targets for monetary growth and maintained a low public 
sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) provided ample opportunities for indirect action against the 
unions. In addition, Thatcher's resolve includ,ed a flllD repudiation of any kind of governmental 
commitment to bargain with the unions. As she noted with regard to the Social Contract: "No 
Government should bind itself by an agreement with a minority sectoral interest so as to lose its 
freedom of action on matters affecting all the people of the country" (cf. Kahn 1985: 27). In short, 
labour organisations had to come to terms with the 'factum bruttum' that the Thatcher Government 
was unequivocally renouncing the post- war Keynesian compromise between welfare state provi-
sions, full employment policies and the incorporation of unions in both the industrial and political 
arenas. 
During its fli'St year in offlce, the Conservative Government did not intervene directly into the 
industrial relations system. Rather, recasting the parametres of economic policy- making assumed 
centre stage in 1979-80, and "union reform was no more than an adjunct to monetary policy" (cf. 
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Marsh 1992: 65). The government placed its faith in the disciplinary effect of rising inflation rates 
and increasing unemployment. Between 1979 and 1981 unemployment doubled from 1.18 to 2.29 
million. 
The need to "solve the union problem as the key to Britain's recovery"6 was flrst exhibited in 
various nationalised sectors and then after a Cabinet reshuffle in September 1981.7 Following a 
severe industrial dispute against mass redundancies and for wage increases, the ISTC had to give in 
to real wage cuts and so-called reorganisation schemes. In 1981 an extended strike of the general 
civil service unions followed, and in 1982 the NUR as well as employees in the National Health 
Service organised protracted walk-outs. However, in each case the strikes failed, while Thatcher's 
conviction politics increasingly demonstrated that the unions were being isolated in the political and 
industrial arena. 
While the Labour Government and the TUC had agreed during the Social Contract that income 
differentials were to be narrowed, the neo -liberal policy prerogatives renounced coordinated wage 
policies, refuted union participation in governmental decision making and stipulated the notion that 
income disparities should reflect individual effort. The most noticeable distributional change concer-
ned the government's negligence of continuously rising mass-unemployment at the beginning of 
the eighties. Besides, the jobless encountered various restrictions concerning the duration, scope and 
availability of unemployment benefits (for more details see Hepple 1987: 280). 
In legis~tive terms, redressing the balance of bargaining power in both the industrial and 
political arenas was concentrated on the (i) relationship between union members and the organisatio-
nal leadership as well as (ii) the unions' negotiation resources vis-' -vis employers' associations. 
In order to resolve the problem of compliance with the policy the legislation was introduced in 
stages and the emphasis focused on its enforcability (cf. Tebbit 1988: 184). With the Employment 
Acts of 1980 and 1982, the Trade Union Act of 1984, the 1988 Employment Act and the 1990 
Employment Act, the government's legislation focused on six areas: (i) outlawing secondary picke-
ting, (ii) removing the blanket immunity enjoyed by unions, (ill) narrowing the defmition of a 
legitimate trade dispute, (iv) gradually removing the legal basis of the closed shop, (v) requiring 
6) Title of a pamphlet by Sir Keith Joseph, published in the run- up to the General Elections 
in 1979. 
7) Norman Tebbit succeeded Jim Prior as Employment Secretary. His appointment was general-
ly considered as a statement of intent towards the unions: to assert government authority in industri-
al relations and introduce new legislation. 
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unions to hold secret ballots for the election of officers and industrial action, (vi) extending indivi-
dual unionists' rights vis-a-vis their unions, for instance when refusing to go on strike or when 
crossing picket lines. 
The step-by-step transformations had a cumulative effect. Recasting British industrial relations 
mainly affected intra-associational procedures of consensus formation and membership require-
ments. In this regard, the legal balance between unions and employers was considerably altered. In 
addition, the government's intervention rested on a twin interest: making the unions' capacity for 
action more predictable, and linking industrial relations to the macro-economic priorities of the 
political system. While the former directly affected intra- union mobilisation patterns and bargaining 
procedures, the latter objective advanced the "democratisation" of labour organisations (cf. Clark 
1985: 163ff.). Giving the membership a greater say in unions' policy formulation thus stipulated 
stronger rank-and- file participation rights and aimed at enhancing intra-organisational policy 
moderation. 
Having outlined the macro-economic policy changes and the phased transformation of the industri-
al relations system, we shall now turn to the issue- building process of working time policies as it 
evolved from the mid-seventies onwards. As shall be illustrated, the union claim for an hours' 
reduction did not gain any ground under the last Labour Government. The work sharing demand 
only gathered momentum when the institutional and politico-economic environment was undergo-
ing significant transformations. But these alterations chiefly saw employees, shop stewards and 
unions as the losers of the changed rules of the game. Not only did the Thatcher Government reject 
any forms of cooperation with the labour organisations in the field of work sharing, but it also 
unequivocally renounced the commitment to full-employment policies. Under conditions such as 
these, introducing work sharing as a redistributive objective implied major challenges and con-
straints amidst a limited range of strategic choices. 
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3. Agenda Setting of Working Time Policy 
The Take-off in 1977 
The objective of reducing standard weekly working hours had been on the shopping list of TUC 
unions since 1972. At its annual Conference of that year the claim included a working week of 35 
hours in all industrial sectors with the long -term objective of a 32-hour week. Such shorter hours 
objectives were supplemented by the goal of a four week holiday, as well as early retirement 
schemes (cf. TUC 1972: 554). Such a mix of working time demands illustrated that no clear 
priority existed. The shopping list included something for everyone: more leisure time for the 
young, longer holidays for families and improved retirement schemes for elder employees. In 
general, the working time demands focused on quality of life aspects. Thus, the objective of work 
sharing had no significance during the initial phase of the issue- building process. But neither did 
the demands as such gain any ground within the industrial arena. Only from 1977 onwards was the 
35- hour week turned from a slogan into a strategy. 
Once the Callaghan Government had changed direction in 1976/77, the TUC could no longer 
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expect that public sector expenditure, for instance in order to implement job creation schemes, 
would compensate for the rising tide of unemployment: With the labour market situation showing no 
signs of an upturn during 1977- 1979, while the macro- economic policy options of the Labour 
Government were constrained by the conditional loan of the IMF, the TUC unions faced a critical 
conjuncture: unions themselves had to provide innovative approaches which would be capable of 
confronting unemployment. The search for alternatives included 
"a phased transition to the 35-hour week (which) could have a larger effect in reducing the 
present mass unemployment and avoiding long period unemployment than any other measure or 
combination of economic measures that has been proposed in Britain. Depending on the bargaining 
approach adopted, this might be largely achieved within two to three years ... there could not be a 
better time to go over to the 35 -hour week" ( cf. TUR U 1977: 1 - 2, my italics). 
The clarion call of the TURU research institute, which was closely associated with the TUC, was 
warmly appreciated by the leader of the TGWU, J. Jones. Accordingly, during the London Confe-
rence of the ETUC in 1977, Jones called for a ten percent reduction of working time on the basis 
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of a coordinated international approach (cf. Evans 1979). But European level demands did not 
receive the same degree of support at domestic union conferences. At its 1977 Congress the rue 
vigorously debated a return to free collective bargaining and urged the Callaghan Government to 
initiate a reflation programme in order to confront industrial decline and rising unemployment. Only 
ranking sixth on the list of policy priorities, the motion carried the following demand: 
"In accordance with the objectives of the EruC, Congress calls on the affiliated unions to give 
priority to an early reduction of the working week to 35 hours without loss of pay. In addition, 
curbing overtime is to be reached wherever it seems practical, and where extra hours are introduced 
as an alternative to job creation" (cf. TUC 1977: 588, my italics). 
The ranking and content of the resolution demonstrated that a policy of working time reduction 
faced reservations within the unions. In addition, possible work sharing objectives rather focused on 
provisions monitoring the curtailment of overtime. While the 35-hour week target was not in 
principle rejected, the rue resolution lacked commitment from the individual unions. As Len 
Murray, the rue General Secretary told the 1977 Congress: 
"To go in the direction of a reduced working week has social and economic priority. However, it is 
not the principal answer to economic stagnation because while the economy stays stagnant work 
sharing would be of little real benefit to our members. But if we bring growth back to our econo-
my, then the increase of the production potential of our industry through new technology can be 
linked with a reduction of the working week, additional employment and the improvement in the 
standard of living" (cf. ibid.: 458, my italics). 
Murray's line of argumentation not only illustrates a certain caution and moderation as regards work 
sharing effects, but also "that Congress House was putting forward employer arguments" (cf. Taylor 
1978: 453).8 In addition, his statement reflected the sustained attachment of the TUC to the Keynes-
ian logic of economic policy making. Together with the rue's demand for a government sponsored 
reflation programme, Murray's accent on economic growth targets showed no acknowledgement that 
the Keynesian option of deficit spending had been unequivocally ruled out by Callaghan since 1976. 
Accordingly, work sharing proposals were of but secondary importance on the ruc•s shopping list. 
The measure was considered as a bargaining supplement, while the rue expected to get the most 
mileage out of a combination of economic growth, technological innovation and the increase of 
production potentials. 
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The defensive nature of the TUC's formulation of working time demands was congruent with 
the existence of differentials in the working time standards of union members. This central charac-
teristic in British collective bargaining made it necessary for the TUC- General Council to avoid 
the formulation of a specific working time target: 
"Given that different groups of workpeople have different normal working hours at present, it 
would be wrong for the General Council to express an unambiguous target for 1978/79 for all 
groups. The TUC's objective is for a 35-hour week but certain groups may have to consider a 
phased reduction towards this target" (cf. ibid., my italics). 
If the TUC's position was reserved, if not sceptical, then the Labour Government's view of work 
sharing was even more cautious. The administration's White Paper in 1978 provided little encoura-
gement for those seeking to spread the idea of work sharing .. Rather, the document argued that a 
shorter working week could not involve a rise in net unit costs of more than five per cent. In 
addition, the reduction would have to be offset against the yearly pay rise figure foreseen within the 
framework of the incomes policy. So the Callaghan Government tried to lay down principles to 
which any collective bargaining unit would have to adhere while the Social Contract was in existen-
ce. As the government pointed out, its position on work sharing would have been more promising, 
"if all our major international competitors implemented an equivalent reduction at the same time". 
This not being the case, work sharing "does not compare favourably with the special employment 
measures no~ being operated by the government ... these approaches carry high risks of upsetting the 
major objectives of controlling inflation and maximising the rate of recovery" (cf. Department of 
Employment Gazette 1978: 401-402). 
Considering the responses of both the Labour Government and the TUC, the work sharing 
objective seemed unlikely to have a major impact as an innovative weapon to counter the labour 
market difficulties. While the government was first and foremost concerned with curbing inflation 
and holding the line on future pay policies, the TUC clung to solutions from the increasingly out of 
vogue Keynesian paradigm. So, the Labour Government was politically unwilling and economically 
unable to further consider measures advocated and expected by the TUC. 
8) The 1978 TUC Economic Review acknowledged that an hours cut would result in a "sub-
stantial" increase of unit labour costs for the employers. Unless the move was phased and Britain's 
competitors went along with it, "it will damage the country's export competitiveness" (cf. TUC 
1978: 453). 
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The TGWU was the first union to cast doubt on the coordinated incomes policy in 1978. During 
its annual Congress in that year, the most emphatic supporter of the Social Contract - J. Jones9 -
had to acknowledge that further wage moderation lacked intra- union approval. The symbolic 
importance and political implications of this admission were promptly registered by the other 
TUC-unions. One after the other, the union Congresses passed motions which renounced the 
Social Contract, and called for a return to free collective bargaining. 
While the TUC-unions were refuting the burden of self- obligation in coordinated incomes 
policies, they were nevertheless willing to put on record their self-moderation in the field of 
working time reduction. Within this scenario, cost- neutral and phased working time innovations 
found inter- and intra- union consent. After four years of incomes policy, the unions first sought to 
recapture their autonomy of action in pay determination. But in the same breath, they were willing 
to compromise with the Labour Government and the employers as regards the settlement of working 
time agreements. 
Such a bargaining approach was pursued in the breakthrough settlement in the engineering 
industry in 1979. However, the engineering unions faced a new, quite different, government. With 
M. Thatcher holding office in 10 Downing Street, a Conservative Government began to confront 
the dismal consequences of the Winter of Discontent. Their guiding belief was that established and 
consensual relations with unions were unnecessary. Given the pace- setting nature of the engineer-
ing agreement we shall focus our analysis on the making and content of this hours settlement. The 
usefulness for the present study is further underscored by the manner in which the engineering 
agreement was arrived at. Extended negotiations and prolonged industrial action amidst a new 
political context put to the test employers' solidarity to refuse, and union determination to win a 
reduction of basic working hours. 
9) The TGWU -Congress was dominated by the resignation of Jones, who wished to retire. It 
was, nevertheless, noteworthy that the charismatic union leader stepped down while the TGWU-
delegates rejected the prolongation of a policy .that had carried his signature. 
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The Breakthrough Agreement in the Engineering Industry 
After the EEF and the CSEU10 agreed to a national contract in 1979 which provided for the intro-
duction of the 39-hour week by 1981, the TUC Campaign for Reduced Working Time gained 
momentum. While the industrial relations actors had waited for a branch to make the first step, the 
take- off in the engineering industry and the subsequent dynamic spreading to other sectors and 
groups of employees propelled shorter hours to the forefront of British labour market policies. 
But the breakthrough in the engineering sector also gained significance for other reasons. Next 
to the contents of the contract, the manner in which the compromise was reached was noteworthy. 
Prolonged industrial action lasting over ten weeks was necessary until both sides finally agreed to a 
new national contract. Thus, focusing on the inter- and intra- organisational consensus problems 
during the conflict is sociologically fruitful for two reasons: First, a manifest preference for the 
CSEU- working time claims was not the prime reason for the rank-and- me support for the 
strike. Rather, the union leadership was able to mobilise the shop stewards, and these again the 
rank -and- me on grounds of and appeals to union loyalty in a prolonged industrial struggle. This 
form of organisational patriotism labelled - "my union, first and last" - accounts for the second 
aspect of our elaboration: the engineering employers profoundly underestimated the inner- union 
solidarity resources and its ability to mobilise rank-and-me support. In effect, it was the employ-
ers' solidarity\ which crumbled fll'St. 
Working Time Interests of the Employers 
Advocating employer unity and categorically rejecting firm level agreements on working time 
reduction was both the strategic priority of the CBI11 as well as its core dilemma. This becomes 
comprehensible in the light of certain structural features of British employers' associations. In 1979 
over 190 registered employers associations existed in Britain (cf. Certification Office 1979: 4). The 
10) The CSEU is a national confederation of 11 engineering unions which annually negotiate 
with the EEF on pay and working conditions. These primarily cover national minimum pay rates, 
overtime compensation, shift premiums and holiday entitlements. 
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quantity and heterogeneity of employers' organisations leads to an extensive pluralism of interest 
representation which in turn contributes to complex and divergent collective bargaining strategies on 
the employers' side. Thus, overcoming both associational heterogeneity and fragmentation while 
establishing a uniform body of interest representation marks the central challenge and the core 
constraint of British employers. This objective was reflected in a policy statement issued by the for-
mer CBI-President, Sir John Hedly-Greenborough: 
"employers must find ways of working together for greater solidarity, so that they are not picked 
off one by one. This is one of the major themes on which we in the CBI will be working" (cf. CBI 
1978: 3). 
Furthermore, the CBI embraces members from both the private and nationalised industries. With the 
latter receiving full membership status in 1969, the CBI explicitly acknowledged a fait accompli of 
the British post-war economy: the existence of a large nationalised sector, and thus of a mixed 
economy. In terms of policy approaches the integration of members from the nationalised sector 
repeatedly contributed to major intra-associational consensus problems. By their very nature, the 
nationalised industries "tended to adopt a more corporatist, social democratic standpoint on issues 
such as industrial relations" (cf. Leys 1985: 14). In contrast, the members from the private sector, 
who outnumber those from the nationalised industries, advocated a more intransigent position 
against unions. 
The CBI's policy guidelines on working time reduction can be understood in the context of 
achieving intra- associational solidarity. Employers' intransigence towards union claims for shorter 
hours was to serve as a test-case for organisational unity. In the face of growing union pressure to 
put working time reduction on the agenda of collective bargaining rounds, the central organisation 
of the British employers submitted policy guidelines in 1978 which unequivocally rejected the union 
claim: 
"The CBI is strongly opposed to any reduction in normal working hours at the present time .. .It is 
essential that all employers stand f"rrm on this issue ... Working hours are most usually the subject of 
national and not company negotiations; claims for reductions in hours submitted locally must be 
resisted" (cf. CBI-Guidance on Stage Four. Citation taken from TURU 1978: 1, my italics). 
11) 1965 proved to be a turning point in the associational history of the British employers. The 
British Employers Confederation, the Federation of British Industries and the National Association 
of British Manufacturers merged into the CBI (cf. Grant 1983: 69ff.). 
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Yet, the frrst major opportunity to put employers' solidarity to the test - the engineering negotia-
tions - illustrated that the objective of rank- and- file unity was unfeasible. The core reason for 
this failure, and thus the dominal)ce of associational autonomy at the branch and firm levels, was in 
the missing collective bargaining authority of the CBI. Unlike the French CNPF and the Belgian 
FEB, the British CBI has no competence to set norms and standards in the field of collective 
bargaining. As a result, the central employers organisation is more a spokesperson of business 
interests than a collective bargaining actor. Since the CBI cannot negotiate with the unions, the 
affiliated members retain "their prerogatives as the bargaining agents of employers" (cf. Armstrong 
1984: 52). 
The CBI has sought to compensate for this limitation in associational authority by participating 
in tri-partite institutions. Its favoured arena for demonstrating associational authority and establi-
shing patterns of consultation with the TUC and the government was the NEDC. This arena for 
tri-partite consultation was founded in 1962 by the Conservative Government. The forum predo-
minantly dealt with macroeconomic policy problems and garnered substantial public attention during 
the period of the Social Contract. However, the NEDC never became an institution for the imple-
mentation of policies (cf. Hall 1986: 87). 
The national engineering agreement of October 1979 - which was regarded by all actors as the 
breakthrough on working time reduction - reinforced the limited competence of the CBI. Still, the 
limited organisational resources at the national level were compounded by constraints and impedi-
ments of the branch association to overcome managerial autonomy of decision making at the flfm 
level. The course of the negotiations and the prolonged industrial action that followed highlighted 
the fact that the engineering federation could not obligate its members on specific policy guidelines. 
In order to fully comprehend the strategy of the EEF during the national engineering strike in 
1979, it is necessary to consider the configuration of membership relations within the federation. 
Membership status of individual flfms in the engineering industry is flfSt established on a regional 
basis, within the so-called Employers' Associations. These combine to a Federation, i.e. at the 
national industry level, the EEF. As Prigge (1987: 146) has shown, organisational density within the 
EEF improved consistently during the seventies. Yet, the EEF's bargaining position and its repre-
sentational strength would have· been stronger had · numerous large engineering enterprises also 
affiliated to the Federation. In particular North American multi- nationals like Ford Motor Co. and 
Vauxhall are not members of the EEF. Such companies prefer to maintain entrepreneurial indepen-
dence in their industrial relations (cf. Armstrong 1984: 57). 
Accordingly, the existence of two widely unrelated bargaining and regulatory systems renders 
certain associations and individual member flfms in an exceptional position within the EEF. This is 
r:-.· l> 1 
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most true of the automobile industry, and therein especially of Rolls Royce and British Leyland. 
The extraordinary position of the car manufacturer is reflected in two characteristics of the EEF's 
structure. For one, as the engine~ring dispute demonstrated, unions usually target a select number of 
highly symbolic sites for industrial action. By targetting the flagships of the industry, the Federation 
was prone to substantial internal pressure. On the other hand, the more authority is based at the 
company level, or located outside the EEF, the more union bodies at the firm level can eventually 
force substantial concessions from management. As a result of this particular conflict logic, the 
outcomes concerning pay and working conditions will differ considerably from the provisions 
established at the national level. The resulting erosion of associational authority was most evident in 
the field of local agreements reached independently of EEF guidelines. 
Working Time Preferences of the Employees 
The collective bargaining round between the CSEU and the EEF started in December of 1978. 
While the Winter of Discontent was entering its second month the engineering unions demanded (i) 
a reduction in the working week to 35 hours without loss of earnings, (ii) a minimum of five weeks 
of annual holidays and (iii) a new National Minimum Time Rate12 • The triptych of claims indicates 
that the engineering unions were only making one specific wage demand on the national level. With 
this self- curtailment the CSEU acknowledged that re-establishing free collective bargaining on 
pay was a competence reserved to the shop stewards. But neither rank- and- file unionists nor the 
CSEU -leadership could be sure that their social base would support the bargaining agenda. 
Taking into consideration the real wage losses and growing labour market problems yielded by 
economic development since 1975 crisis, employees were unlikely to favour longer blocks of leisure 
time. Data from the General Household Surveys between 1974 and 1976 confirmed the overall 
uncertainty of worker preferences in relation to an hours cut. However, the survey also showed that 
further income sacrifices were explicitly ruled out of the menu of options. The responses to the 
question: "Pay and hours - How satisfied are you?" underlined a growing dissatisfaction with the 
development of wages, yet revealed that workers' perceptions of the hours issue did not suggest any 
preferences for change (cf. Butler 1977: 906ff.). 
12) The National Minimum Time Rate specifies basic hourly wages in the engineering industry. 
The rate also applies for those companies who are not members of the EEF. 
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Aggravating the union campaign for reduced working time was the number of extra hours 
worked, especially by manual men in engineering. Two factors are relevant. For one, the extra 
hours compensated for wage losses as a result of the incomes policy. Additionally, in spite of the 
employment crisis, 29 percent of manual workers put in 45 hours or more during the week in 1977. 
20.2 percent of the manual workers even extended their standard weekly working time by eight 
hours or more, hence practically working a six-day week schedule (cf. TUC-Progress Report 
1979: 4). 
Given the amount of extra hours in the engineering industry it is comprehensible why the 
overtime issue was not on the agenda of the CSEU- working time demands. The inter- and 
intra- associational process of consensus formation was not to be burdened with a claim which 
would have increased the compromise costs and required additional sacrifices from the employees. 
Yet, relinquishing complementary regulation on overtime levels left a central adaptation option of 
management in the field of working time organisation untouched. 
Next to the obvious shortage of enthusiasm for working time reduction on the workers' side, the 
CSEU faced a state of unpredictability regarding the rank- and- file appetite for industrial action 
called in August 1978. How could it be otherwise: there had been no strike- ballot and the 
walk- out was simply proclaimed by the CSEU -leadership. Irrespective of the undemocratic 
procedure, the union representatives at the firm level were able to mobilise a degree of loyalty 
which the employers underestimated. Not only did they expect the engineering unions to divide in 
the course of hte strike, but the EEF also committed a strategic error during the industrial militancy 
when it sought to separate steward bodies from the national union leaders (cf. Mcintyre 1979: 26). 
In consequence, the strategy of breaking- up inter- and intra- union solidarity backfired on its 
protagonists and reinforced rank- and- file determination. The employers' intransigency and 
provocative strategy gave 
"the stewards [the feeling] that management had been totally inflexible, one saying that "I could go 
on bread and water if need be". In other words, the sense of being in a fight strengthened the 
stewards' resolve not to give way" (cf. Edwards and Scullion 1982: 60). 
Organisational patriotism and shop floor resolution to meet the employers' confrontation were 
supplemented by a distinct political instrumentalisation of the strike at the national level. As the 
walk out went into its fifth week the annual TUC Congress was staged at a crucial time. The unions 
were in the course of digesting the meaning of the Tory victory and of pondering the future direc-
tion of the country under the Thatcher Government. Given the changed political constellation, the 
engineering dispute was not only symbolic in terms of the TUC Campaign for Reduced Working 
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Time. The breakthrough at the national industry level was the fuel to give the TUC campaign the 
necessary momentum. Furthermore, the strike was seen as the first showdown with a Conservative 
Prime Minister who had relen~essly campaigned with the notion "that Labour does not work". A 
delegate of the National Union of Sheet Metal Workers expressed the political implications most 
clearly: 
"what I want to use my few moments for is to speak about the desire of workpeople to fight against 
this Government's policies, and to give as a particular example the present struggle of the engineers 
that has been waging for the past five weeks .. .! say now, let the call go out to the engineers who 
are in the middle of their struggle and need your support to lift them for the next round; let the call 
go out to all workers who will be engaged in the struggle in the months ahead: swnmon up the 
blood, stiffen the nostrils, let the Tories come from the four corners of this country and we will 
shock them" (cf. TUC 1979: 518, my italics). 
This lengthy quotation well illustrates how the engineering strike also served political purposes. In 
the end the engineering unions demonstrated an impressive sense of unity and solidarity. Such 
resolution proved too much for the numerous employers who increasingly gave in to union demands 
at the local level, thereby signalling their willingness to reach a compromise independent of EEF 
guidelines. But the roots of employer capitulation lie outside working time issues. Rather, the longer 
the strike endured, and the more employers' intransigence helped cement union-employee loyalty, 
the greater the risk to established plant level bargaining relations. Instead of continuing to pursue a 
confrontation course managers opted for compromise because they had already invested significant 
resources in establishing a viable bargaining relationship with shop stewards, and did not want to 
jeopardise the stability of this arrangement in responding to the strike ( cf. Edwards and Scullin 
1982: 60). 
The growing number of fmn level agreements - the TUC reported 250 engineering employers 
conceding the full claim (cf. TUC 1979: 518) - had major repercussions within the EEF. For one, 
the Federation had to decide if such members would have to be expelled from the EEF. More 
important however was the glaring lack and further loss of associational authority during the natio-
nal bargaining rounds. With bargaining arrangements such as these the national engineering contract 
which was fmally signed in October 1979 only provided an orientation framework. While the 
reduction to 39 hours was established as the new common standard, individual firms were free to 
introduce larger hours cuts. As a concession to the employers and mindful of the regulatory compe-
tence of the shop stewards the CSEU agreed to introduce the hours reduction from 1981 onwards. 
Hence, company actors were given a two year leverage for industrial reorganisation along the lines 
of efficiency bargaining. Finally, the duration of the contract guaranteed that further claims concer-
ning working time reduction could only again be put on the agenda in 1982. 
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4. Outcomes of the Campaign for Reduced Working Time 
Characterisation of the Agreements 
Where national industry and/or fmn -level agreements provided for a reduction of working time 
between 1981 and 1984, the scope of the settlements was wide. At least three types were involved: 
(i) catching-up effects, i.e. lagging sectors gradually introducing working time reduction, (ii) the 
harmonisation factor, i.e. the objective to reduce working time differentials, (iii) pace-setters in 
working time reduction. The classification illustrates that in the wake of the breakthrough in the 
engineering industry very different repercussions energies unfolded. 13 
Tab. 2: Changes in staodard weekly working time for employees in manufactming between 1978 
and 1987 
Year Workers in 1.00d 
1978 127 
1979 \ 35 
1980 489 
1981 3,230 
1982 1,949 
1983 1,614 
1984 1,024 
1985 149 
1986 147 
1987 110 
1. Number of workers affected. 
2. Average weekly working time reduction in hours. 
Source: Department of Employment Gazette 1987: 132. 
Average weekly WTR. 2 
2.5 
5.3 
1.2 
1.0 
1.1 
1.1 
1.0 
1.0 
0.8 
1.5 
13) For the various company examples see the settlement register of the Pay and Benefits 
Bulletin databank regularly published by the m-RR between 1982 and 1984. 
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As table 2 illustrates, only following the engineering agreement did the collective bargaining process 
on working time reduction gain momentum in Britain. In terms of the scope of the cuts in standard 
working time, the hours round reached its peak between 1981 and 1984. However, more extensive 
coverage lead to smaller reductions in working time. Hence, once lagging sectors had gradually 
brought themselves into line with the general move to 39 hours, the Campaign for Reduced Wor-
king Time gradually lost impetus. 
The harmonisation of pay and conditions became a key issue, resurfacing during the hours 
round as one of the primary regulatory problems. While the move towards harmonisation received 
instant support from skilled workers, it simultaneously triggered-off cross-class tensions, especial-
ly on the part of white-collar employees and their union representatives (for instance Apex, Tass 
and ASTMS). Thus, reductions for manual workers equalled an erosion of differentials in the eyes 
of many staff employees. In response white-collar unions sought to preserve their relative position 
either through a reduction in hours, or, failing this, financial compensation. According to the 
employers' association in the chemical industry (CIA), the harmonisation issue was the prime reason 
for agreeing on working time reduction. As the CIA claimed, 
"much progress has been made in current years towards the harmonisation of the conditions of 
employment of staff and manual workers. The length of the normal working week is an area where 
for the most part a differential still exists and the reduction to a 38-hour week for manual workers 
will substantially reduce or close that gap ... However, the reduction may provoke claims from staff 
for a restoration of the differentials in terms of working hours" (cf. CIA 1982: 2). 
In practice, staff unions focused on maintaining existing differentials in working time standards 
between white and blue-collar employees-. Otherwise, substantial income concessions made by 
management to staff enabled employers to buy-out the claim for an hours cut. It was a utility 
trade- off classic: the more the individual benefits of such wage increases outnumbered advantages 
resulting from a reduction of hours, the greater was the likelihood that the reduction claim would be 
dropped, i.e. bought-off. 
In that respect, the compromise patterns spoke of a specific regulatory dilemma should a (se-
cond) hours round be put on the agenda. If unions representing manual workers called for (further) 
working time reductions, then white-collar labour organisations reacted by ciaiming parallel 
reductions in order to maintain their differentials. In effect, this competition virtually excluded any 
attempts for a second hours round. Accordingly, employers used the intra- union controversies on 
differentials as a tool against further agreements on working time reduction (cf. CIA 1982: 4). 
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In contrast to the harmonisation disputes, so- called 'big -bang' reductions of pace -setters 
closed the ranks of and between TUC unions. Pace-setter agreements played a prominent role in 
the hours debate because of their exemplary character. In order to popularise the Campaign for 
Reduced Worki.og Time the TUC repeatedly claimed in its Progress Reports that lagging sectors 
should follow the lead established by pace-setters. In other words, such 'leaders' served the 
purpose of advancing the dynamic of the campaign to other affiliated unions, sectors and groups of 
employees. 
By far the most important success of the TUC beyond the 39-hour threshold concerned the 
agreement introducing the 32.5 hour week at 'Westland Helicopters in 1984. Labelled as a "major 
breakthrough in the engineering industry", the contract provided for (i) a reduction of working time 
from 37 to 32.5 hours, (ii) those working shifts did not receive an effective reduction of hours but 
rather a week -off every five weeks, and (ill) special bonus entitlements if the employee accepted 
to work in shift systems during four years. The Westland contract was emphatically welcomed by 
the TUC General Secretary L. Murray. With regard to the emulation effects that such pace-setters 
offered, Murray stressed that 
"the agreement represents a big and welcome step forward in the campaign for shorter working 
hours which is now gathering momentum, not only in Britain, but throughout Europe" (cf. roc-
Progress Report 1984a: 2). 
~. 
The optimism accompanying the campaign in its initial phase faltered the more the 39-hour week 
became the new standard in collective bargaining. Between 1981 and 1984 pace-setters were 
portrayed as propitious examples of the successful working time policy of TUC unions. Thereafter, 
however, they were more evidence of the failure: few remaining exceptions of a campaign which 
was obviously losing momentum. As the TUC warned, "there is a danger of the trade unions failing 
to break through the 39-hour barrier. It is now clear that negotiations on weekly hours have 
slowed to a trickle" (cf. TUC-Progress Report 1987: 1, my italics). 
According to the TUC, two factors were decisive for the loss of impetus. First, a shift towards 
basic holiday improvements, and secondly a general preference shift within the workforce for taking 
reduced working time in larger blocks of leisure rather than hours off each week or minutes off 
each day (cf. TUC-Progress Report 1985: 1-2). A similar assessment of the situation was 
reached by employers' associations. The picture of few concessions was confirmed by CBI -data on 
industry level and company settlements where managers appeared to be holding the line on further 
working time reduction (cf. CBI 1988: 8). 
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As a result, the 39-hour week was increasingly becoming the new and by all sides respected, 
working time standard. By and large, then the reduction process had come to a halt after its initial 
step. Agreements surpassing the pew standard were the result of specific firm level conditions as 
well as companies acting in isolation (cf. White and Ghobadian 1984: 125). What is more, the lack 
of enthusiasm was also influenced by a major regulation dilemma in the TUC's working time 
campaign. This concerned the problem of curtailing extensive overtime levels through union action 
while shorter hours were being implemented. 
The Overtime Problem and its Consequences for the TUC Campaign for Reduced 
Working Time 
An exclusive evaluation of basic hours would disregard the effective situation and its evolution, 
precisely because overtime levels are ignored. In fact, an analysis of extra hours sheds some further 
light on the constraints of the TUC Campaign for Reduced Working Time. With the exception of 
provisions concerning the duration of working hours for youths and female employees, legal stan-
dards are non-existent in Britain. Still, the issue of and demand for legal regulation of overtime 
levels is as old as the conflict about weekly working time reduction (cf. Whybrew 1964). 
Between 1979 and 1981 the share of employees working extra hours diminished in absolute and 
proportional terms. Why? Principally, because of the recession in the manufacturing sector which 
pushed up unemployment dramatically. But from 1982 onwards overtime levels increased consistent-
ly (cf. Department of Employment Gazette 1985: S15 and ibid.: 1988: S18). However, this turn-
around cannot be attributed to the trend set by the implementation of the 39-hour week in engi-
neering. Rather, the upsurge between 1982 and 1985 is due to a growing number of firms having 
shed manpower during the recession. Such fJ.rms needed to revert to flexibility options in the Held 
of working time organisation. In other words, 
"increased overtime was linked ... to manpower reductions which formed an important aspect of 
productivity improvement ..• As existing slack was removed from manning levels, more flexibility 
was needed by management from other sources. Overtime, costly though it might be, was being 
incurred as the price to pay for tighter manning standards" (cf. White and Ghobadian 1984: 180). 
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Reverting to the overtime alternative was not rejected by the shop stewards; nor did employees 
refuse to work extra hours amidst the rising tide of unemployment. As the CIA concluded in a 
report concerning the introduction of the 38-hour week in the chemical industry, "although. 
overtime has been condemned by trade unions at national level, there are still pressures at local 
level for its continuation and even extension" (cf. CIA 1982: 1). Yet, with overtime levels increa-
sing, the credibility of the TUC campaign depended on the regulation of complementary features of 
the labour process. Next to provisions linked to the intensification of work, such measures con-
cerned the challenge of controlling the overtime variable of individual firms. As the General Secre-
tary of the engineering union Tass, B. Anderson, declared in all candour: 
"The failure of this movement to make significant advances must be the cause of great concern. 
Working hours and unemployment in Britain are now the highest in the advanced industrial 
world .. .if shorter working is introduced simply as a benefit to those in work and not directly related 
to job creation, we will be tarnished with the same guilt as those employers and those politicians 
who created unemployment in the flrst place" (cf. TUC 1987:212-213, my italics). 
But talking is easier than doing and when the issue of influencing the overtime variable of indivi-
dual flmlS was put on the agenda of British labour regulation, the collective actors faced the lacuna 
of non -existing legal provisions. This led the TUC to consider the introduction of legal provisions 
on overtime rflgulation in 1981-82 (cf. TUC 1981: 23). However, the reception from the affiliated 
unions and the shop stewards was ice-cold. For the former, political considerations were dominant. 
Since legal limits on working hours requires governmental action, TUC unions would have encou-
raged M. Thatcher to intervene with statutory regulation. In addition, the danger of a general limit 
on working time duration might have established an undesirable precedent for further legal interven-
tions into other areas of collective bargaining. 
By contrast, the shop stewards feared being stripped of a central bargaining chip in negotiations 
with management. If legal requirements provided conditions and limits of overtime, the shop 
stewards would not only loose bargaining authority, but also trade -off options with managers. The 
employers joined in the debate and simultaneously rejected legal restrictions. Taking into considera-
tion that flmlS were gradually recovering from the prolonged recession in manufacturing, the CBI 
argued that working hours and holidays were not matters on which the government should legislate. 
Any statutory imposition of a uniform working week would be considered an impediment to econo-
mic recovery. Such a legal intervention ran "counter to the tradition of voluntarism in industrial 
relations in Britain and risked alienating both employers and unions" (cf. White 1986: 18). 
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The by-partisan coalition between unions and shop stewards arguing in favour of unrestricted 
collective bargaining on the one side, and employers defending the principle of 'laissez-faire' on 
the other, forced the TUC to dr<;>p its policy proposals. The manner in which the Confederation 
withdrew the plan was nevertheless meaningful. Expecting a "future sympathetic government" (cf. 
TUC-Progress Report 1983: 1, my italics), the claim was postponed. 
Assessing Work Sharing Effects 
The position of member unions and shop stewards on overtime legislation not only marginalised the 
TUC initiative, but also hindered the realisation of any work sharing objectives. Employers mana-
ged to retain options in working time organisation and the credibility of the Campaign for Reduced 
Working Time was considerably impaired by internal union divisions. With TUC officials acknow-
ledging the shortcomings of the campaign, the prospects for work sharing became all the more 
remote. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the TUC never published an official assessment of the 
labour market effects of the introduction of the 39-hour week. However, a stock- taking of the 
various provisions including shorter hours agreements elicited the following remark from the TUC 
General Secretary L. Murray: 
"Though the TUC had never argued that reduced working time was the sole answer to unemploy-
ment, it was disappointing that so few agreements tied cuts in hours specifically to job crea-
tion ... there was a trade-off between money and jobs" (cf. TUC-Progress Report 1984b: 3, my 
italics). 
In a detailed report based on a 1982- 83 survey of frrms affected by the implementation of shorter 
hours, White and Ghobadian (1984) quantified the effects of working time reduction in establish-
ments of the engineering and construction industries. Concerning labour market outcomes, the 
authors left no doubt about their findings: "employment was not stimulated by the reduction in 
hours" (cf. White and Ghobadian 1984: 181, emphasis in the original document). Why not? -
chiefly because of the manner in which shorter working hours were put into practice at the frrm 
level. In that respect, 
"the scope for changes in manning and methods is such that the expected employment effect has 
been consistently offset and avoided. It is not only that the scope for readjustment at establishment 
level has been considerably underestimated by those who have predicted an employment effect. It is 
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also, more fundamentally, that the local level has partly different aims and priorities from the 
national level, and is controlled by decisions at national level only to a limited degree" (cf. ibid.: 
193). 
This highlights a structural feature of the British industrial relations system which proved problema-
tic for the realisation of work sharing strategies. Whereas the TUC campaign attempted to foster the 
incorporation of labour market objectives into negotiations, the individual implementation patterns 
were beyond the reach of national industry bargaining arrangements. Hence, the divergence between 
campaign and hours round. The former reflects a mobilisation process within collective bargaining 
organisations, while the latter is the result of specific organisational arrangements at the fJl'Ill level. 
On another track, the TUC faced the problem of a lack of enthusiasm from the workforce and 
other union bodies concerning further progress in reducing basic working hours. Reservations over 
the general prospects of shorter hours were mirrored in the attitudes expressed by the workforce 
regarding work sharing as a means of reducing unemployment. While unemployment remained a 
national concern, experiences in the workplace with shorter hours and the reservations expressed 
about the suitability of the strategy for solving labour market problems indicated weak support for 
further reductions. 
Tab. 3: Perceived remedies for unemployment by social class (1985 survey) 
\ Total I&II' ill Non- ill Manual IV&V2 
manual 
% Supeorting % % % % % 
Lowering 
retirement age 83 81 83 87 85 
Shortening 
working week3 25 25 24 25 25 
Job-sharing 45 49 so 31 44 
Restricting 
overtime 64 76 62 61 59 
1. Managers and professionals. 
2. Unskilled and semi-skilled workers. 
3. Including reducing earnings. 
Source: British Social Attitudes (1986: 26) 
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As the representative survey illustrated, lowering the age of retirement was the most popular 
strategy among all groups of workers. Next was the restriction of overtime. However, here some 
cleavage existed: those favouring the remedy most strongly were managers and professionals. By 
contrast, those who were most likely to work overtime, no doubt dependent on the extra pay, were 
less supportive of this strategy against unemployment. Reducing the working week aroused the 
greatest reservations of any of the strategies listed. Without any variation among the population 
subgroups, a further reduction of working hours was judged by only 25 percent of all respondents 
as the best strategy to overcome unemployment. In sum, the pattern is clear: lowering the retire-
ment age was almost universally welcomed, while a second step in favour of shorter hours was 
rejected by three-quaters of the respondents. 
To explain this we need to take into consideration how unemployment developed while shorter 
hours were being implemented. The staged implementation of the 39-hour week coincided with a 
dramatic deterioration of the British labour market, especially in manufacturing industries. Between 
1979 and 1981 the national rate of unemployment doubled (from 5.2 to 10.2) and the registered 
unemployed swelled from 1.23 to 2.42 million. By 1984 the jobless rate had reached 13 per cent, 
and manual men in particular were being touched by widespread lay-offs and fmn closures (cf. 
Central Statistical Offlce 1986: 114, 116).14 Hence, the TUC claims of benefits resulting from its 
working time campaign for workers were conterfactual. Accordingly, implementing shorter hours 
was literally drowned by the drama of the British labour market evolution. In consequence, the 
viability of work sharing via shorter hours was undoubtedly discredited. 
14) Owing to various legal revisions concerning the registration of unemployment introduced 
between 1981 and 1984, the figures reported by the Central Statistical Office vary considerably 
pending on which edition is consulted. 
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5. Towards a Second Step 
Introduction 
So far, our line of discussion has demonstrated how the 39-hour week was gradually implemented 
on an industry- wide scale after the signing of the national engineering agreement in 1979. In the 
context of this endeavour, the hours round was analysed according to three indicators: (i) the 
catching-up effects of lagging sectors, (ii) the harmonisation of differentials, and (iii) pace-setters 
in working time reduction. In what follows, our elaboration seeks to explain why a second hours 
round yielded only limited results in British industry. With few exceptions, the 40 -hour threshold 
was replaced by a 39-hour barrier. 
This impasse will be analysed by looking at the collective bargaining rounds between the CSEU 
and the EEF from 1983 onwards. The usefulness of this focus for the present study is thowfold. 
Just as the settlement in the engineering industry served as a spur to the general move from 40 to 
39 hours in British manufacturing, the outcome of the bargaining rounds was regarded as setting the 
pace for future shorter hours provisions (cf. TUC-Progress Report 1986: 5). What is more, 
compared to\1979, the bilateral talks illustrated the extent to which the issue of working time had 
moved away from an exclusive focus on reduction. Rather, the notions of temporal flexibility and 
restructuring the work process became the order of the day in the course of the negotiations. A 
complex issue expansion could thus be identified which required a high degree of bargaining 
adjustment and compromise incentives between the collective actors involved. 
Agenda-Setting of the Second Hours Round 
The negotiations between the CSEU and the EEF began in September 1983. Next to the annual pay 
claim, the union side considered a second step of working time reduction as central. While· the 
unions focused on the introduction of the 35-hour week, the approach taken by the engineering 
Federation was innovative in many ways. Instead of unequivocally rejecting shorter hours, the EEF 
presented a specific trade-off package: further working time reduction in return for wide-ranging 
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flexibility concessions from the unions. The enlarged flexibility options concerned revised shift 
working schedules, 24-hour operation time and the possibility of a seven-day working week. In 
addition, cuts in job demarcation figyred as a priority on the EEF shopping list. 
In return, a staged reduction from 39 to 37.5 hours was the compromise offered to the CSEU. 
However, the new hours norm was only to be reached on the basis of a yearly average, in this way 
placing annualised hours schemes on the bargaining agenda. In contrast to established routines of 
collective bargaining in Britain, the EEF demands entailed a fum commiunent from the unions to 
link the reduction of basic hours with binding productivity increases. In practice, this objective 
meant guaranteing the cost-neutrality of shorter hours through so- called productivity bargaining. 
That the CSEU did not object in principle to the recurrence of productivity bargaining was 
illustrated by the way the Confederation conducted the negotiations. In the course of the bilateral 
talks the issue of working time policy was detached from the annual pay round and delegated to a 
joint sub-committee. Since the "unions were getting in wages what they wanted" (cf. Int. CBI), 
such a procedure became acceptable to all sides. The modus operandi itself demonstrated that a 
compromise between the EEF and the CSEU was perceived as possible. Referring to the objective 
of enhancing competitiveness, the President of the CSEU, Bill Jordan, claimed that "working time 
flexibility is the best defence against a continuing decline in the British engineering industry" ( cf. 
FT 06.11.1987). Still, Jordan's rather emphatic position was not shared by all CSEU members. 
Some unions voiced considerable reservations about the idea of a framework agreement. While the 
AEU, EETPU and Apex favoured a compromise, others like the TGWU, GMB and Tass would 
approve only some of the flexibility provisions: 
"It is not simply a case of reducing working hours at any cost. We must ensure that any reduced 
hours are related directly to an increase in the number of people employed. There is no point in 
agreeing to increase flexibility, to agreeing to the erosion of trade union conditions, to the erosion 
of trade union organisation, in return for a shorter working week. Shorter hours on these terms, 
comrades, will not create a single job and it really is a nonsense for trade union leaders to come to 
this rostrum and to hail such agreements as a breakthrough. It must be understood that such agree-
ments are condemmed by many unions involved in those discussions" (cf. TUC 1987: 212). 
Internal dissent also ruled the deliberations within the EEF. The employers' controversies focused 
on the principle question of whether changes in working practices should be reached by trading 
working time reduction in return. Many fums had already established flexibility arrangements 
beyond what was being negotiated at the national industry level, but without having to concede 
further working time reduction. From their point of view, a national industry agreement would 
oblige them to introduce shorter hours while the flexibility proposals tabled by the EEF did not 
constitute an additional element of concession bargaining. 
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Legitimacy Deficits and Representational Pluralism of the CSEU IEEF Bargaining 
Unit 
As shown earlier, the CSEU/EEF negotiating body is primarily concerned with the yearly fixing of 
minimum pay rates. However, the importance of these talks is limited in two ways: CSEUIEEF pay 
settlements only affect some 600.000 engineering workers directly. The national contract sets a 
benchmark for subsequent fum level agreements which generally provide for an upward revision. In 
other words, most companies pay well above the standard rate. In addition, the EEF is not authori-
sed to negotiate national pay rates for white collar employees. Hence, many firms do not depend 
fundamentally on the engineering Federation for a lead in pay settlements (cf. Smith 1989: 9). 
The limited collective bargaining influence of the yearly pay negotiations between the CSEU and 
the EEF helps to explain why talks at the national industry level may take so long. Furthermore, in 
case of a failure or break-down of national talks, no automatic arbitration procedures follow. 
Rather, the controversial issues on the agenda are either dropped, or - more likely - cancelled to 
the next yearly bargaining round. This procedure gives negotiators incentives to delegate any 
controversial demand, and discharges the actors involved from conducting negotiations to a conclu-
sion. As a union representative comments, successful outcomes only carry the day, "if a frame-
work agreement lifts a whole sector agreement up one or two notches. If it only gives comprehen-
sive agreements and trade-offs, then it is not possible" (cf. Int. TGWU). 
Next to such operational shortcomings of the institutional bargaining design, the status of the 
engineering negotiations was also impaired by the presence of competing unions within the CSEU. 
The longstanding rivalries between the engineering unions derive from the fact that the individual 
unions organise different groups of employees, they demonstrate diverging avenues of interest 
representation, and their monitoring of national industry talks differs considerably. Multi -unionism 
and traditional rivalries over the demarcation lines of spheres of influence in the engineering sector 
thus make the CSEU a loose confederation with limited central control over its member unions. 
Whatever the problems facing the CSEU, ·they were ·more than matched by controversies within 
the EEF. These derived from growing doubts over the role of the engineering Federation as such. 
Not only is the Federation unauthorised to negotiate pay rates for staff employees, but the employ-
ers' association was additionally subject to a considerable fall in membership during the 1980s. The 
drift of employers out of the EEF reduced its membership from 6.000 to 5.000 between 1981 and 
1987 (cf. FT 07.11.1987). Such an erosion of the Federation's rank-and-file and the limited 
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importance of the annual pay negotiations for many companies placed the EEF in a twofold dilem-
ma: as an interest organisation its authority was constrained, and as a collective bargaining associa-
tion vis-a-vis the CSEU its r~urces were diminishing. 
In the course of protracted negotiations like in the engineering industry a dynamic prevails 
which either contributes to claims being dropped, delegated or new demands being introduced onto 
the bargaining agenda. The CSEUIEEF talks followed the third trajectory, and here in particular lie 
the roots of failure. The strategy of gradually enlarging the scope of demands essentially explains 
why the bargaining rounds came to no agreement. It was the EEF which tabled proposals for a 
general revision of industrial relations in the field of collective bargaining. It is to this aspect that 
we shall now turn. 
Issue-Et$rgement by the EEF 
The proposals on temporal flexibility had already demonstrated that the EEF did not intend -
unlike in 1979 - to treat working time as an issue in its own right. In the course of the marathon 
negotiation, the Federation swelled its agenda with demands which sought a general overview of 
working conditions and a revised arrangement for industrial relations. The additional claims concer-
ned areas as different as (i) harmonisation of employment conditions, (ii) elimination of restric-
tive manning practices and (iii) the rationalisation of bargaining arrangements. 
The third proposal was given increasing priority and was the subject of a highly charged debate 
in the course of the negotiations. At first, the rationalisation clause focused on revised dispute 
procedures at the ftrm level. But in connection with the call for "new principles for the recognition 
of CSEU unions" the clause could be interpreted as an instrument to curtail the representative 
pluralism of British engineering unions. In practical terms the EEF demand whispered the notion of 
multi- union plants and aimed at obliging the unions to "act as one body". In the case of such a 
self-commitment, the majority union in a given plant would not only be strengthened as regards its 
status. In addition, it would assume bargaining responsibility for all other unions involved. 
The more the talks focused on the respective consequences of the rationalisation clause, the 
more the CSEU members were at odds over who would benefit from it. In the minds of TGWU, 
GMB and Tass negotiators, accepting the clause would have lead to employer-imposed unions. 
Hence, the multiplicity of the fi11Il level union profile would gradually be eroded. As one CSEU 
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representative concluded, such a flexibility package highlighted "how much the EEF thought that 
the scope of collective bargaining had changed during the eighties. The era of single-unionism 
cropped up" (cf. Int. TGWU). 
In light of single- union agreements signed in the past by the CSEU members AEU15 and 
EETPU, such a concern was merited. In particular the AEU expected to get additional mileage out 
of the framework agreement, especially in the form of new members and enlarged representation 
authority. By contrast, the unions opposing the compromise suspected that a national contract would 
open doors for industrial relations packages at the flrm level. The best example of such a pattern of 
union -management relations was the EETPU. Between 1985 and 198 7 the electricians union had 
signed 24 agreements including no- strike obligations and 'automatic binding arbitration'. 16 
In light of considerations such as these, the internal divisions of the CSEU not only reflected 
controversies over the respective issues on the bargaining agenda. Rather, they reinforced an 
inter-union power struggle over fum level representation, established bargaining patterns and the 
demarcation of respective spheres of influence. As a result, the disputes contributed to cementing 
the political rivalries between the CSEU members along the lines of a 'left-right dualism' whose 
focal point of reference was the contested AEU and CSEU -President Jordan. The political conti-
nuum of the inter-union conflict had two extremes: the so-called 'new realists' (AEU and 
EETPU) versus the 'traditionalists', sometimes also called the 'fundamentalists' (TGWU and 
GMB). 17 
Yet, ~. fleld of controversy was not only a matter of politics, or of diverging strategic priori-
ties, but related fundamentally to the different social bases of the engineering unions. Key here was 
the spheres of influence and the internal union demarcation lines to recruit new members. Both 
factors shali be elaborated in the next section while simultaneously considering how the British 
labour market and the composition of the workforce have changed during the past decade. 
15) In April 1985 the AEU won Nissan's eye in a 'beauty contest' at its new production site in 
Sunderland, Northern England. Competition over a single-union agreement involved the TGWU 
and GMB. 
16) Automatic binding arbitration refers to the incorporation of a peace clause and a system for 
resolving disputes at the expense of taking constitutional industrial action. Because of its repeated 
willingness to sign strike -free and single -union agreements, the EETPU was expelled from the 
TUC in 1988. 
17) The labels 'new realists', 'fundamentalists' and 'traditionalists' are used by the unions 
themselves. This has become a custom of inter- union controversies at TUC Congresses since the 
mid-eighties. 
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Unions' Spheres of Influence Amidst Growing Labour Force Flexibility 
The various flexibility proposals tabled by the EEF extended from working time over cuts in job 
demarcation to issues concerning the rationalisation of collective bargaining arrangements. The 
overall package sought to secure explicit union acceptance of enlarged labour market flexibility. The 
material basis of this objective lay in far reaching structural changes in the British labour market 
during the past decade. 
In general, we can identify a long -term restructuring process in the evolution of employment. 
Its size and velocity accelerated considerably during the 1980s. In the course of this development, a 
new type of employment category has grown from an insignificant fringe of the labour market to a 
sizeable one-third of the workforce: the share of jobholders (i) whose employment provisions and 
status are labeled flexible, (ii) who are positioned outside full-time employment and (iii) who do 
not hold employment contracts with indeterminate duration. This new employment category is 
mainly composed of (i) part-timers, (ii) temporary workers, (iii) home workers and (iv) self-
employed people. Together, these four groups constitute Britain's so-called flexible labour force18 • 
Between 1981 and 1985 the flexible workforce expanded by 16 per cent (1.15 million) and 
accounted for 8.1 million or 34 percent of those in employment in the latter year. While the 
number of female full-time workers grew by 55.000 between 1983 and 1985 to reach 4.8 million, 
they were outnumbered for the first time by the 5 million female flexible workers. Wives and 
mothers constitute two-thirds of the total flexible workforce (cf. Hakim 1987). While the number 
of full-time permanent employees fell by 1.02 million (minus 6 percent) between 1981 and 1985 
to 15.62 million two other, diverging, trends accompanied this evolution. Whereas total employment 
is gradually rising again since 1984, the increase is almost exclusively accounted for by changes in 
the size of the flexible workforce. Over 96 percent of the fall in full-time jobs occurred between 
1981 and 1983. On the contrary, 72 percent of all flexible jobs were created during 1983 and 1985 
(cf. FT 05.02.1987). 
18) Instead of "flexible labour force" the terms "non -regular", "peripheral", "atypical", 
"non-traditional" or "unstable" are used in the extended debate on labour market flexibility and 
flexible employment conditions. To name only a few for the British case, see Atkinson 1987, 
Standing 1990, Towers 1987. 
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To a great extent much of the growth in flexible employment relationships is due to a striking 
rise in temporary working (including those with seasonal, casual and flxed -period or contract 
jobs). Within four years to 1985, the number of temporary workers increased by 700.000 to over 
1.3 million and reached 1.47 million people, some 5. 7 percent of the workforce by 1989. It is 
significant to note that the current expansion touches more men than women, even if the majority of 
temporary workers - 58 percent of the total - (still) are female employees (cf. IRS 1990: 7). 
In part, the growth of jobs with limited duration status derives from government employment 
and training schemes for the unemployed. In addition, legal provisions concerning recruitment 
procedures were changed by the Thatcher Government on two occasions: legislative measures 
extended the qualifying period for eligibility to present a complaint of unfair dismissal from six 
months to one year in 1979 and then to two years in 1985 (cf. Hepple 1987: 281). 
Finally, an analysis of temporary work yields two other findings. The government's 1984 labour 
force survey found that only a third of seasonal or casual workers would have preferred a perma-
nent job (cf. The Economist 1987: 25). However, let us not 'blame the victim' too readily. Flexible 
workers often alter their employment objectives because of their inability to fmd a permanent job. 
The unavailability of indeterminate employment is still the largest single reason given for why they 
take temporary work (cf. IRS 1990: 7). 
Next to the unprecedented growth in temporary work, the increase of self-employment in 
Britain d~g the 1980s is noteworthy. The number of job holders in that employment category 
increased by 1.1 million (52 percent) between 1981 and 1991 to a total of 3.3 million (cf. Campbell 
and Daly 1992: 269). Amidst these transformations in the British labour market, the single most 
important category of the flexible workforce still remains part-time work. 19 Between 1984 and 
1991 part-time employment grew by over 800.000 people and accounted for 5.6 million or 24 
percent of total employment (cf. Naylor and Purdy 1992: 153). Next to the Scandinavian countries, 
Britain holds the largest rate of part-time employment in western Europe. 
The EEF's focus on changed working practices, innovative working time schedules and increa-
sed manpower flexibility has to be placed in the context of such a transformation of the labour 
market. The central challenge for the CSEU members was to map out a common answer to the use 
19) Ever since the so-called marriage bar was abolished in 1940, both women's position in 
the labour market and the options for part-time work considerably changed. The marriage bar 
forced women to leave paid employment once they got married. Up until 1963 the Post Office 
Workers union ensured that the bar stayed in operation (cf. Walby 1986: 57). 
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of non -standard labour. Otherwise, as the TGWU claimed, organisations ignoring such drastic 
labour market changes would "risk seeing history pass them by" (cf. IR-RR 1988: 10). But while 
the necessity for a blueprint oq flexibility is uncontested and endorsed by various surveys on trade 
union attitudes to flexible working hours (cf. Lee 1983: 80ff.), when we evaluate the pros and cons 
in practice the engineering unions only re-established their divisions. 
The source of these inter-union consensus problems derived from their constituencies. The 
respective labour organisations focus on very different groups of employees as regards their status, 
qualifications and income levels. Notwithstanding this selectivity, all sustained significant losses in 
membership during the 1980s. 20 Bearing both factors in mind, the preparedness of the engineering 
unions to approve or refuse the flexibility elements in the framework agreement depended largely 
on the resulting prospects for recruiting new members. 
While the TGWU is the largest single union within the TUC and the CSEU (as regards overall 
membership), the majority of its social base in the engineering sector comes from unskilled and 
semi-skilled manuals. These members faced considerable employment problems during the 1980s, 
are generally paid according to minimum rates and depend on working overtime. The redundancies 
taking place in engineering between 1980 and 1984 have mostly touched these occupational groups 
and severely affected overall TGWU membership. Between 1979 and 1985 the largest TUC union 
suffered a drop in membership of 37 percent. A further fall of 56.000 followed in 1986 and by the 
end of 1988 the TGWU recorded another loss of 148.000 members (cf. Certification Offlce 1987: 
10 and FT 10.12.1988). 
Contrary to the TGWU membership configuration, the AEU rank-and-ftle is predominantly 
composed of skilled workers in better paid jobs. Nevertheless, it does not follow that their jobs 
were safer. Like the competing TGWU, the AEU has been hit by substantial membership losses. 
Within one year - 1985/1986 - the AEU lost 117.000 members. This corresponded to a drop of 
12 percent. Total membership of the Amalgamated union reached 858.000 in 1987 (cf. Certification 
Office 1987: 10). 
So, the 1980s were tough times for both the TGWU and the AEU. Hence, they were "desperate 
for new membership" (cf. Int. researcher II). Taking their respective spheres of influence in the 
20) In 1979 union membership had reached its highest post-war level with over 13.3 million 
affiliates. Since then it has fallen steadily in each subsequent year, reaching 9.9 million members at 
the end of 1990, the lowest membership figure since 1961, and 25 percent below the peak level in 
1979. Such membership losses were almost entirely a result of a fall in male membership. Union 
density is now registered at 38 percent (cf. Bird et al. 1992: 185). 
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engineering sector into consideration, the TGWU had the support of other CSEU members to defeat 
an agreement it saw as benefitting mainly skilled AEU members. The unions rejecting the frame-
work agreement (TGWU, GMB, Tass) not only feared that established working practices and 
organisational resources would be sacrificed. Also, their apprehension derived from the perception 
that the flexibility agreement would favour craftsmen who would enter the core workforce, therefore 
receiving secure jobs. Accordingly, the AEU could then be encouraged to call for a review of 
existing agreements on recognition and membership recruitment practices while the TGWU would 
be left with the tidal wave of part- timers and temporary workers sweeping the British labour 
market. 
Some CSEU members thus feared that accepting the draft agreement would result in . considera-
ble organisational damage for them and asymmetrical pay-offs. They would have to shoulder the 
burden of manpower flexibility and be confronted with further membership losses. This concern was 
further fuelled by the consequences should the CSEU approve the rationalisation of bargaining 
procedures in multi -union plants. The obligation to "act as one body" was regarded as strengthe-
ning the hand of the AEU at the expense of hard-won conditions and long-established practices. 
Accordingly, the confederation executive voted in November 1987 by 17 to 13 to reject the pro-
posals and deliver the CSEU- President Jordan, who had fmnly supported an agreement, a personal 
defeat. Together, the AEU, the EETPU and Apex had to acknowledge the bitter fact that the 
regulation df extended flexibility provisions depended on weathering inter- union rivalries so 
prominent in the British system of industrial relations. . 
6. Conclusion 
If the breakdown in the engineering talks had one positive effect it lay in the trade-off constella-
tion that had been put on the agenda: without concessions in the field of flexible labour innovations 
the CSEU's campaign to cut the working week below 39 hours would not make any progress. The 
former became a quid pro quo for the latter. In addition, numerous domestic-level settlements21 
reinforced decentralisation which in turn increasingly casts doubt on the future role of industry level 
bargaining in British labour relations. While the prospects for change through consensus on the 
issues of flexibility and shorter hours are limited at the national level, decentralised approaches 
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provided for significant innovations. 
The regulatory authority of flilil level bargaining arrangements accounts for the central differen-
ce between the British and oth~r western European systems of industrial relations. As illustrated by 
the engineering talks which faltered over the defmition of specific trade -off provisions, the 
fragmented and competitive structure of British labour relations rendered settlements above the firm 
level ambiguous. Contextual constraints deriving from such an institutional design put the question 
of reforming the organisational structures of union interest representation on the agenda of collective 
bargaining. It is precisely such a remodelling of collective bargaining procedures, labelled "to act as 
one body", which the EEF raised in the course of the negotiations. The employers' drive for 
temporal flexibility corresponded with the rationalisation of interest representation as its structural 
correlate in the field of industrial relations. Seen from this perspective, neo-industrialism is 
embedded in revised decision making patterns between the two sides of industry. 
Regarding the issue- building process of work sharing in Britain during the 1970s, it is signifi-
cant to note that the labour confederations did not embrace such a strategy. Even if the TUC had 
adopted the idea of a shorter working week as far back as 1972, the claim "added up to little more 
than an attractive slogan at the start" (cf. Taylor 1978: 452). The focus on work sharing only 
started to gain currency in the labour movement after the Social Contract had been revoked by the 
unions in 1977/78. 
The implementation of the 39-hour week further illustrates to what degree companies were 
capable of retaining local freedom of action. The importance of flilil-led innovations was repeated-
ly underestimated by national industry bargaining actors. Rather than conforming to an industrial 
agreement decentralised approaches managed to establish their own settlements during the 1981 
engineering dispute. In addition, the staged implementation of the hours cut gave industrial flililS 
enough leeway to have greater control over the timing and the configuration of the changes. Hence, 
the decentralised implementation process made "national agreements depend for their effect on inter-
pretation at enterprise level. .. the strength of the local level meant that national industry agreements 
to reduce working time could be followed by a process of locally agreed changes to offset the 
effects of the reduction" (cf. White and Ghobadian 1984: 177). The potential ability of flililS to 
21) In 1988 two agreements for shift workers at Michelin's plants in Burnley, Lancashire and 
Ballymena, County Antrim provided for the introduction of the 31.5 hour week in exchange for 
new shift patterns. The settlements were described by the TGWU as a milestone in the campaign 
for reduced working time and pictured as a trendsetter for other industries as regards its provisions. 
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absorb the effects of reduced working hours and divert objectives striven for at the national level 
was soundly documented in the increased overtime levels and the non -stimulation of work sharing 
results (cf. TUC 1988: 9, White 1987: 13). 
As a result of the diversity of company level agreements and the limited degree of control which 
industry level bargaining was able to exert, managerial confidence midway through the 1980s 
seemed strong enough to reject a further hours reduction. For many employers the decision on the 
scope of a second hours round was to remain exclusively in the hands of frrm level negotiators. 
There is further evidence for managerial confidence. The evolution of the British working time 
debate suggests that, with the re-entry of reduction claims in national industry bargaining, the 
employers' side clearly demonstrated how much they had revised and broadened their proposals in 
the meantime. The unions' demand to press for a shorter working week was countered by a menu 
of options linked to the overall notion of flexibility. 
The EEF's push to break through old demarcation lines of the working week combined with a 
changed role for management and unions attempted to restructure industrial relations and adopt a 
systematic approach on the issue of flexibility. What made the Federation's proposals both a matter 
of controversy and innovation was the fact that the package tended to map out a new employment 
and bargaining culture. The flexibility proposals were not merely an opportunistic adjustment to 
custom and practice but reflected a comprehensive strategic approach on industrial reorganisation 
and revised labour relations (cf. Atkinson 1987: 93). 
Toget.ber\with the unprecedented degree of industrial relations legislation, the Thatcher Govern-
ment's acceptence of continuously rising mass unemployment at the beginning of the eighties placed 
any work sharing objectives of the TUC in a specific policy dilemma. The longer high unemploy-
ment persisted, the more union measures, which focused on its presupposed reversibility, lost their 
appeal and credibility. Especially significant was the lack of governmental recognition at a point in 
time when the political marginalisation of British unions assumed top priority on Thatcher's agenda 
of industrial relations policy. Rather, the official appraisal of shorter hours concluded that the policy 
was ill-suited to confront a set of structural problems in the British labour market. 
An additional signpost of the unfolding policy dilemma consisted in fact that, while the Thatcher 
Government relentlessly advocated deregulation and state retreat from markets, "the reordering of 
British markets and recasting of state- society relations entailed massive institutional change that 
[could] be accomplished only by the intervention of a particularly strong state" (cf. Hall1986: 126). 
By contrast, until the end of the 1970s the politics- industrial relations nexus in Britain was charac-
terised as one of defending the status quo. Employers and unions were staunch opponents of any 
policies that limited their autonomy in collective bargaining. Only on occasion did tripartite consul-
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tation between the government and the two sides of industry take place. In consequence, a rejection 
of unilateral state intervention highlighted the institutional structure of the British industrial relations 
environment. 
Because central politico- institutional preconditions proved to be to their advantage, British 
employers faced a unique opportunity structure to initiate the restructuring of production processes 
and manpower utilisation. The bargaining power of the trade unions was repeatedly being curtailed 
by the Thatcher Government in both the industrial and political arenas (cf. Ward 1988: 74)22• Legal 
intervention served to promote industrial adaptation processes and encourage economic transforma-
tion. Disciplining the workforce and their respective interest organisations not only entailed nume-
rous Employment and Trade Union Acts. In addition, the government's toleration of a rising level 
of unemployment (in particular between 1980 and 1985) as well as Thatcher's vigorous resistance to 
public sector wage demands gave British employers unprecedented leverage in the industrial arena. 
Finally, while both the interventionist component and the reorganisation of industry are a clear 
case in poirit, our assessment would nevertheless fall short if the substantial growth of the flexible 
labour force in virtually every sector of the British economy during the past decade were ignored. 
Amidst flexibility provisions gaining currency, employment patterns, demarcation lines between 
white and blue-collar employees as well as those in employment and those seeking entrance into 
the labour market are fundamentally changing. Under conditions such as these the core challenge of 
union (working time) policies relates to how they can extend their spheres of influence to the 
periphery of the labour market while maintaining their organisational resources for the core work-
force. As illustrated by the protracted CSEUIEEF negotiations, the national industry level and 
endemic union parochialism structure could not flnd a common solution to this challenge. 
22) The Manpower Services Commission was abolished in 1988 after the Thatcher Government 
unsuccessfully tried to double the number of employer seats. The tripartite employment service 
organisation had been established in 1973 by the Heath Government. 
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Chapter VI 
Comparative Perspectives 
1. Introduction 
The study of working time policies in Belgiwn, France and Britain has shown that redistributive 
labour market policies are invariably a collective endeavour shaped by a complex political process. 
The picture presented is of an intricate pattern of manoeuvering on the part of the industrial rela-
tions actors. The policies under consideration were influenced by a dynamic that originated as much 
in labour market problems as in the industrial relations system. 
In what follows, I will try to synthesize this pattern. However, I will refrain from sweeping 
conclusions and from taxing the reader's endurance with additional empirical findings. Drawing 
lessons frori'l cross-country analysis requires prudence. In particular, compelling generalisations 
cannot be formulated easily about this group of nations. My theoretical propositions extend only to 
the reach of the empirical material. 
Our line of argument in the preceding chapters can be considered as a response to gaps in 
earlier studies of work sharing strategies. The three cases suggest that a nwnber of important 
variables have been either excluded or not appropriately treated by recent scholarship on redistribu-
tive labour market policies. First, a policy of work sharing was in competition with other strategies, 
such as (i) early retirement, (ii) flexible wage policies, (iii) and the promotion of labour market 
flexibility. Our approach implied making endogenous the processes by which labour market actors 
opted for a certain policy within constraints. 
Furthermore, decisions concerning labour market policies in Belgiwn, France and Britain were 
made under uncertainty and with limited means of forecasting their performance, costs or unantici-
pated contingencies. As the three cases illustrated, many sources of contextual uncertainty and 
imperfect foresight were involved in work sharing via working time reduction. This degree of 
contextual uncertainty is regularly overlooked in work sharing studies that have focused on identify-
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ing cause and effect relations of shorter hours. Statements concerning the performance of labour 
market policies are therefore statements of probabilities; they carry with them uncertainties of 
outcomes and uncertainties of causal linkage, i.e. how much, if any, impact can a specific policy be 
expected to have? In sum, work sharing strategies implied the impossibility of knowing ex ante the 
optimal design and procedural configuration of the policy project and its objectives. 
To the reader of the preceding chapters it should be apparent that our enterprise has sought to 
combine an account of policy making in the labour markets of three Western European countries 
with an argument for an institutional approach to political economy. We are now in a position to 
reconsider the leading question to which the data addressed itself: whether it is true that multiple 
paths shaped different programme proflles but lead to similar outcomes in the three countries. The 
empirical analysis investigated the process by which original intentions are transformed through the 
evolution of outcomes, the perception of policy performance by the labour market actors and the 
institutional design of politics in three countries. 
The roles played by the organisations of the state, capital and labour within a constellation of 
institutional variables were held to be central to the nature and performance of labour market 
policies. We shall therefore organise a comparative evaluation around key issues of the evidence 
presented earlier. To have wide generalisation, the evidence should be tested against a larger 
number of national cases. That is clearly beyond the scope of this work. In lieu, at this stage we 
consider Germany as a counterfactual. However, its elaboration must remain preliminary. Its 
inclusion will allow us to sharpen the focus of the analysis of labour market policies in Belgium, 
France and Britain. Therefore, the question guiding the following sections concerns why shorter 
hours policies were draped in the three countries giving way to temporal flexibility while Germany 
displays a successful combination of working time reduction and flexibility provisions. 
2. Germany as a Counterfactual 
Singling out shorter working hours as a means of confronting pressing labour market problems in 
(West) Germany implied (re- )discovering presupposed beneficial relations between unemployment 
and its curtailment through work sharing (" Arbeitsumverteilung"). This scenario entailed a redefini-
tion of arguments in favour of working time policies. Historical experience, in particular the intro-
duction of the 40-hour week between 1962 and 1965, suggested that collective working time 
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reductions occurred under conditions of near full- employment, uninterrupted wage increases and 
strong trade union bargaining positions (cf. van Kevelaer and Hinrichs 1985). 
Over a fifteen year period from the beginning of the eighties, the unions' strategy of cutting 
standard weekly working time to 35 -hours was achieved in three stages. First came the break-
through agreement in engineering in 1984. Following the biggest and most- embittered dispute in 
German post- war history the compromise provided for the introduction of the 38.5 hour basic 
workweek without loss of earnings. The agreement further introduced provisions that allowed for 
increased temporal flexibility for different firms, and, inside firms, different groups of workers to be 
included under co- determination between employers and works councils. The strike of 1984 and 
the subsequent compromise underlined that trade union power was a political reality, in spite of 
adverse 1 circumstances. 
In 1987 the metal industry again proved to be Germany's pace-setter for working time reduc-
tion. The three-year pact reinforced the give-and-take pattern and provided for a one-hour cut 
in basic weekly hours to 37.5 in return for wage moderation, a long duration of the agreement and 
the transfer of jurisdiction on working time provisions from the industrial agreement and trade 
unions to co-determination within the works councils. An additional 30 minutes were lopped off in 
1989. Finally, in 1990 an agreement on the 35 -hour week in the West German metals and printing 
industries provided other European trade unions with a much welcomed breakthrough. The com-
promise incl~udes a phased introduction which will take effect in 1995. However, opening the door 
to the basic 35-hour week is conditional upon German and European economic and social trends. 
Furthermore, the compromise allows for up to 18 percent of a company's workforce to put in a 
40- hour week, a considerable nod in the direction of greater temporal flexibility for individual 
firms. 
What emerges from the German example is, first, that shorter hours with a view to the goal of 
the 35-hour week has been achieved. In addition, a variety of flexibility provisions proved from 
the outset of negotiations to be the essential trade-off element for shorter hours. Hence, the 
process of working time reduction was shaped by a mode of compromise formation which endorsed 
the issue of enlarging options for temporal flexibility. In that respect, the exchange model establi-
1) I am referring to the Conservative-Liberal coalition under Chancellor H. Kohl taking 
office in 1983 after 14 years of Social Democrat-Liberal coalition government. The Kohl Govern-
ment explicitly challenged the metal union's shorter hours strategy with legal initiatives focused on 
early retirement. 
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shed a pattern which allowed the demand for the 35-hour week to remain, or continuously 
resurface, on the bargaining agenda, instead of being dropped or giving way to other policy 
priorities. 
It also has to be taken into consideration that the institutional design of German collective 
bargaining guarantees regular and legally binding negotiations every one or two years (depending on 
the length of the previous agreement). This element of routinisation is framed by the fact that, if 
negotiations breakdown, automatic arbitration procedures follow. Thus, in order to avoid either 
large-scale industrial action and/or third party compromise propositions, the two sides of industry 
face various obligations to bring negotiations to a viable conclusion. Jacobs et a1 (1978: 214) have 
labelled this pattern "co-operative conflict resolution." Finally, legal intervention in industrial 
relations is designed to underscore the responsibility of the 'social partners' for effective industrial 
self-government. This characteristic of the West German system has put comparatively centralised 
and encompassing trade unions and employers' associations in a position to "exercise delegated 
regulation authority with strong legal facilitation" (cf. Streeck 1988: 3). 
Even if considered only briefly, the German case can contribute to a better understanding of 
various sub- fields of labour market policies that repeatedly surfaced in the dynamics of work 
sharing strategies. In effect it highlights four factors: (i) the role of policy legacies, (ii) the relation 
between work sharing and income sharing, (ill) the feasibility of viable exchange models, (iv) and 
the role of the state in the policy process. In what follows, I shall elaborate these sub-fields more 
comprehensively across the three countries of study before turning to the question of policy modifi-
cation. 
3. Working Time Policies in Practice 
The agenda-setting of working time policies during the end of the 1970s and early 1980s was 
mainly characterized by two trajectories. During the initial stages, establishing opportunities for 
early retirement, thus curtailing life-time working hours, predominated. Alternatively, work 
sharing through reducing basic weekly working hours generally implied the goal of the '35- hour 
week'. 
It is noteworthy that of the three countries under consideration, Belgium introduced various early 
retirement schemes before turning to the measure of reducing weekly working time. In the French 
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case both options were implemented simuluweously after the Mitterrand Government took office in 
1981. By contrast, British Governments - Labour and Tory - steadfastly refused to consider a 
policy of early retirement schemes or measures curtailing weekly working time. 
If we compare the ambitious claims brought forward by the protagonists of work sharing at the 
end of the 1970s with the situation over a decade later, it becomes strikingly evident that the only 
feasible result achieved was the introduction of the 39-hour week on an industry- wide scale in 
Belgium, France and Britain. In other words, apart from single reduction steps on the national level, 
shorter hours demands did not make any headway past the first round. 
The three cases suggest the general tendency of trade unions, and of the early Mitterrand years 
in particular, to oversell work sharing to their rank-and-flle and the public. Work sharing tended 
to be introduced as a panacea for very different labour market problems which varied greatly in 
their connection to each other. Given the decade -long experience with the advocacy of work 
sharing objectives, we observed that small steps in working time reduction did not reverse long-
standing unemployment problems. 
However, to infer that a policy of shorter hours has been tried and failed would be too simple. 
Its history as revealed here does not dictate that a policy of working time reduction is dead forever, 
any more than the decade long record of the policy has killed the idea of work sharing permanent-
ly. For the time being shorter hours strategies have been recalled to the factory for repairs in the 
three countries under consideration. We can predict that the fixing will take some time. 
To the reader of the preceding chapters it has become apparent that a redistributive policy of 
working time reduction (i) entailed consequences for in,come formation, (ii) affected the organisatio-
nal resources of the industrial relations actors to mediate the plurality of contending interests, (iii) 
and revealed the extent to which strategies have to be modified in the event of policy performance. 
The Legacy of Policies 
All existing or former policies leave a residue which shape both the options available and the likely 
outcomes of developing policy responses. Such a residue can be seen to be a factor in each of the 
three countries studied. To briefly recall the Belgian situation, the unions' attachment to automatic 
wage indexation made employers all the more reluctant to involve themselves in negotiations over 
work sharing. Whereas index -linking can be regarded as an element of social policy under 
conditions of low inflation and full-employment, it proved to be an "important factor of rigidity" 
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once the crisis began to reach dramatic dimensions during the late seventies and early eighties (cf. 
OECD 1984: 45). As long as the wedge issue of income sharing remained unresolved, either in the 
form of partial wage compensation or through the reform of the indexation mechanism, managerial 
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resistance towards any forms of redistributive labour market policies was unbending. By contrast, 
relying on the institutional feature of automatic wage indexation made the curtailment of inflation a 
distant objective for Belgian unions (cf. Kevelaer and Bastian 1989: 186). 
The working time policy introduced by the Common Front during 1936-1938 determined for 
more than forty years the state of work sharing strategies on the agenda of French labour market 
policies. The preoccupations and anxieties that the legacy still managed to mobilize at the begining 
of the eighties was best described by the former president of the CNPF, F. Ceyrac: "We all know 
that it is the system of 1936 which we have to revise. But this legacy constitutes ... a taboo. It is the 
symbol of a period which has remained important in our social history" (cf. Le Monde 
11.07.1980). 
Turning to the British case, we are left with a paradox: regarding the implementation of the 
Social Contract between 1975 and 1977 the combination of voluntary wage moderation and negotia-
ted pay - offs mirrored core requirements of work sharing strategies. In addition, the Labour 
Government which was commited to full employment sought the active participation of the TUC in 
economic policy making. After the 1975-77 period such a constellation did not surface again. 
When the unioDB fmally began to put work sharing on their collective bargaining agenda (1979-
1980), it was precisely the legacy of the Social Contract and the change of governments which 
rendered the TUC incapable of supplementing the demand with a second round of voluntary wage 
moderation. 
What emerges from this short overview is that respoDBes to unemployment in the three countries 
were shaped by the legacy of previously instituted policies. In Belgium, the legacy of wage indexa-
tion established the institutional procedures for incomes policies. Automatic wage- price indexation 
had a by-product which hindered the popularisation of conditions which would have encouraged 
voluntary wage restraint on the part of the unions. The French case mirrors how the Blum legacy 
influenced the industrial relations actors' perception of shorter hours policies, in particular if they 
were state-induced. In Britain, the record of the Social Contract shaped the corridor of action of 
labour market actors. First and foremost this applies to the unions' incomes policies after the 
renunciation of the Social Contract and while they were simultaneously starting to embrace work 
sharing strategies. 
In toto, legacies tended to limit the range of manoeuverability on the part of industrial relations 
actors and predetermined the field of compromise formation. They can thus be regarded as a source 
of inertia and rigidity. Legacies also coDBtituted a set of judgements shaped through a history of 
conflicts and organisational learning from the past. 
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Work Sharing - Income Sharing 
Working time policies, in particular within a work sharing context, carry a price tag. Acknowled-
ging this central compromise element as a condition sine qua non was most difficult to achieve for 
the labour organisations. What the unions had to come to terms with, at times involuntarily, was 
that work sharing entailed income sharing in one form or another. The problem of income sharing 
posed a severe dilemma for unions not merely because it constituted a core element of work sharing 
but primarily because it forced labour organisations into an explicit assessment of the diversity of 
working time and income preferences of its rank-and-file. Furthermore, the advocates of work 
sharing had to consider how the f1rm -level actors would respond in the course of the implementa-
tion process. To understand the work sharing-income sharing relationship is thus to identify 
potential lines of conflict, and their possible resolution, within as well as between the labour market 
actors. 
Employers could point to unions' shorter hours claims as an additional wage demand in disguise. 
By contrast, the demand for "no loss of wages" was the prime 'safety belt' for union negotiators to 
be able to mobilise their rank- and- file in favour of working time reduction. Redistributive strate-
gies via intra-class trade-offs thus placed the question of solidaristic incomes policies on the 
agenda of collective bargaining. In order to avoid unfavourable effects on costs and competitiveness, 
let alone secure \employer cooperation during the implementation process, a multiple transaction 
between time, money and jobs became part of the bargaining agenda. That this is a crucial issue 
seems evident for all three countries. 
As the claim for working time reduction was repeatedly confronted with the issue of revising 
automatic wage indexation in Belgium, and later overtaken by statutory wage regulation, any 
progress on the hours issue was slow to come and subject to recurring conflicts between the indus-
trial relations actors. While the Belgian employment crisis was further deteriorating midway through 
the eighties, those in employment experienced the Christian Democrat-Liberal Government's 
working time policies as biased and widely unsuccessful. Unilateral sacrifices on the part of 
employees' income and evident failures in terms ·of· its labour market· objectives characterised the 
statutory 5-3-3 exchange scheme. 
From the French example we learn that the implementation of the 39- hour week and the fifth. 
week of holidays were stymied with wild cat strikes disrupting the post- election voluntarism of the 
early Mitterrand Government. The appeal of partage du travail was further tarnished by the subor-
dination of unionism to politics during the wage compensation debate. Its star was then on the 
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wane. With income sharing proving unattainable, and the 35-hour week objective collapsing, 
ample evidence was available as of the difficulties of achieving state- induced work sharing in 
France. 
The British work sharing debate was largely shaped by the question of how national unions 
could monitor the implementation of shorter hours in a decentraliced and fragmented bargaining 
system. Given the degree of wage regulation autonomy of shop stewards in the British system of 
interest representation, the enforcement resources of branch and national-level organisations to 
oversee rank-and-flle unionists are traditionally weak. Thus, raising the issue of work sharing 
modalities, and thereby arguing in favour of income moderation, implicitly placed established 
customs and practices between management and shop stewards on the agenda of working time 
negotiations. In doing so, the need to reformulate the organisational interplay between the TUC, 
affiliated unions and shop stewards could not be ignored. 
But where income sharing became part of the unions' field of interest, it still did not have an 
impact on the decision fteld because labour organisations anticipated that emp~oyers could raise the 
threshold of compromise costs to a level that would prove unacceptable to the union side. What is 
more, being out of step with competing unions while lacking the enforcement resources for a 
unilateral approach rendered income sharing proposals a high-risk strategy in Belgium, France and 
Britain. 
Recalling the strategies of the various labour confederations in the three countries, only two 
unions did not reject work sharing in partnership with income sharing. As shown, the Christian 
CSC in Belgium and the Leftist CFDT in France seemed to be acutely aware of the danger of a 
'vicious circle' in which unbending union attitudes in wage policies paved the way for managerial 
resistance to work sharing and thereby fostered state intervention. 
But the inability to imprint this position on other unions in the two countries replicated their 
poor ability to control strategy in inter-union conflicts and reinforced longstanding rivalries within 
the French and Belgian union systems. The emphasis on voluntary wage moderation was not suffi-
ciently strong to outweigh the employers' greater resistance and the other unions' intransigence. 
Hence, the relation between working time reduction and partial wage compensation was repeatedly 
decided by the line of anticipated least resistance. The conditions of compromise formation were 
then likely to be affected by what union leaders could realistically hope to attain at reasonable costs 
for their rank-and-flle. The initial stages of the issue building process on work sharing in the 
three countries reflected the influences most distinctly. 
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The Architecture of Exchange Models 
The interplay between work sharing and wage moderation leads us directly to the question of 
compromise formation within employers' associations. Answering this by exclusively focusing on 
costs and benefits may be to postulate a monotonic relation. As shown, employers seldom evaluated 
unemployment as a (pressing) problem and labour market policies aimed at its curtailment as a 
function of an economic calculus alone. Rather their evaluation reflected a complex interaction 
between the management of economic uncertainty and the existence of standard operating practices 
in the labour market which filled the "indeterminancy left by market forces" (cf. Brown and Simon 
1975: 24). 
In light of our empirical fmdings we are now in a position to rephrase our argumentation on 
employers' positions on working time reduction. Employers were most likely to accept shorter hours 
if sophisticated exchange models were part of the compromise package. Such trade -off arrange-
ments entailed trade union concessions in the fields of (i) voluntary wage moderation, (ii) producti-
vity bargaining, (iii) decisions regarding flexible work systems, (iv) and the reorganisation of 
collective bargaining mechanisms. 
As we have seen, voluntary wage moderation did not become part of such exchange models. 
Where the issue of partial wage compensation for shorter hours managed to be integrated into 
collective bargaining agreements, it was only as a result of prior state intervention, most notably 
exhibited in the Belgian context of the so-called Operation 5-3-3. Still, in all three states a 
noteworthy side-effect of the work sharing debate consisted in opening the door for finding new 
ways to police economic sacrifice, in particular concerning the suspension of particularistic solutions 
in the interest of longer-term benefits. 
The imposition of flexible wage policies, and, if need be, the acknowledgement of (involuntary) 
wage moderation became a central feature of labour market policy in Belgium, France and Britain 
during the past decade. Thus, the view that work sharing could be achieved by unilaterally pricing 
employers and/or the state does not hold against the empirical evidence presented for the Belgian, 
French and British cases. Rather,·greater reliance on the market for the promotion and apportioning 
of flexible wage policies became a common feature in all the countries, despite widely different 
political incumbency. Our fmdings suggest that one of the primary learning experiences for workers 
and unions in the context of the work sharing debate was the acknowledgement of a underutilization 
of their potential power to force up money wages in order to create opportunities for the requisite 
redistributions. 
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Regarding the other three compromise options, the regulation of basic terms of exchange 
occurred in recognition of the fact that employers linked working time policies to concern for and 
changes in economic performan~. On the agenda of associational politics towards shorter hours was 
the individual fum's propensity to adapt and reorganise amidst widespread turbulence in the market 
environment. 
Integral to the process were frequent references by employers to the vulnerability of domestic 
economies if a policy of shorter hours was pursued in isolation. In practice, they emphasized that 
the impact of a country's position within the international economy could not be ignored when 
introducing labour market policies, in particular those with redistributional objectives. The signifi-
cance of a European -wide coordination of working time policies was a concern shared by employ-
ers and some unions in the three countries during the initial stages of the work sharing debate. On 
the whole, the importance of this factor was most clearly exhibited in the case of Belgium as a 
small country with an open economy, but it also surfaced with noticeable effect in France in 
1981-1982 and in Britain in 1976-1978. 
Furthermore, employers' associations, more than the individual entrepreneur, were motivated to 
- however reluctantly - accept working time reductions in the interests of established and routini-
zed relations with trade unions. Moreover, in the face of a rapidly changing economic environment, 
the planning horizon in capital-labour negotiations included the recognition of stable and predic-
table bargaining institUtions. Yet, the interest of safeguarding such labour relations, and with it 
preserving the durability of institutionalized bargaining systems, have to be so important to manage-
ment that they render precarious a breakaway by employers, despite a favourable market situation 
and tempting political constellations. Encouraged by an unprecedented level of state intervention in 
labour relations in Belgium and Britain, employers considered or even tried to throw into question 
the primary role of trade unions in the labour market and in the workplace: their contribution to 
legitimate industrial governance ( cf. Garbarino 1984: 40). 
Trying to resolve problems of economic restructuring at the expense of established institutional 
arrangements took the form of excluding the labour confederations at the national and intermediary 
levels during the HanseDne experiments in Belgium. In Britain, the approach was more sophistica-
ted. Using the second round of working time negotiations as a vehicle, employers in the engineer-
ing industry sought to introduce new rules and practices for fum -level bargaining which would 
have considerably curtailed the representational pluralism of unions. In France, the rapidly degene-
rating state of unionism during the Socialists' tenure in government provided numerous members of 
the patronat with incentives to ask why the CNPF should further recognise the five labour confede-
rations, in particular the COT and the CFDT, as representative and therefore legitimate collective 
bargaining org~ons. 
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The Role of State Politics 
Because small states like Belgium are dependent on developments and structural constraints in world 
markets which are beyond their control, they have invested considerable energy to framing their 
political and economic responses through consociational institutions. As seen in chapter III, the 
openness and vulnerability of its economy was a core reason to establish an extensive network of 
consultative institutions between 1945 and 1965. However, in the face of the evolving economic 
recession and growing labour market problems, the multi -dimensional arrangement proved unable 
to produce a commonly shared reading of the crisis. In the absence of such an understanding, none 
of the numerous Belgian Governments during 1974 and 1982 could provide policy alternatives to 
the economic and institutional crisis which had the endorsement of the other industrial relations 
actors. 
The peculiar double structure of politicised, but linguistically and ethnically diverging, regional 
interest organisations in the Belgian system of labour relations further hindered the advancement of 
a consensual approach to the unfolding employment crisis. While it has to be kept in mind that the 
territorial tensions between French and Dutch- speaking citizens did not derive from the problems 
of economic ~~sion and rising unemployment, they nevertheless proved to be a political catalyst 
that considerably hindered a possible cure on grounds of a consensual modus operandi. In other 
words, the mutual differences between both regions contributed to the "flowing together of socio-
economic and communitarian cleavages" (cf. Deweerdt and Smits 1982: 265). 
With the objective of recasting the institutional pattern of Belgian policy- making, and linking 
industrial relations to economic and political prerogatives, statutory regulation initiated a series of 
conflicts with the two sides of industry from 1982 onwards. The Belgian example thus highlights 
how a Christian Democrat -Liberal coalition government tried to overcome the ever -deepening 
crisis of 'govemability' through statutory regulation and the transformation of institutional arrange-
ments in collective bargaining. Subsequently, government directives repeatedly formed the agenda of 
collective bargaining, shaped the scope and depth of negotiable issues and determined the appropri-
ate levels of bargaining between unions and employers. 
In political terms, the active promotion of macro-economic redistribution in favour of capital 
incomes forced the unions into cooperation with the government's incomes policies. The strategic 
importance of incomes policies, and the disciplinary effect which could be attained through statutory 
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norm- setting was reflected in the (i) devaluation of the Belgian Franc in 1982, (ii) the interruption 
of automatic wage indexation for two years, (iii) and the Operation 5-3-3 which combined 
involuntary wage moderation -yvith the reduction of the working week. 
The French example points to a set of particularities of state- induced labour market policies 
that are expected to perform in the short-run. Properties of the policy process, such as institutional 
deficits in the industrial relations arena and implementation shortcomings resulting from shortcom-
ings in policy coordination with a view to a clear goal, were obviously miscalculated during the 
initial period of the Socialist's tenure in government. What is more, by introducing a package of 
active labour market policies and redistributive welfare programmes whilst attempting to stimulate 
domestic growth against a background of slower growth and other macro-economic policy priori-
ties abroad, the French situation of 1981/82 proved to be a unilateral endeavour in Western Europe. 
This exceptional position only underscored the need for an adequate base of support for policy 
implementation within the industrial relations system. 
As shown, the institutional and economic problems did not put the government in a position of 
defending its initial commitment of socialisme a Ja fran9aise in general, and the 35-hour week in 
particular. The limits of national economic policies and isolated redistributive labour market strate-
gies placed the state in a situation of being out of step with its major trading partners. The learning 
experience proffered by this situation reinforced the conclusion drawn by Rueschemeyer and Evans 
(1985: 62) that "even in countries where the state appears to be in the strongest position relative to 
private capital ... the state remains dependent on private capital, foreign and domestic, not only to 
promote accumulation but also to produce a surplus in which the state itself may share." 
Finally, the spectre of who might or does hold the seat of government ·loomed large on the 
French industrial relations tapestry, both unions and patronat always keeping an eye to the existing 
and potential incumbents of government. The power accorded to the executive, and to the President 
as its leader, plus the weak institutionalisation of the industrial relations system are the keys to this 
political dependence in France. This situation continues to the present day. Because industrial 
relations actors mainly depend on their respective positions in the so-called rapport de force, 
collective bargaining in France remains conflict- prone within as well as between the relevant 
labour market actors. 
But still, we need to shed more light on the question of why the Socialist Government failed to 
gain the support of labour market organisations for external purposes? The Mitterrand Government 
undertook a tacit initiative of tripartism in 1981 -1982 driven by the objective to seek organisatio-
nal support for policy implementation. But its degree of formalisation was limited and the initiative 
concentrated on a specific field of policies, in particular work sharing. The initiative quickly faced 
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the twin problems of competing union leaders with limited authority over the rank- and- file, and 
employers whose reluctance to cooperate originated from the rejection of various policy measu-
res and the means sought by Mitterrand to implement these. 
What emerges from our empirical findings in chapter IV is that collective bargaining organisa-
tions were appreciated by the early Mitterrand Government for their instrumental capacity to act as 
promoters of reform. Yet, the Socialists ignored specific characteristics of the respective organisa-
tions and underestimated the pervasive self -interests of unions and employers' associations, in 
particular with regard to the interests of their members. Otherwise, if not pressed by a national 
crisis like in May 1968, the French state focused on statutory intervention in various policy fields 
and did little to change the widely unregulated character of labour relations. 
In Britain, the Thatcher Government tried to recast the institutional design of politics in favour 
of the problem-solving capacity of government institutions (the state as a legislator) and the 
decentralised self -regulation of market forces. In both cases fundamental changes in the law and 
standard operating practices of industrial relations became politically feasible after the government 
had converted to monetarism and no longer depended as much on union cooperation, e.g. voluntary 
wage restraint, as its Keynesian predecessors had. In consequence, the negative external effect of 
inexorably rising mass- unemployment was primarily attributed to the irresponsibilities of indus-
trial relations actors, in particular trade union incomes strategies. Nevertheless, an impervious 
attitude towards dramatically rising unemployment and shifting the blame to irresponsible industrial 
relations actors did not blight re-election chances. 
The British industrial relations context further entailed that the individual strength of unions had 
to be taken into consideration as a potentially inflationary force that a government could not ignore 
as long as it was committed to full-employment policies. In consequence, the last Labour Govern-
ment in Britain acknowledged this force by seeking to integrate labour confederations into the 
decision -making process of economic and social affairs. The Social Contract was the most promi-
nent evidence for this approach. By contrast, the Thatcher Government used the fear of mass-
unemployment, market based strategies and unprecedented industrial relations legislation to curb 
union power, in particular in the political arena. 
It is thus tempting to conclude that governments can be strong in their capacity to intervene, i.e. 
they have at their disposal numerous instruments of regulation that differ in scope and content. The 
long arm of the state is ever-present as the strength of French etatism, Belgian statutory interven-
tion in collective bargaining during 1982 -1986 and the Thatcher decade between 1979 and 1989 in 
Britain testify. The state may not sit around the bargaining table but its ghost stalks the chamber. In 
France, more than in Britain and Belgium, the state played the leading role in shaping the industrial 
I 
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relations context and was the most active protagonist in the administration of labour market policies. 
A long tradition of interventionist policies frequently shaped and predetermined the options. In the 
event of no agreement the pos~ibility of state fiat was ever present. 
The conclusion over institutional variation of state intervention into the labour market and the 
arrangement of industrial relations can be extended. Just when the Thatcher Government in Britain 
and the Martens V coalition in Belgium were fll1llly repudiating a macro-economic strategy built 
around Keynesianism since the Second World War, the Mitterrand Government in France opted to 
introduce an isolated reflation programme that featured all the ingredients of Keynesian economic 
policy-making. The French experience is also unique (in relation to the Belgian and British cases) 
regarding the absence of any explicit forms of tripartism. Whereas the implementation of the Social 
Contract illustrated the problems of getting such institutional arrangements off the ground in Britain, 
the Belgian case exemplified before the U- turn in 1982 a high degree of institutionalised co-ordi-
nation between the state and the two sides of industry. 
While au three trajectories entailed intervention in the respective economies, important differen-
ces in technique, scope and content were apparent. Emerging in Britain was unilateral state action. 
Recasting industrial relations and advancing the rationalisation of the economy were directly enfor-
ced by the state. Belgium occupies a middle position in that the Centre-Right Government first 
combined statutory intervention with bargaining between the government and the two sides of 
industry. By contrast, the French socialist experiment actively sought to promote consensual approa-
ches and regarded the labour market organisations as relay stations2 for the implementation of re-
form policies, only to turn to unilateral intervention once it became apparent that an adequate base 
of support could not be established. 
Still, differences in techniques and objectives of state intervention may yield similarities of 
outcomes. What then emerges is a central feature of contemporary state politics in conditions of 
sustained labour market problems. It rests in the fact that the most extensive advances in working 
time policies which have taken place in the 1980s in both Belgium and France stemmed neither 
from the operation of market forces, nor the successful orchestrating of collective bargaining institu-
tions. Rather, the advances derived most directly from measures initiated by the state. Yet, the 
contrast between the approach .ofthe Martens Government, exemplified by the Operation S-3-3 
and the Hanseime Experiments, and that of the French Socialists, mirrored by the introduction of 
the 39-hour week and the Delebarre law, is most distinctive. 
2) I owe this term to Claus Offe who 'relayed' it to me in a personal conversation. 
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Distinguishing in this way different forms and objectives of state intervention amidst diverging 
institutional arrangements of industrial relations has important implications for a central topic in our 
analysis: whether state intervention is conducive to or imperils the efficient operation of labour 
market policies. As shown, this will depend - inter alia - on the institutional setting of the state, 
its enforcement capacities and the degree of organisational support it can muster for its policies. 
While the latter concerns the internal strength of unions and employers' associations vis-a- vis 
their membership, the former two parameters inhere in contemporary politics and legacies of action 
on the part of state institutions. 
Having elaborated on various sub- fields of labour market policies that repeatedly surfaced in 
the dynamics of the policy process, we are now in a position to return to our initial question 
concerning the transformation of work sharing strategies into measures enhancing temporal flexibili-
ty. Any attribution of causal primacy to this convergent end in the three countries cannot single out 
one core reason. Since the process by which they arrived at this outcome is different in Belgium, 
France and Britain, the underlying explanans calls on a combination of factors. This is where an 
analysis of the relationship between labour market institutions and actor constellations becomes 
decisive. 
4. Why \Labour Market Policies Change Course 
Empirically we have observed in the preceding chapters that in France and Belgium the objective of 
reducing working time was pushed out to the sidelines following the first step towards the 35-hour 
week objective. In Britain a second hours round formed part of the bargaining agenda in engineer-
ing but any progress towards its effective implementation proved unattainable. While shorter hours 
did not make any further headway in the three countries, they demonstrated that the flexibilisation 
of working time became the new order of the day on the industrial relations agenda. 
To explain such adaptation as ·the result of unfavourable political circumstances or by blaming 
the adversary at the bargaining table would appear short-sighted. Instead, we may recall that 
policy adaptation was linked to labour market actors interpreting contextual uncertainties, assessing 
possible trade-off constellations and perceiving the respective performance of policies. We thus 
draw attention to the following questions: which problems and constraints have lead labour market 
actors in Belgium, France and Britain to refrain from lending further support to work sharing 
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strategies? and secondly, what kind of adaptation strategies did the respective actors introduce in 
light of the problems surfacing in each country?3 
Contextual Uncertainty 
The degree of unpredictability involved in work sharing greatly complicated the task of labour 
market actors. Any policy focused on the objective of labour market performance had to be tenta-
tive with regard to its operational guidelines. All three country cases suggest that the announcement 
of policy objectives can be a double-edged phenomenon, in particular if objectives are pursued 
which are not under the control of those announcing them. The French experience between 1981 
and 1983 is a particularly instructive example of the problems that can arise with an explicit com-
mitment to a-policy, working time reduction, and the objective, reducing unemployment. 
Within the policy itself contextual uncertainty relates to (i) the amount of reduction, (ii) the 
degree of wage compensation and (ill) implementation procedures. As regards the performance of 
the policy uncertainty hinged on (i) business strategies of employers, (ii) the overall economic 
impact, (ill) the effects on organisational links between the industrial relations actors, (iv) the 
autonomy of individual ftrm.s, (v) the mosaic of preferences within the workforce and (vi) employ-
ment effects. Indeed, the only element that could probably be anticipated in advance was that there 
would be uncertainty about future consequences and unforeseen contingencies! 
Note further that identifying unemployment as an object of public policy can lead to an intri-
guing situation which surfaced more or less clearly in each of the countries under consideration: the 
demand and search for labour market policies might rise faster than the actual supply of adequate 
programmes which are capable of dealing with the nature of the crisis. Hence, existing capacities to 
carry out a range of labour market policies influenced industrial relations actors' choice of policies. 
Moreover, resdistributional labour market policies could be politically desirable but this says 
next to nothing about their likely performance. In other words, as the French and Belgian experien-
ces at the beginning of the 1980s testify, the desirability of a policy was not a guarantee for its 
(later) success, let alone its economic rationality. Dissent over labour market policies often derived 
3) These remarks are made with the beneftt of hindsight. What seems clearer today was 
strongly coloured by its own time and place a decade earlier. 
201 
from conflicts over yardsticks to be applied. Should a government endorse an economically dubious 
and uncertain, but politically desirable, policy? The Mitterrand example of 1981 - 83 testified to 
this. Vice versa, the decision making process lost none of its unresolved consensus problems. Thus, 
we have to take into consideration that political desirability can be subject to repeated controversies 
within the industrial relations system, and must therefore allow for the possibility of necessary 
adjustments that characterised the policy process in all three countries. 
But the diversity of contextual uncertainty cannot be held responsible for everything. Whereas 
differences in degree of uncertainty existed between the three countries, they cannot alone account 
for policy modification. Our findings rather suggest that the line of argumentation has to be expan-
ded to the complex of factors focusing on particularities of Belgium, France and Britain. 
How Sustainable are Labour Market Policies? 
In order to achieve a clearer picture of policy adaptation we need to explore in more detail cause 
and effect. The notion of the sustainability of redistributive labour market policies can provide some 
additional stepping stones for our understanding of policy adaptation. Recognising the unsustainabili-
ty of a policy, and the way such recognition influences subsequent policy choices, has been given 
extended ~ntion in the Belgian and French chapters of this study. In both cases action was taken 
because governments were faced with a set of indicators that called for swift and thorough policy 
adjustments. Hence, policy modification in Belgium and France has to be put in a broader context. 
From a political point of view, the decision to make a U- turn was seldom chosen on purely 
domestic grounds. Mounting external pressure could and did act as a trigger for and fuelled the 
legitimacy of policy modification. 
In the economic literature, the problem of sustainability is defmed as a situation in which a 
given course of policy encounters difficulties. The emergence of such a crisis situation is reflected 
in both the accumulated evidence and the interpretations of labour market actors that the chosen 
course of a policy has become unsustainable. In consequence, policy makers have the choice 
between termination of the policy, goal displacement or a switch of priorities ( cf. March and Simon 
1958: 150-158; OECD 1988). 
In Belgium, the objective of restoring the internal balance of the economy and halting the 
erosion of institutional arrangements subsequently affected the formulation and modes of implemen-
ting labour market policies. In contrast to the interventionist approach taken with the S-3-3 
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formula, the Hansenne working time experiments aimed at an active deregulation policy. The effects 
of this modification on the further course of Belgian working time policies mainly concerned a 
switch from work sharing aspj.rations to flexibility objectives. By and large, the working time 
experiments implied dismantling barriers in labour law, and thereby increasing the general adapta-
tion capacity of Belgian firms. 
Seen from the perspective of the labour confederations, the intervention of the Martens Govern-
ment in industrial relations affairs increasingly threatened to deprive the unions of their essential 
legitimacy: industrial governance. In contrast to employers who can react to repeated statutory 
regulation by drawing on the resources of autonomous decision making at the plant level, unions do 
not have such an alternative at their disposal. The consequences of this disparity were reflected in 
the Catholic and Socialist labour confederations' willingness to engage in considerable policy 
concessions, if only the further limitation of collective bargaining could be brought to a revision. 
The labour confederations' willingness to make such concessions illustrated how profoundly the 
exchange relations between the state, capital and labour were being transformed to the detriment of 
the latter. What happened in Belgian industrial relations between 1982 - 1986 "constitutes an 
out-and-out shift of power" (cf. Spineux. 1990: 50). 
Faced with a review of strategies, the Belgian unions are gradually acknowledging new, mainly 
qualitative issues in a context of change and discontinuity. Engaged in such a critical reflection of 
their bargaining priorities during the past decade, the trade union position can be characterized as 
an adaptation to circumstances and pragmatism. This endeavour entails the search for credible 
alternatives and a response to the extension of precarious, non-standardized forms of employment 
in the Belgian labour market. In doing so, defending and recasting the principles of concertation 
and autonomous decision making has advanced a spirit of 'new realism' in Belgian industrial rela-
tions. 
The French case is flrSt and foremost a striking example of where unilateral attempts can lead a 
government committed to active labour market policies and redistributional welfare programmes. 
From the viewpoint of the French Socialists, the 1981 -1983 episode constituted an acute dilemma 
caused by goals and policies which were implemented in isolation. The experience also provided 
disillusioning evidence regarding the imposition of limits on government's freedom of action through 
international interdependence and international institutions (cf. OECD 1988: 56-64). The manifest 
shift of policy priorities waved goodbye to Socialisme a la Fran~aise undertaken in mid -1981. 
Thus, the Mitterrand experiment between 1981 and 1983 "ended in largely the same type of 
balance of payments problems, political retreat and ideological demoralisation as half a century 
earlier the 1936 Blum Government" (cf. Tberborn 1987: 280). 
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The need to step back into line entailed, inter alia, the redirection of working time policies. The 
U- turn in 1983 illustrated that working time policy was henceforth treated as a strategy to enhance 
the operation of market forces. Thus, _establishing new style trade-off constellations and refraining 
from a uniform standardisation of working (time) conditions represented the central components of a 
decade -long policy debate. 
But it would be short sighted to blame monetary and other macro-economic factors alone for 
the turnabout. Institutional variables and the contingencies of strategic decisions by, and interactions 
of, collective actors and, thus, the possibility of a different outcome, help to explain the remarkable 
U- turn of the French socialists. The acknow!¢gement of domestic and foreign economic con-
straints which the government encountered in 1982 - 1983 was not only dependent on monetary 
considerations, but also subject to an (implicit) defmition of politically tolerable risks and costs. 
Such an analysis of the policy shift calls attention to the role of collective bargaining organisations, 
in particular their capacity to internalise macro-economic parameters such as inflation through a 
policy of voluntary wage moderation. 
In a similar vein, the analysis of the French case illustrates that the state- induced politics of 
working time reduction lacked the institutional support needed to translate a generic formula into a 
concrete programme. This translation is shaped by collective bargaining organisations that work as 
ftlters for the implementation of redistributive labour market policies. But the high hopes for institu-
tional chans,e orchestrated by the French Government in 1981/82 foundered in the face of (i) 
economic constraints, (ii) the inability of labour market actors to respond to the fragmentation of 
collective interests within and between their organisations, and (iii) the institutional immobility in the 
industrial relations arena. Under these circumstances a multi- year scheme on shorter basic hours 
became subject to considerable adaptation pressure and was eventually pushed to the sidelines 
altogether. 
But can we analyse the British case through the lens of sustainability? The focus, in my view, is 
too partial and incomplete. What needs specific attention regarding the British experience is the 
interplay between the profound revision of macro-economic policy priorities, legal intervention in 
unions' collective bargaining capacities and the degree of discretion that actors at the shop floor 
have at their disposal. In particular the influence of the shop stewards at this regulatory level 
accounts for the central difference between the British on the one hand and the Belgian as well as 
the French systems of industrial relations on the other. We can thus enlarge the focus of inquiry on 
policy modification from contextual uncertainty and the (un- )sustainability of policies to embrace 
the dynamic of institutional arrangements in the labour market. 
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Using the fear of IIUISS- unemployment proved -to be a major weapon for placing the idea of 
flexibility on the agenda of collective bargaining in Britain. The search for greater flexibility in 
working practices and its combipation with a revision of routinised patterns of interest representation 
was profoundly influenced by the socio-economic costs of the British recession between 1980 and 
1984. The possibility of being touched by unemployment exposed employees and union repre-
sentatives to a predicament which subsequently shaped their perceptions of collective bargaining 
priorities. The same disciplinary effects hold for the Belgian case. But the parallels do not end here. 
Repeated statutory intervention in the industrial relations system by the Thatcher and Martens 
Governments further paved the way. With the political marginalisation of the unions, labour organi-
sations' bargaining power on a variety of issues was significantly curtailed in Britain and Belgium. 
Arguably, the lesson learnt at the f1I111 level about the costs of austerity and the adverse consequen-
ces of directly repudiating central negotiations had a greater impact on the collective actors than 
what could have been achieved by legislation alone. 
Returning to the British example, the TUC's Campaign for reduced working time increasingly 
lost momentum the more the 39-hour week was becoming the new standard. What is more, the 
lack of impetus was also influenced by the inability of the labour confederation to successfully 
confront the shop-steward level with the overtime problem. The drama of the British labour 
market evolution during the staged implementation of shorter hours further discredited the policy. 
The general lack of success in terms of labour market outcomes may primarily be attributed to 
the structural irresponsibility of the f1I111 level bargaining system. While the TUC campaign reported 
increasing rates of settlement, the pattern of agenda- setting at the local level was decided by other 
rationalities and bargaining routines. Within a fragmented, competitive and decentralised bargaining 
arrangement, the length of the implementation chain frottl top to bottom was systematically underes-
timated by national industry negotiators. 
Regarding the possibility of a second hours round we observed a complex enlargement of the 
bargaining agenda. In Britain this enlargement was primarily due to initiatives on the part of the 
employers. By contrast, the Belgian case mirrors the degree of state monitored issue enlargement, as 
became apparent in the 5-3-3 exchange model and the Hansenne experiments. France holds a 
middle position in that employers sought to re-define the agenda of inter -industry bargaining on 
working hours. But in doing so, they were widely encouraged by the modernisation concept that the 
Fabius Government introduced in 1983/84. 
In general, working time reduction was linked to wide-ranging flexibility concessions, cuts in 
job demarcation, the rationalisation of bargaining arrangements and the revision of employment 
provisions. The employers' onslaught combined enlarged labour flexibility with new-style agree-
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ments that included an emphasis on consensual style bargaining, in the French case labelled "don-
nant-donnant". As shown in chap V, it was the latter demand which increasingly assumed centre 
stage in the British negotiations and ultimately contributed to a failure of the negotiations. Seen 
from this perspective, the rationalisation of collective bargaining procedures and sustained flexibility 
provisions formed part of an industrial relations package unprecedented in negotiations at the 
national level in Belgium, France and Britain. 
In light of considerations such as these most unions perceino agreement on shorter hours the 
lesser evil to a compromise which either (i) risked to curtail the representative pluralism at the flrm 
level, as was the case in Britain, (ii) or eroded intra-union consensus formation like in France, 
reflected in the 1984 syndrom. Pushing the claim out to the sidelines and instead accepting flexibili-
ty provisions which were not burdened by trade-offs related to the design of industrial relations 
was less conflictual than pressing further a high-risk strategy of shorter hours at the national level. 
The acceptance of flexibility deals limited in scope and content was also enhanced through the fact 
that, in terms of wage bargaining on the shop- floor level, engineering unions were making consi-
derable headway since the mid-eighties (cf. Marsh 1992: 205, 207). 
Finally, the employers' focus on wide- ranging flexibility concessions and the unions' attempt to 
provide a comprehensive blueprint on flexibility were both guided by the extensive transformations 
of the labour markets in the three countries during the 1980s. As shown, various forms of non-
standard employment increasingly lost their exceptional character. With the flexible labour force 
growing to~ sizeable one-third of the workforce as in Britain, which constitutes the front-runner 
of our country sample, any industrial relations actors .ignoring such a tidal wave of change would 
risk isolation in collective bargaining and interest representation. 
Responding to the challenge of labour market flexibility has thus assumed centre stage in 
Belgian, French and British labour relations. While companies are - often - quietly introducing 
many changes in working conditions without cutting the working week, the unions are seeking 
appropriate trade-offs and have singled out pay bargaining as well as shorter hours. In that 
respect, the issue of working time reduction has undergone a profound transformation as regards its 
objectives and justifications. 
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I .inking the Facets of Policy Modification 
The interpretive utility of seeing policy modification as caused by a mosaic of qualifiers allows us to 
refocus the analysis in several ways. Looked at through the lens of contextual uncertainty, we may 
see policy adaptation as the result of a core problem that bedeviled sustained unemployment in 
Belgium, France and Britain: it tended to create political and social circumstances under which it 
became increasingly difficult for the industrial relations actors to confront the crisis in a promising 
manner. 
Seen through the lens of sustainability, domestic and international economic constraints come to 
view as well as institutional rigidities which tended to create a policy dilemma up to the point where 
a dramatic policy U -turn became inevitable. The lens of labour market institutions can clarify 
organisational resources of industrial relations actors and elucidate how policy making is shaped by 
the interaction of structure and agency. Neither of the lenses is complete without the other to bring 
into focus the different facets of policy modification. 
The overall claim then is that at a micro -level transformations are shaped by institutional 
rigidities that derive from organisations' interest to maintain their equilibrium. It is because of such 
tendencies that labour market actors are not to be viewed exclusively as means for achieving 
specified ends, but simultaneously as ends in themselves (cf. Scott 1992: 52). At the macro-level, 
what is (un- )sustainable can depend as much on what is happening abroad as what occurs in the 
domestic organisational interplay between the state, employers' associations and trade unions. At the 
end of the day we are left with the conclusion that the architecture of politics is a continuing 
process of structuration in which labour market actors are embroiled in the complexity of constraints 
and opportunities. 
It is here that our convergence hypothesis needs reconsideration. Conceptualized in dynamic 
terms, different processes could be observed in the three countries: for instance, what is predomi-
nant in the Belgian case is that capital-labour bargaining was forced to conform to policy goals 
and modes of policy making taken by an external actor, the state. In Britain, coercive effects were 
also at work. But pushing the idea of temporal flexibility on the bargaining agenda was equally 
fuelled by the recognition of learning about the problems of working time policies, not least 
deriving from the significant transformations in the British labour market during the eighties. 
Finally, the French example illustrates how the government's labour market policies were increa-
singly driven by the need to avoid unnecessary discrepancies, to mitigate unintended consequences 
of domestic policy, in a word, to step back into line. 
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Divergence in the political processes by which Belgium, France and Britain reached similar 
outcomes leads us the acknowledgement of institutional forces endogenous to the industrial relations 
systems. Within this context, institutions governing the decision making process of labour market 
actors can be understood as normative arrangements with lasting effects on the patterns of social 
relations. Hence, a particular institutional setting may effectively influence the policy choices of 
collective actors. The matrix of incentives and constraints that a network of institutions displays are 
fundamental to our understanding of the adoption, implementation and evaluation of labour market 
policies. The dual nature of institutions thus creates opportunities and places constraints on gover-
nance and politics. 
Institutions affect the way labour market actors interpret unemployment and arrive at policies 
which pertain to focus on its solution. They provide actors with resources for policy implementation 
and regulate the use of resources. More broadly speaking, institutions defme the "formal rules, 
compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between 
individuals in various units of the polity and economy,. (cf. Hall1986: 19). Seen from this perspec-
tive, institutions have a bearing on the costs and benefits as well as the trade -off texture and the 
interactions of organisations involved in the implementation of labour market policies. 
If I am correct in assuming that institutional dynamics shape the process of policy modification, 
then the fmal question is, what are the qualifying conditions that can encourage the refinement of 
policy instruments within organisations? At this stage, it goes beyond the scope of our analysis to 
outline the\ conditions in detail. Rather what needs specification is what such a refinement should 
accomplish in the firSt place. All the more when considering that a deceptive but profound learning 
experience deriving from our analysis entails that the effective means of ameliorating the employ-
ment crisis were either beyond the reach of strategies implemented by the labour market actors, or 
involved costs and sacrifices that these were unable to bear. 
Within this dynamic context, organisational learning calls to attention self -regulatory capacities 
of organisations. This capacity includes that collective organisations not only seek to forward their 
respective goals, but also put greater emphasis on external, long-term effects of their actions. The 
introduction of organisational procedures capable of enhancing such properties could take the shape 
of a 'Richter-scale' which indicates to organisations the consequences of their policies more 
rapidly. Such a policy barometer can be understood as a cognitive extension of the organisation's 
perceptive horizon, and thus gradually contribute to organisational learning. 
While such a tentative project would allow for organisational self-regulation, it avoids the 
contemporary fashion of a free- for- all deregulation. But given the constraints under which labour 
market actors were typically operating during the 1970-1980s, there can be .no guarantee that such 
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an indicator is capable of significantly changing the process of policy making. Moreover, there is 
no royal road to more effective policy surveillance. The different stages in the policy process need 
as much attention as defining tpe scope for feasible improvements. 
Still, the contours of such a learning process depend essentially on what March and Olsen 
(1989) have termed "the search for appropriate institutions." To be effective, the design of appro-
priate institutions must recognise two qualitative criteria: (i) taking the view of the other(s) into 
consideration, for instance learning from other organisations, and (ii) the capacity to be prospective, 
i.e. reasonably future concerned. The persistence of labour market problems and conflicts over their 
resolution have become a permanent feature of contemporary Western European societies. Because 
organisational innovation as well as institutional rigidities will continue to conflict in the face of 
such pressing problems, the search for a new architecture in the development of labour market 
policies continues. 
All the more when bearing in mind that the labour market developments in the three countries 
under conSideration exemplify the process of progressive decline of a post- war policy principle: 
full-employment. Those who have warned that a sustained labour market crisis would wreck the 
economy and impair domestic social cohesion have been discounted as Cassandras. Regarding both 
the increased prominence of non-standard forms of work and the gradual spreading of non-
employment in Britain, France and Belgium (cf. Balls 1992: 11), the post-war definition of 
full- employment as a target in which virtually everyone who wants a permanent job can obtain 
one becomes increasingly doubtful. With employment flexibility acquiring a new aura of legitimacy, 
the priority given to the full-time worker, who is male, skilled, blue-collar and between 30 and 
45 years of age, can no longer withstand uncontested scrutiny (cf. Lane 1989: 583). The persistent 
labour market crisis during the past 15 years underlines that the nature of exchanging time for 
money and a standard employment contract are being fundamentally transformed. 
The Future of the Working Time Debate 
We are thus left with the formidable task of reconsidering the scope and content of the exchange 
relation. Such a task cannot be undertaken in detail at this point. Policy recommendations in compa-
rative research are always subject to the criticism that proposals generated from one country could 
not possibly work in another. Comparative researchers know only too vividly that no two or even 
three countries are the same, and that the exportation of policies, let alone .institutions4, is hazar-
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dous. But comparative work can bring a wider range of options to view. In this regard, I shall 
discuss a number of policy alternatives in different areas. 
In the interest of brevity, we can begin to identify some necessary parameters for such an 
enterprise. Any answer has to bear in mind the interrelation between flexibility concepts and indus-
trial relations reform. The arrangement of industrial relations are co- directing the very nature of 
the trajectory. Accumulating the capacity necessary for weathering such challenges thus calls for an 
institutional design capable of embodying and policing strategic prudence opposed to particularistic 
temptations. Strategy- induced bargaining entails a sequence of steps and regards processes as 
malleable. They can therefore be re-designed and re-directed. Thus placing collective bargaining 
priorities under the reservation of potential revisions seeks to establish arrangements in a manner 
that it creates more, than it hinders, decision making possibilities. 
Such a system incorporates cooperation and productive discomfort within and between the actors 
involved. In that respect, one of the main issues resurfacing in current industrial relations is where 
the respective labour market actors organise the institutional conditions and social sources of obliga-
tions that can transform a zero-sum game into positive-sum solutions. With regard to the central 
topic in this analysis - working time policies - the dichotomy of risks and chances deriving from 
such strategic behaviour implies both a lesson and an alternative trajectory. 
While work sharing proved to be inherently random as concerns its outcome, innovative 
working time policies can effectively be introduced the more constructive and original solutions are 
sought. Besldes, the demand cannot be isolated from other problem fields of the labour market in 
general, and the individual sector or frrm in particular. As White (1987: 22) claims, "the develop-
ment of more predictable results depends upon employers and trade unions [to] agree to enlarge the 
scope of their agreements and hence to bring more elements of the problem under their joint 
control." 
In order to confront these different transformations, industrial relations actors face the task of 
engaging in complex bargaining across issue -areas. This necessitates discretionary control over a 
wide range of resources. But extracting a level of resources equal to this challenge from the present 
arrangement of industrial relations systems in Belgium, France and Britain remains a conundrum. 
The described shift from the national level as the key arena of regulation to more frrm -based 
institutions underscores the argument. As a result of state- induced decentralisation in Belgium and 
4) Our analysis must leave open the question of the 'exportability' of labour market institu-
tions, and rather assess specific policies which·can succeed in particular institutional environments. 
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France, whereas in Britain the local level has traditionally assumed priority over the national level, 
the structure of labour relations has rendered the fmn actors a new and more important role ( cf. 
Hancke 1991: 466; Segrestin 1990: 97). 
This challenge is amplified by developments, in particular in France, where the idea of a union 
is becoming less and less acceptable within the workforce. As shown in chapter IV, organised 
labour is incomprehensible to many of these. The question of union survival is at the heart of 
contemporary French labour debates, and is receiving increasing attention in Britain through union 
mergers. By contrast, the Belgian case illustrates a remarkably high level of union density through-
out the eighties. This difference is strongly influenced by the operational logic of the national public 
unemployment system. In Belgium unemployment benefits are partly paid out by the approved trade 
unions (cf . .Berghman et al. 1987: 776; Rothstein 1991: 10). 
What implications do these fmdings have for the original initiative of enhancing labour market 
effects via the trajectory of cutting standard weekly working hours? As shown in the empirical parts 
of this study, measures aimed at reducing basic working hours were at the heart of debates about 
labour market policies during the past decade. By contrast, the focal point of current debates rests 
on defming organisational features of working time. Achieving temporal flexibility is the order of 
the day, and reduced basic hours are being considered as a possible trade-off element in collective 
bargaining. This suggests that the notion of enlarged flexibility options in working time organisation 
has gradually been accepted by the unions. However, their commitment to enhance flexibility in the 
areas of (i) working conditions, (ii) job profiles, (iii) rationalisation of bargaining procedures, (iv) 
and new-style pay systems constitute the controversial compromise dimensions. In short, distribu-
tional objectives have been replaced by concerns over the allocation of time and its influence on 
revised working practices. 
Within this context, flexible production patterns and working conditions as well as new -style 
bargaining procedures constitute transformations that touch base with trends in individualized 
employment conditions, multi- skilling and moves toward greater employment mobility. These 
developments in the Belgian, French and British labour markets not only bring new issues on the 
collective bargaining agenda, but also demand conceptual answers that invariably call to atten-
tion the strategies to be adopted in the future. Measures to improve the flexibility of industrial 
relations thus merit a place on the political agenda of the 1990s. This is a large and uncharted 
subject. In short, there are numerous questions still searching for answers. The discussion must be 
regarded as a preliminary reconnaissance rather than an exhaustive mapping. 
The demands on the agenda of collective bargaining and industrial policy during the 1990s 
include dismantling of labour market regulations, performance related pay systems, access to 
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training and qualifications, just- in- time production and breaking through demarcation lines of the 
working day and the five-day working week. The hours component in this menu· of options 
focuses on (i) weekend working, (ii) annualized hours schemes, (iii) round-the-clock working 
schedules and (iv) non-standard working time schemes. In short, temporal flexibility is used as a 
vehicle for changes in manpower policies. 
Furthermore, a noticeable feature of the 1990/91 bargaining year in Britain was the move 
towards longer basic working hours in different sectors. Initiatives to increase working time as part 
of a sustained push for more flexible working patterns are at the centre of demands put forward by 
British Coal, and various fl11ll-level agreements ~ve already been reached in banking as well as 
insurance. Union initiatives to re-establish the demand for shorter hours are increasingly being 
opposed by employers which seek to (re- )direct the hours pendulum towards the extension of the 
working day and the working week. This confrontation is not only taking place in Britain but also 
in Germany as the recent discussion on labour market· flexibility has shown (cf. Bastian 1993). 
Setting the terms and conditions for encompassing restructuring measures in production patterns 
and the organisation of work implies that the whole set of collective bargaining standards and 
industrial relations norms is put on the agenda of labour market policies. Given such new bargai-
ning requirements, the relevant labour market actors face the task of reaching exchange formulas 
which in turn demand significant concessions from unions and employers. The blueprint for such a 
comprehensive approach has yet to be fmalised in the field of working time policies. But, as shown 
in the course of this study, there are several indicators for changes developing as well as pressures 
evolving which call for such an undertaking in Belgium,, France and Britain. 
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Financial T~es 
Le Monde 
Liberation 
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The Sunday Times 
Business Week 
Business Week 10 January 1983: "Why the French Shifted to Economic Austerity." pp. 42-45. 
The Economist: 
The Economist 25. July 1987: "Flexible Workers and Unions Tempting Temps." pp. 22-25. 
Financial Times: 
FT 05.02.1987: "UK 'flexible' labour force up 16% in 4 years." 
FT 06.11.1987: "UK engineering unions reject flexibility package." 
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FT 07.11.1987: "Flexibility talks founder in the face of unbending opponents." 
FT 10.12.1988: "Move to develop policies for 1992." 
Le Monde: 
Le Monde 11.07.1980: "Les negociations sur la reduction du temps de travail reprendraient a 
l'automne". 
Le Monde 12.02.1982: "L'application de !'ordonnance sur les trente-neuf heures." 
Le Monde 13.02.1982: "La recommendation pour le maintien du pouvoir d'achat risque d'aggraver 
les relations sociales et les charges des entreprises." 
Le Monde 16.07.1985: "Les distorsions de la 'flex.ibilite'." 
Le Monde 11.12.1987: "Record d'abstentions et chute de la CGC aux. elections prud'homales." 
Le Monde 17.09.1988: "La 'dechirure' de M. Sainjon." 
Le Monde 25.01.1989: "Le rassurant M. Bergeron." 
Le Monde 26.03.1989: "La CFDT se pose en interlocuteur du patronat." 
Le Monde 28.05.1989: "La volonte de renouveau syndical de la CGT est lourdement hypothequee." 
Le Monde 09.01.1990: "L'emploi n'est plus ce qu'il etait." 
Le Monde 03.07.1990: "La reduction du temps de travail, une idee qui refait surface." 
Liberation: 
Liberation 21.11.1985: "Le travail amenage aura sa loi...mais sans foi." 
Liberation 18.06.1992: "La chtlte des adherents de Ia COT." 
DER SPIEGEL: 
SPIEGEL, Vol. 36, No. 8/1982, pp. 121-122: "Frankreich: Erster Schritt." 
SPIEGEL, Vol. 38, No. 37/1984a, pp. 126-127: "Linker Geruch." 
SPIEGEL, Vol. 38, No. 38/1984b, pp. 134-139: "Der Staat darf sich nicht in alles einmischen". 
Spiegel- interview with the French Prime Minister Laurent Fabius. 
The Sunday Times: 
ST 11.04.1976: "Healey gets huge backing from union rank and file." 
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Appendix 
Tabel 1 
List of interview partners in Belgium 
Digit Date Organisation and function of the interviewees 
01 08.06.1988 Confederation des Syndicats Chretiens de Belgique, Research Depart-
ment 
02 10.06.1988 Federation Generate du travail de Belgique, Research Department 
03 07.06.1988 Federation des Entreprises de Belgique, President of the Association 
04 07.06.1988 Universite Catholique de Louvain, Department of Economics, Section 
Economie et Societe (four members of the Department) 
\ 
OS 07.06.1988 University of Liege, former senior advisor to the Secretary of Employ-
ment 
06 06.11.1988 University of Antwerpen, Social and Political Sciences Department 
07 08.07.1988 Ministry of Employment, Department of Work Organisation Regulation 
08 09.06.1988 Ministry of Employment, President of the Department of Work Organi-
sation 
09 09.06.1988 Former Secretary of Employment 
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Appendix 
Tabel 2 
List of interview partners in France 
Digit Date 
01 16.05.1988 
02 18.05.1988 
03 20.05.1988 
04 02.12.1988 
OS 18.05.1988 
06 20.05.1988 
07 17.05.1988 
08 17.05.1988 
Organisation and function of the interviewees 
Conseil National du Patronat Franyais. Collective bargaining representa-
tive 
Confederation Generate du Travail. Collective bargaining representative 
Confederation Fran~aise Democratique du Travail. National official 
Confederation Generale du Travail - Force Ouvriere. Collective 
bargaining representative 
Centre de recherche Travail et Societe, Universite Paris- Dauphine. 
Departmental representative 
Institut Europ6en d'Education et de Politique Sociale, Universite 
Paris -Dauphine. Director of the Institute 
Commissariat au Plan. Industrial relations representative 
Minisrere des Affaires Sociales et de l'Emploi. Sub-director of the 
collective bargaining division 
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Appendix 
Tabel 3 
List of interview partners in Britain 
Digit 
01 
02 
03 
04 
OS 
06 
07 
08 
09 
Date 
27.06.1988 
28.06.1988 
28.06.1988 
29.06.1988 
\ 
29.06.1988 
15.11.1988 
02.07.1988 
30.06.1988 
30.06.1988 
Organisation and function of the interviewees 
Trades Union Congress, Economic Department 
Transport and General Workers Union, National Secretary for Research 
& Education 
Industrial Relations -Review Report, Research Department 
Trade Union Research Union, Ruskin College, Oxford. Collective 
bargaining Department 
Policy Studies Institute, Research Associate 
Templeton College, Oxford Center for Management Studies, Research 
Associate 
University of Bradford, Schools of Industrial Technology, Research 
Associate 
Confederation of British Industry, Collective bargaining Department 
Department of Employment, Director of Employment Affairs 
